

In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

The Center for the Publication of the U.S. Espionage Den's Documents

P.O. BOX: 15815 - 3489

Tehran' Islamic Republic of Iran

Tel: 824005

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In the name of Allah
the Compassionate, the Merciful

In the series of books entitled "U.S. Intervention in Iran" and specially "The Moderates", the policy of the U.S. against the Revolution and its leadership is quite evident. The following is the important excerpt of the cocuments published in the book No. *55,* which illustrates how the issue of Shariatmadari and people related to him was being conducted.

"I (chief of C.I.A station, Tehran) would say, unitl the military recovers, and that is a process we can do almost nothing to affect, what we can do, and, I am now working on, is to identify and prepare to support the potential leader of a coalition of westernized political liberals, moderate religious figures, and (when they begin to emerge) western - oriented military leaders. The most likely catalyst for such a coalition is Ayatollah Shariatmadary."

In response the headquarter of CIA emphasizes that *"our political action goal in Iran would be to promote a government favourable to U.S. interests. To give consideration to Shariatmadary's party as one means of achieving our goal, we must determine its strength and depth."*

"This goal can probably best be attained through the establishment of a moderate popularly supported government which is either led or has the blessing of, the religious community and has the strength to maintain law and order."

With this preface, it becomes clear that, while the U.S. has faced an unexpected defeat in its first attempt and by doing all its efforts and behind the scene manipulation, failed to keep the Shah in power, acted cautiously in connection with the Revolution, and while being regarded as number one suspect and the major threat to the Revolution, shall make every possible effort to refurbish an rehabilitate the lost leverages.

The documents presented in this series indicate that after the victory of Islamic Revolution, those elements who favoured restoration of closer relations with the U.S. officials in every possible way and insisted on the U.S. support for overthrowing the Islamic Republic, where often faced the same and the chiche answer that *"The U.S. does not intend to interfere in the internal policy of Iran."*

The reason was because such elements often lacked the important and basic characteristics required by the U.S.. In other words, they were considered to be aimless and did not enjoy popular support. Proportionate to the moderate and logical position of such

elements in connection with the new situation, the tone of U.S. response also was changing favourably paving the way for U.S. support. Obviously, the Shahs' cronies and the close associates of his regime could not be the axis for the future movements of the U.S. policies. Besides, the ambitious or as the Americans themselves say, the opportunistic objectives of such elements, the U.S. with the intention of espionage and gathering of information, tried to benefit from the accessibility of such elements to the maximum extent. When such information was recognized to be valuable and classified, the person was introduced to CIA and the connection were taking completely an informative shape and the contact would have been selected to be given special espionage trainings.

All these efforts and activities were directed towards the same major objective which was to create a moderate movement.

The following activities are extracted from the following documents.

— Plots and the divisions within the religious leadership.
— Modern intelligence system and the information related to the national security.
— Identifying the middle rank colonels who were to form the nucleus of the future leadership of the army.
— The military and defensive strength* (in connection with the Iraq's attack, against Saudi family, against the U.S.S.R. and in support of Pakistan.)
— Moderates and ways of encountering the provocations of small groups called the unrest of minorities.
— Gathering information in connection with the previous milltary purchases such as submarine from West Germany.

The story about the elements living abroad and claiming to be the nucleus of the opposition was entirely different. These elements had no value for the U.S. in terms of espionage, but the U.S. was interested to be fully informed about the activities of so called exiled groups and also be aware of the reaction of the hosting country against them.

In as much as the U.S. embassy in Tehran evaluated that, they lacked the popular base and support of the people. They also often were exaggerating the U.S. support towards themselves and since there was a possibility that Iranian government's sensitivity be provoked as a result of their activities or cause to undermine the movement of the pro - U.S. supporters who were still holding key positions and were not dismissed from their administrative duties, U.S. was scared to contact such so-called opposition.

The interpretations made in relation to the contemptible character of some of these elements is very interesting. Mean while, some of them such as Manoucher Ganj, who has become the axis of the right wing movement and pro-western activities in the recent years as the hostility of the U.S. against the Islamic Revolution grew wider and more serious. The roots of which should be found in the very same initial contacts and the assessments of the U.S. from the view points of this man. Even after the seizure of U.S. Espionage Den and receiving a new blow, the U.S. benefited from the contribution of elements like Bagheri (the

then airforce commander) in Tabas military attack. In fact in the special situation after revolution, while the issues such as Liberation Movement was, still playing substantial role in the adminestrative affairs, giving new dimensions to the U.S. efforts for regaining its lost interests through the channel different from the previous contacts who were the cronies and associates of the Shah's regime, avoided greatly to be identified as the supporter of those who had no success in the political future of Iran. Nevertheless if the sources of information could be of value to reach the principal objectives, they were advised not to get involved in the so-called "opposition plots". (Syrus Ramtin is one of the examples).

Despite all non-intervention claims of the U.S. in the internal policy of Iran; even the staff working in the political section of the embassy were advancing in their contacts and negotiations with such plots and were ready to negotiate with those who clearly confirmed to be playing roles in the movement of anti revolutionary forces and seeking military actions against the revolutionary government. The joke "non-intervention of the U.S. in the internal policy of Iran" is so stale and ridiculous and is very obvious for those who are familiar with the doucuments of U.S. Espionage Den.

The present series of documents, are classified proportionate to the activities of the persons involved and for each of such documents, necessary explanation is given in the preface. As indicated previously some of these elements were advanced in such a way to have direct contact with the CIA; whereas the others with lesser value were allowed to be in contact with the staff of the State Department only. Surely the esteemed readers will recognize these technical differences.

On conclusion we deem it apropriate for ourselves and all oppressed people of the world who are the lover of the true pure Mohammadian Islam (Islame-Nabe-Mohammadi) to be thankful to almighty Allah for being blessed by such a wise leadership of the Islamic Revolution who is leading this ship to a safe haven through the dreadful tempests of plots every day.

Muslim Students Following
the Line of the Imam
Spring 1989

Name: Hamid Shirazi

Code: S. D. CAT/1

Occupation: Brigadier General in The Air Force

Since the documents indicating the initial contacts have been destroyed, when and how Shirazi contacted the CIA remains in obscurity. Even his name does not appear in any of the existing documents, and only the confessions made by the hostages and further investigations discovered his connection with the CIA.

The existing documents show that in a trip to Hong Kong Hamid Shirazi contacted the Americans and following a series of meetings he accepted to act as an agent for the CIA. Shirazi predicted to get a key position in the Iranian Air Force and for this reason the CIA made every possible effort for his justification and appropriate trainings.

The CIA urged him to collect information and report on the capability of Iran's Air Force, preparedness and availability of warplanes and the pilot's morale, Iran's new Air Defence Systems againsts the possible Iraqi's air attacks and Etc.

(Shirazi stated that as far as current capabilities of the air force and possibly the military establishment were concerned, within a very few days after returning to Iran and talking with his friends in the military he would be able to provide us with an excellent, well informed status report. C/O said he was glad to hear that, but our national planners and policy-makers also had considerable interest in his providing us with plans and intentions on the Iranian military, which he would be able to do on a continuing basis only if he again assumes an active role in the Air Force. Subject said he agreed with that. Document No. 5).

Both sides agreed to maintain regular and active relations in Iran, and if necessary call each other through phonecall and coded mail. However Shirazi failed to communicate with the spies for sometimes after his return to Tehran. While the CIA tried to locate him and find out about his whereabouts, realized that contrary to their predictions, Shirazi was not given a post and retired and for this reason the CIA contacts with him was cut.

As we can remember, debriefing of C/1 indicated no useful access in his status as a retired officer and there is thus no apparent utility in contacting him at this time even if he is interested. Therefore we ignore this one - Document No. 19.

IRQ REQMTS

S E R E T 28 1334Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 503377.

TO: IMMEDIATE TOKYO INFO IMMEDIATE BANGKOK, BERN, HONG KONG.

NIAC TOKYO.

WNIN EL RYBAT AJAJA

SDCA7

REF: TOKYO 8[illegible] 438

1. FOLLOWING ARE REQUIREMENTS REQUESTED BY :

A. WE ARE INTERESTED IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE ON IRANIAN WAR PLANS AGAINST IRAQ. (WE PRESUME THAT WHATEVER PLANS WERE DRAWN UP UNDER THE SHAH ARE STILL CURRENT.) DETAIL THE AIR FORCE'S PLANS FOR AN OFFENSIVE STRIKE AGAINST IRAQ. DETAIL PLANS FOR DEFENSE AGAINST AN IRAQI STRIKE. WOULD THE IRANIANS TRY TO KNOCK OUT THE IRAQI AIR FORCE, THEN THE SAM SYSTEM, THEN SUPPORT IRANIAN GROUND TROOPS? DO ALL THREE ASSUMPTIONS? WHAT SPECIFIC IRAQI TARGETS WOULD HAVE BEEN HIT? WHERE WOULD THE IRANIAN GROUND FORCES MAKE THEIR MAJOR THRUST IN IRAQ? WHAT KIND OF SUPPORT IS AVAILABLE FROM THE AIR FORCE? WHAT KIND OF OPPOSITION DID THE AIR FORCE EXPECT? HOW WAS IT NEUTRALIZED? WHAT WAS THE IRANIAN EVALUATION OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE? DO IRAQI PILOTS MAKE FREQUENT FLIGHTS? DO DIFFICULT TRAINING? DID SUBJECT EVER VISIT IRAQ ON EXCHANGE VISITS (POST 1975)? IF SO COVER IN DETAIL. WHERE DID HE GO? WHAT DID HE OBSERVE? PARTICULAR? IMPRESSIONS? SUBJECT'S EVALUATION OF THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE'S ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THE SHAH'S WAR PLANS. PLANS AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA? TO DEFEND AGAINST THE SOVIETS? TO ASSIST PAKISTAN? BE SURE TO COVER IRANIAN PLANS FOR DEFENSE AGAINST AN IRAQI ATTACK. WHERE WOULD THE RAIDS BE MOST LIKELY TO STRIKE? WITH WHAT? IRANIAN DEFENSES? COUNTERSTRIKE?

B. WHAT IS THE OPERATIONAL READINESS RATE FOR F-14 AIRCRAFT? ARE THE PHOENIX MISSILE SYSTEMS OPERATIONAL? WHAT IS THE OPERATIONAL READINESS RATE FOR F-4 AND F- AIRCRAFT? ARE THE AIR-TO-AIR (SIDEWINDER AND SPARROW) AND AIR-TO-GROUND

2 DIRECTOR 503377 S E C R E T
(ERICK) MISSILES IN GOOD CONDITION?

C. WHAT TYPES OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN USED INST THE KURDS? HOW MANY? WITH WHAT EFFECT? LOSSES? WHAT SED THE LOSSES? MAINTENANCE FAILURES?

D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF ANY MINOR PROBLEMS IN OCHISTAN? DOES THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT ANTICIPATE TROUBLE THIS AREA?

E. WHAT ALTERNATIVES, IF ANY, ARE BEING EXPLORED FOR PARTS AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FROM COUNTRIES OTHER THAN U.S.? (E.G., ITALY, PAKISTAN.)

F. DOES THE AIR FORCE FORESEE A BOTTOMING OUT OF THE R/NORM RATE (NOT OPERATIONALLY READY SUPPLY/NOT OPERATIONALLY AY, MAINTENANCE) FOR F-4, F-5, C-130 AIRCRAFT? IF NOT, WHAT CRES ARE BEING TAKEN TO HALT THE DETERIORATION OF THE RE- ING FLYABLE AIRCRAFT (E.G., STORAGE LIMITED USAGE)?

G. HOW IS THE SPARE PARTS PIPELINE FUNCTIONING FOR E SPARE PARTS AVAILABLE?

H. ARE THERE PLANS TO BRING BACK U.S. AIR FORCE SERS? WHICH IRANIAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS ARGUE IN FAVOR OF NGING BACK U.S. ADVISERS AND WHICH IRANIAN OFFICERS ARE INST THEIR?

I. REQUEST SUBJECT DRAW A LINE AND BLOCK DIAGRAM OF THE AIR FORCE AND HIS ORGANIZATION SHOWING POSITIONS, SENT (OCCUPANT, AND GIVING A FEW COMMENTS ON THE MILITARY FECTIVENESS AND PERSONALITY OF THESE OFFICERS?

J. IS THE HOMOFAR/PILOT CONFLICT BEING RESOLVED? ES REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE INTERFERENCE IN THE AIR FORCE NTINUE?

2. NO FILE RIW 28AUG99 DRV D9C.ALL SECRET.

SECRET
BT
#012

31 AUG

S E C R E T 3100082 AUG 79 STAFF

TE DIRECTOR 505513.

O: IMMEDIATE HONG KONG, TEHRAN INFO PRIORITY TOKYO, BANGKOK.

NINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

EFS: A. DIRECTOR 503258
B. TOKYO 86467
C. TOKYO 86460
D. TOKYO 86480
E. TEHRAN 54078
F. DIRECTOR 503377

1. PURSUANT TO FAVORABLE RESPONSE REF E AND GINOCHIO POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF SUBJECT'S REACTION TO RECRUITMENT PITCH, HQS AUTHORIZES RECRUITMENT WITH FINANCIAL REMUNERATION AS OUTLINED IN PARA 3, REF A. AGREE SUBJECT SHOULD BE MADE REALIZE OUR LONGER TERM INTEREST IN HIM AND HIS POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS PROBABLY DEPENDENT UPON HIS WILLINGNESS IF NECESSARY, ACCEPT JOB OTHER THAN CHIEF OF STAFF.

2. OSR WAS DELIGHTED WITH REF D REPORT AND SUGGESTED IT BE GIVEN HIGH MARKS. IT ALSO WHETTED THEIR APPETITES FOR MORE. THEY STRONGLY URGE THAT SUBJECT BE THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED FOR AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE ON PRE-REVOLUTIONARY WAR PLANS AGAINST, FIRST, IRAQ, SECOND, THE SOVIET UNION, AND, THIRD, ON ANY ASSISTANCE/WAR PLANS AGAINST ANY OTHER COUNTRY. (WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY CLARIFICATION SUBJECT COULD PROVIDE ON LOCATION KIBISI CITED PARA. TWO REF D REPORT.) SUBJECT'S INABILITY COMPREHEND OUR NEED FOR THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION, CITED PARA. TWO REF C, UNDERSTANDABLE. WE DON'T DOUBT THESE SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE WITH USAF ADVISORY TEAMS UNDER THE SHAH'S REGIME. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS U.S. ADVISORY GROUPS - OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL AS IRAN - HAVE GENERALLY BEEN RELUCTANT TO SHARE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION ACQUIRED DURING THEIR TOURS OF DUTY ABROAD FOR FEAR OF BEING PERCEIVED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS AN ARM OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY. THIS HAS RESULTED IN CRITICAL GAPS IN THE HOLDINGS OF SUCH POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS AS OSR, AS APPARENT FROM REF F REQUIREMENTS. (FYI: A NUMBER OF THESE REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN PASSED TO US PREVIOUSLY BY DIA.) ABOUT FYI ONLY. SUBJECT MAY BE TOLD THAT WE ARE IN NEED OF CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION FOR OUR HOLDINGS AND/OR ANY POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS INTO THEM HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE.

3. AS TO SUBJECT'S COMMENT THAT WAR PLANS DRAWN UP UNDER THE SHAH NO LONGER HAVE VALIDITY, OSR DOES NOT AGREE. THEY THINK IT UNLIKELY THE KHOMEINI GOVERNMENT HAS DONE ANY CURRENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING, ESPECIALLY WITH ITS MILITARY IN DISARRAY. SHOULD THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT BE CONFRONTED WITH AN IRAQI AIR STRIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO UTILIZE PREVIOUS MILITARY PLANNING FOR ITS DEFENSE AND COUNTERATTACKS OR IMPLEMENT AD HOC PLANS. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, WOULD VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR PURSUING THIS SUBJECT.

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

IMMEDIATE HONG KONG ROUTINE TOKYO

F (FOR-25 1964)

HAS NO INFO ON PRE-REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY
AND THEIR CURRENT APPLICABILITY. AWACS NA
INFORMATION ON MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND AIRCRAFT
CONSISTENT WITH MISSION REPORTING. APPARENT
QUESTION OF SPARE PARTS HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED
HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITHOUT POSITIVE RESULT. IS
IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING, FROM NUMEROUS SOURCES, THAT
WEEN HONOARS AND PILOTS HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL.

FILE. RVW 30 AUG 99 DRV DOC. ALL SECRET.

31 Aug 79

E CR T 311954Z AUG 79 STAFF

TAGE HONG KONG 6814?

IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TOKYO, BANGK

TENTIAL RYBAT AJAJA

A. DIRECTOR 505513
B. TEHRAN 54278
C. TOKYO 86431
D. TOKYO 86467

APPRECIATE REFS A AND B. SUBJECT REFS WAS BRIE
RNING 31 AUG ACCORDING TO HONG KONG CONTACT PLAN FOR P
EDULING LENGTHY SESSION EVENING 31 AUG FOLLOWING TREND
TWEEN HOURS OF 1730 AND 1800.

2. TEHRAN. APPRECIATE CONTACT PLAN PER REF B. REM
PTIONAL MEANS (I.E. ALTERNATIVE PICK UP POINTS) FOR C
FROM TEHRAN FORWARDED HONG KONG BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE. F
INFO SPECIFIC REASONS SUBJECT COULD HAVE QUALMS ABOUT REF
ISSUED HAVE ALTERNATIVES IN THIS EVENT FOR DISCUSSION T
CE SAY, REALIZE YOUR REPLY TO SAME REQUEST IN PARA 2
DOES WITH THIS.

3. C/O INTENDS TO DISCUSS HIS JOB OFFERS AND POSS I
ITH SUBJECT THIS EVENING UPON WHICH WE WILL BASE MORE R
ARA 4 REF C. SUBJECT HAD CLEARLY TOLD C/O THAT OFFER WAS F
IR FORCE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, WHILE TEHRAN AND HQS HAV G
PEN IN TERMS OF AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF. IS THERE I
ARE MISSING HERE? WILL CLARIFY THIS POINT AGAIN WITH
O INQUIRE IMTO SUBJECT'S WILLINGNESS ACCEPT LESSER POSI
ORCE, OR MILITARY, COMMAND.

4. AT THIS POINT DO NOT KNOW EXTENT OF TIME SUBJ
SUBJECT TO MEETING WITH C/O. TIME PERMITTING, WILL SEND
CLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES ONCE AGAIN, AS REQUESTED REF A.

5. FILE: 41-120-27. RVW 31 AUG 99 DRV DOC

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

S E C R E T 011604Z SEP 79 STAFF

IE HONG KONG 68171 SECTION 1 OF 2

IMMED TEHRAN, DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY BANGKOK

INTEL RY AT AJAJA

FS: A. T HR N 54091
B. HONG KONG 68149
C. DIRECTOR 505513

1. SUBJECT REFS MET EVENING 31 AUG AND ACCEPTED
ROPOSAL ASSUME CLANDESTINE ROLE AS NI-PRODUCING ASSET REPORTING
IRECTLY TEHRAN OFFICER. HE COULD NOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE
CCEPT MONETARY REWARD OR SALARY, AND DEMANDED NOTHING IN
ETURN FOR HIS SERVICES. HE DID REITERATE HIS CONCERN FOR HIS
ON IN PARTICULAR, WHOSE EDUCATION UNDER THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN
RAN HAS BEEN DISRUPTED (AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY ADVISED BANGKOK)
UT HE REQUESTED NO ASSISTANCE GUARANTEES AND AS CLEARLY TOLD
ONE COULD BE OFFERED. SUBJECT ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSED ROLE FOR
HIM AS HIS "CONTRIBUTION TO FREEDOM," A GOAL WHICH HE SAYS
WITH APPARENT SINCERITY IS MORE IMPORTANT TO HIM THAN HE FUNDS.
WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT, HOWEVER, POSSIBILITY THAT SUBJECT WOULD
BE WILLING TO ACCEPT SALARY IN THE FUTURE AS PROOF AGAINST
UNCERTAINTIES OF HIS OWN FUTURE.) SUBJECT AGREED TO ACCEPT A HIGH-
LEVEL POSITION IN THE AIR FORCE, EVEN IF SOMETHING OTHER THAN
CHIEF OF STAFF, IF OFFERED, IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE THE LEVEL OF
ACCESS WE DESIRED. SUBJECT HAS A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH NEW CHIEF
OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL AMIR BAHMAN BAGHERI, WHO WAS ONE OF TWO
MAJOR GENERALS SUBJECT HAD RECOMMENDED TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE
AS QUALIFIED FOR THAT POST. SUBJECT SCHEDULED TO DEPART HONG
KONG EVENING 2 SEPTEMBER. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED 1400 HOURS
1 SEPTEMBER FOR PRIMARY PURPOSE TO REVIEW TEHRAN CONTACT PLAN.

2. MEETING WITH SUBJECT EVENING 31 AUG LASTED APPROXIMATELY
1 1/2 HOURS. ANTICIPATE MEETINGS WITH HIM UNTIL DEPARTURE HONG
KONG WILL BE FAIRLY BRIEF AS IT HIS DESIRE TO ENSURE OUR GROUP
MEMBERS DO NOT BECOME SUSPICIOUS OF HIS ABSENCE. C/O BEGAN
BY INFORMING SUBJECT THAT INFORMATION HE HAD PROVIDED TO



ACE 2 ONG KONG 6817 S E C R E T
EQUIR ENTS. EVIED TOKYO HAD BEEN VERY WELL RECEIVED IN
ASHIN ON. WITH SUCH TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF BOTH HOW WELL HE IS
NFORM AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO ANSWER OUR QUESTIONS, SUBJECT
AS TO THAT WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF A
ONTIN NG, CLANDESTINE RELATIONSHIP. SUBJECT AGREED WITH BASIC
SR LI OF REASONING THAT KHOMEINI GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO
AVE N ALTERNATIVE TO USE OF MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANS
ORMUL ED UNDER SHAH IN EVENT OF OUTSIDE ASSAULT ON IRAN. THE
ATION E FO OUR HIGH-LEVEL INTEREST IN DETAILS OF THAT PLANNING.
HE AGR D THAT, TIME PERMITTING IN HONG KONG, WE WOULD REVIEW
EQUIR MENTS ONE MORE TIME. SUBJECT STATED THAT AS FAR AS CURRENT
CAPABI ITIES OF THE AIR FORCE AND POSSIBLE WITH THE MILITARY
STABL SHMENT WERE CONCERNED, WITHIN A VERY FEW DAYS AFTER
RETURN NG TO IRAN AND TALKING WITH HIS FRIENDS IN THE
MILIT Y HE WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE US WITH AN EXCELLENT, WELL-
INFORM D STATUS REPORT. C/O SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT, BUT
THAT O NATIONAL PLANNERS AND POLICY-MAKERS ALSO HAD CONSIDERABLE
INTERE T IN HIS PROVIDING US WITH PLANS AND INTENTIONS OF THE
IRANI MILITARY, WHICH HE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO ON A CONTINUING
BASIS ONLY IF HE AGAIN ASSUMES AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE AIR FORCE.
SUBJE SAID HE AGREED WITH THAT.

SUBJECT SAID THAT IN ORDER TO FULFILL OUR
REQUI MENTS FOR HIM, UPON RETURN TO IRAN HE WOULD ACCEPT A
POSIT ON WITH THE AIR FORCE, IF, AS HE FULLY EXPECTS, IT IS
AGAIN OFFERED. HE SAID HE CANNOT AT THIS POINT AGGRESSIVELY SEEK
A POS ION, FOR THAT WOULD NOT JIBE WITH HIS ATTITUDE TO DATE, AND
HE F Y EXPECTS MINISTER OF DEFENSE RIAHI TO APPROACH HIM AGAIN
WITH JOB OFFER SOON AFTER HIS RETURN. WE THEN DISCUSSED JOB
POSSI ILITIES, AND C/O INFORMED HIM THAT MAJOR GENERAL AMIR
BAHMA BAGHERI HAD BEEN NAMED NEW CHIEF OF STAFF. SUBJECT WAS
NOT AW ARE OF THIS (APPARENTLY BAGHERI HAD BEEN SELECTED AFTER
SUBJEC T'S DEPARTURE ON CURRENT VACATION), BUT STATED THAT IN FACT
IN TALKS WITH RIAHI HE HAD RECOMMENDED BAGHERI AND ONE OTHER MAJOR
GENERA L, N. YOOSEFI, AS BEST QUALIFIED FOR THE POST OF CHIEF OF
STAFF. SUBJECT STATED THAT HE AND BAGHERI WERE CLASSMATES IN
COMMA D SCHOOL IN THE US AND HAD BECOME CLOSE FRIENDS, AND
THEIR WIVES HAD PARTICULARLY MAINTAINED VERY CLOSE FRIENDSHIP SINCE
THAT IME. SUBJECT AND BAGHERI REMAIN ON VERY GOOD TERMS
BAGHER I IS A FIGHTER PILOT WITH CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE AND

[illegible] SUBJECT WAS SKEPTICAL, HOWEVER, THAT BAGHERI WAS [illegible] TO REORGANIZE THE AIR FORCE, AS PLAN WANTS DONE. [illegible] WHETHER BAGHERI WILL BE FULLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE [illegible] GOVERNMENT. THUS, EVEN THOUGH BAGHERI HAS BEEN SELECT[illegible] CHIEF OF STAFF, SUBJECT IS FIRMLY OF THE OPINION HIS OWN SPECIA[illegible] WILL BE NEEDED.

4. [illegible] POSITION FOR HIMSELF, ASSUMING BAGHERI REMAINS WHERE [illegible] SUBJECT BELIEVES THERE WERE TWO GOOD POSSIBILITIES. [illegible] IN THE ENVELOPES FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE AIR FORCE, [illegible] SUBJECT WOULD ELIMINATE THE SUPREME COMMAND AND INSERT VICE CHI[illegible] OF ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND [illegible] SERVICE HEADS. IF HIS PLAN IS ACCEPTED, HE BELIEVES HE MIGHT [illegible] BE A CANDIDATE FOR VICE CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE. ALTERNATIVELY [illegible] PERHAPS HE WOULD WORK DIRECTLY FOR BAGHERI FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE [illegible] OF DRAWING UP AND IMPLEMENTING THE AIR FORCE REORGANIZATION. [illegible] WAS EMPHATIC THAT HE WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT ACCEPT AN [illegible] OPERATIONAL ROLE WHICH WOULD DICTATE THAT HE TURN AIR FORCE UN[illegible] ON KING- [illegible] TY GROUP TARGETS INSIDE IRAN. AT THE SAME TIME, SINC[illegible] IS NOT [illegible] PILOT HIMSELF AND BASED ON HIS SPECIAL EXPERTISE ON [illegible] NON-OPE[illegible] TIONAL MATTERS, SUBJECT DID NOT VIEW IT AS LIKELY THA[illegible] SUCH A [illegible] WOULD BE PROFERRED.

5. IN LIGHT OF SUBJECT'S RESPONSES, INCLUDING HIS EARLI[illegible] AGREEME[illegible] TO BE MET CLANDESTINELY IN TEHRAN--REITERATED BY HIM [illegible] THIS EV[illegible] NING--C/O INFORMED HIM THAT IN RETURN FOR HIS SERVICES [illegible] C/O WOU[illegible] LIKE HIM TO HAVE $1,000 AS A TOKEN OF GOOD FAITH AND [illegible] OUR APP[illegible] CIATION, AND THAT WE WOULD OFFER HIM $1,000 PER MONTH [illegible] FOR A [illegible] MONTHS' TRIAL PERIOD) AT THE END OF WHICH TIME WE WOU[illegible] REVIEW [illegible] THE TERMS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. SUBJECT SAID HE [illegible] APPRECI[illegible] ED OUR OFFER BUT THAT WHAT HE HAS DECIDED TO DO FOR L[illegible] CANNOT [illegible] BE MEASURED IN DOLLARS AND CENTS. HE HAS LOST HIS [illegible] FREEDOM, HE CLAIMED, AND HIS COUNTRY IS NO LONGER FREE. HAS [illegible] REASON FOR COOPERATING WITH THE US GOVERNMENT IS TO DO WHAT HE [illegible] TO SEE THAT FREEDOM IS RESTORED IN IRAN. THEREFORE, HE WOULD [illegible] LIKE TO ASK THAT WE CONTRIBUTE THE FUNDS WHICH HAD BEEN REFER[illegible] FOR HIM TO "THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM." TO ACCEPT PAYMENT FOR HE[illegible] GOAL OF FREEDOM WOULD GO AGAINST HIS CHARACTER AND CONSCIENCE. [illegible] HE ADDED THAT HIS MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS TO SEEK AN ARRANGI[illegible] WHEREBY HIS SON CAN CONTINUE HIS STUDIES. SUBJECT HOPES THAT

[illegible] SITUATION IN IRAN WILL CHANGE SO THAT [illegible] WITHIN A SHORT TIME HE CAN AGAIN LIVE IN PEACE AND FREEDOM [illegible] HIS SON AND HIS FAMILY CAN AGAIN LIVE IN [illegible] THAT COUNTRY. IF THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE, HE WOULD LIKE HIS SON [illegible] BE ABLE TO STUDY IN THE US. C/O SAID THAT HE WAS WELL AWARE [illegible] SYMPATHETIC TOWARD [illegible] DESIRE, BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD [illegible] ASSISTANCE IN THAT REGARD. SUBJECT REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD [illegible] AND REALIZED C/O COULD NOT DO THAT. C/O SAID THAT WHENEVER [illegible] TWO PEOPLE FORM A NEW RELATIONSHIP, DESPITE ITS POTENTIAL, [illegible] THERE IS A BREAKING-IN PERIOD WHILE BOTH ASSESS THE OTHER'S [illegible] PERFORMANCE. WE HAVE HIGH HOPES FOR HIS CONTRIBUTION [illegible] IN THE FUTURE, BUT [illegible] THE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF DEEDS DONE. [illegible] WE MUST BE CAUTIOUS. SUBJECT SAID HE AGREED COMPLETELY AND [illegible] STILL WANTED TO COOPERATE WITH US, THAT HE BELIEVED IN THE U.S. [illegible] WANTS US TO HELP HIS COUNTRY.

5. SUBJECT SAID DID WANT C/O TO KNOW THAT HIS CAREER [illegible] WAS SUCH THAT IN ALL THINGS HE HAD ALWAYS PROCEEDED ON THE BASIS [illegible] OF WHAT HE HIMSELF FELT TO BE THE RIGHT WAY, AND THAT HE COULD [illegible] NOT BE FORCED INTO SOMETHING HE DID NOT BELIEVE HIMSELF TO BE [illegible] PROPER. C/O REPLIED THAT IN THE HOURS THEY HAD SPENT TOGETHER [illegible] THE STRENGTH OF SUBJECT'S CHARACTER HAD BEEN VERY EVIDENT TO [illegible] ONLY WISHED TO SAY THAT SUBJECT SHOULD BE PATIENT IN OUR [illegible] RELATIONSHIP, THAT PERHAPS SOMETIMES WE WOULD PRESS HIM TOO [illegible] ANSWERS AND BE WHAT WE THOUGHT JUDGED IS TOO ABRUPT, BUT THAT [illegible] WOULD RESPECT THE PRESSING DEMANDS OF THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF [illegible] U.S. GOVERNMENT AND C/O WOULD ASK THAT HE NOT COMPROMISE OUR [illegible] MUTUAL BID FOR FREEDOM BY PETTY DISAGREEMENTS ON A PERSONAL [illegible] PERSONNEL SUBJECT, UNCHARACTERISTICALLY, SMILED SLIGHTLY [illegible] AND EXPRESSED AGREEMENT.

6. TIME DID NOT PERMIT MORE THAN MENTION BY C/O THAT [illegible] WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF TEHRAN CONTACT PLAN. [illegible] SEE DISCUSSED AT THE 30 HOURS 1 SEP MEETING. SUBJECT WAS [illegible] PROVIDED PHOTOS OF HIMSELF AT THAT MEETING.

7. APPRECIATE REF A, INCLUDING CLARIFICATION ON [illegible] MILITARY TITLES WHICH SUBJECT ALSO EXPLAINED AT THIS LATEST [illegible] SESSION.

8. FILE: 4-120-27. RVW 1 SEP 99, DRV DSCL

SECRET

SECRET 011058Z SEP 78 STAFF

CITE HONG KONG 68177

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TOKYO, BANGKOK

NIACT TEHRAN, DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54078
B. TEHRAN 54079
C. TEHRAN 54091
D. DIRECTOR 505513
E. HONG KONG 68178 (IDEN)

1. SUBJECT REFS MET AS SCHEDULED 1430-1530 HOURS 1 SEP FOR THOROUGH REVIEW OF TEHRAN CONTACT PLAN. PER REFS A AND B. DETAIL FOLLOW. REF C ALTERNATE CONTACT PLAN NOT REQUIRED AND NOT DISCUSS WITH SUBJECT, HOWEVER APPRECIATE TEHRAN PROVIDING AS CONTINGENCY BACKUP. SUBJECT IN BEST OF SPIRITS, EAGER SMILING, EXPRESSED CON FIDENCE IN COMMO PLAN AND PLEDGED HIS BEST EFFORT IN CONTINUING OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP. FINAL MEETING WITH C/O IN HONG KONG SET FOR 1400 HOURS 2 SEP FOR DISCUSSION OF DIRECTOR 503377 ANTIEL REQUIREMENTS AND LAST MINUTE REVIEW OF CONTACT PLAN.

2. REF A PARA 3 SECTIONS A AND B OF CONTACT PLAN WERE COMPLETELY ACCEPTABLE TO SUBJECT AND WILL BE CARRIED OUT AS DIRECTED TEHRAN. DATES OF 13, 20, AND 27 SEPTEMBER ARE NOT REPEAT NOT ACCEPTABLE, AS THURSDAYS ARE SET ASIDE FOR VISITS WITH RELATIVES. SUBJECT STATED THAT INASMUCH AS HE IS RETIRED, HIS WIFE PLANS FULL ACTIVITIES AND IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO STATE NOW WHAT DAYS HE WILL BE FREE. HE DECIDED, THEREFORE, THAT HE WOULD SCHEDULE INITIAL MEETING WITH TEHRAN CONTACT VIA PHONE CALL TO "JIM MULLIGAN," IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS KHOSROW, IN AMMER SET FORTH PARA 3C REF A. SUBJECT STATED HE WILL PLACE CALL SOMETIME BETWEEN 7 RPT 7 AND 16 RPT 16 SEP. HE WAS PLEASED WITH SECURITY BUILT IN TO TEHRAN PLAN AND ENVISAGES NO PROBLEM IN CARRYING IT OUT. BASED ON HIS FULL ACCEPTANCE OF PRIMARY PLAN, C/O DID NOT BRING UP ALTERNATE PLAN PER REF C.

3. SUBJECT IS DESCRIBED AS 49 YEARS OLD, 6'9" TALL, APPROXIMATELY 150-160 LBS, PARTIALLY BALD, AND ALWAYS WEARING BACK FRAME, NEAR GLASS, EYEGLASSES. AT PICKUP, HE WILL BE WEARING SHORT-SLEEVED WHITE BANLON TENNIS SHIRT WITH BLACK EMBROIDERY ON SHIRT

COLLAR, LIGHT BEIGE TROUSERS, AND LIGHT BROWN SHOES. SUBJECT HAS VERY ERECT POSTURE AND WALKS SLOWLY AND DELIBERATELY. WILL OBTAIN PHOTOS OF SUBJECT ON 2 SEP AND POUCH TO TEHRAN AND HQS FROM TOKYO.

4. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR FACILITATING CONTINGENCY CONTACT WITH SUBJECT:

A. SUBJECT'S OWN HOME ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER ARE IDEN B. IDEN B IS WHERE SUBJECT, WIFE AND TWO CHILDREN ARE CURRENTLY RESIDING WITH RELATIVES, FOR ADDED SECURITY. SUBJECT'S DAUGHTER AND FATHER ARE THE ONLY CURRENT RESIDENTS AT HIS OWN HOME (IDEN A). HE RECEIVES HIS MAIL AT IDEN A AND PICKS IT UP FROM HIS PARENTS.

B. SUBJECT STATED THAT HE CAN SECURELY RECEIVE LETTERS POSTED INSIDE IRAN AND SENT TO HIM AT HIS OWN HOME (IDEN A), C/O INSTRUCTED SUBJECT IN SCORCH SYSTEM OF DEVELOPMENT IN EVENT WE HAD TO SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO HIM ON ONE-SHOT BASIS. LETTER SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO SUBJECT AT IDEN A ADDRESS, SHOULD BE WRITTEN IN FARSI, AND ORIGINALLY POSTED FROM MASHAD, ALTHOUGH TEHRAN WOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE. RETURN ADDRESS/NAME IS NOT REQUIRED ON ENVELOPE. LETTER SHOULD STATE THAT WRITER IS INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING PURCHASE OF LAND OWNED BY SUBJECT IN MASHAD (HE DOES OWN PROPERTY IN MASHAD) AND REQUESTS SUBJECT PHONE HIM AT SUCH AND SUCH NUMBER. ANY APPROPRIATE SIGNATURE CAN BE USED. WRITING SHOULD BE ON ONE SIDE OF PAPER ONLY. SUBJECT WILL RECOGNIZE FROM CONTENT OF LETTER THAT IT IS FROM US, AND WILL APPLY SCORCH TO DEVELOPMENT ON CLEAR SIDE OF PAPER.

5. MAIL SHOULD NOT BE POSTED TO SUBJECT FROM OUTSIDE IRAN. DURING SHAH YEARS, MILITARY OFFICERS WERE PROHIBITED FROM CONTACTS WITH FOREIGNERS, AND SUBJECT ASSUMES SAME INJUNCTION IS IN FORCE.

6. SUBJECT OWNS TWO AUTOMOBILES: A 1978 RENAULT, 4-DOOR, COLOR ORANGE, AND A 1977 IMPALA, 4-DOOR, COLOR RED. HE COULD NOT RECALL LICENSE NUMBERS. BOTH SUBJECT AND HIS WIFE DRIVE. HE DOES NOT HAVE CHAUFFEUR.

7. SUBJECT BELONGS TO NO CLUBS, ORGANIZATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS. READING IS HIS MAIN HOBBY; HE KEEPS CURRENT ON THE WORLD THROUGH NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES. FOR RELAXATION, HE ENJOYS BOOKS ON SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. HE PARTICIPATES IN SPORTS PARTICULARLY SKIING, TENNIS, SWIMMING AND VOLLEYBALL. SKIS IRAN NEARBY TEHRAN. HE USED TO PLAY TENNIS AT THE AIR FORCE COMM-

PAGE HONG KONG 68177 S E C R E T
ROUND BUT IS NOT DOING SO AT THIS TIME. HE HAS A SWIMMING POOL AT
HIS OWN HOME.

4. SUBJECT HAS NO CLOSE CONFIDANTS. HE REGARDS HIMSELF AS HIS OWN BEST
COUNSELOR. HE ACCEPTS EVERYBODY ON THEIR OWN MERITS, EXPECTING NEITH
MORE OR LESS THAN HE FEELS THEY CAN OFFER. HE HAS NEVER SHARED
DETAILS OF HIS WORK WITH HIS WIFE, HAVING EXPLAINED TO HER THAT
THAT IS HIS JOB AND SHE WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND IT. HE DOES NOT
INTEND TO INFORM HER, OR ANYONE ELSE, OF OUR CLANDESTINE RELATION-
SHIP, FOR THE SAME REASONS, AND OUT OF CONCERN FOR HIS OWN AND
THEIR SECURITY.

5. C/O NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF HIS SPONSOR.
SUBJECT RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT IN THE EARLY STAGES OF OUR CONTACT
HE HAD KNOWN THAT IT WAS INTELLIGENCE, AND MOREOVER KNEW EXACTLY
WHO THE SPONSOR WAS. HE SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR TO HIM AND
IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO SAY MORE.

6. SUBJECT MADE NO REFERENCE AT THIS MEETING TO OUR EARLIER
OFFER OF FINANCIAL REWARD, HOWEVER SAID THAT HE MIGHT BE NEED
OF OUR ASSISTANCE AT SOME LATER DATE IN CHANGING RIALS INTO DOLLARS
C/O REPLIED THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO HELP HIM AND THAT WE SHOULD
DISCUSS THE SUBJECT WITH HIS TEHRAN CONTACT.

7. MISCELLANEOUS:
THE ONLY PEOPLE WHO ARE AWARE THAT SUBJECT HAS CONSIDERED
LEAVING IRAN ARE HIS PARENTS, ONE BROTHER, 3 UNCLES AND HIS WIFE'S
TWO SISTERS AND THEIR HUSBANDS. WITH THEM HE HAS MADE RELATIVELY UNEMOTIONAL
THAT FOR THE SAKE OF HIS CHILDREN HE MIGHT DECIDE TO LEAVE. HIM
ON CURRENT VACATION TRIP, SUBJECT HAD BROUGHT WITH HIM VISAS
PASSPORTS OF HIS WIFE AND TWO CHILDREN TO ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN VISAS THAT
FOR HIM AS WELL. US CONSULATE OFFICIAL IN BANGKOK STATED THAT WHE
FAMILY MEMBERS MUST APPEAR IN PERSON TO OBTAIN VISA, BUT THAT
TIME PERMITTED HE FORESEES NO DIFFICULTY IN THE IF OBTAINING VISAS.

8. FILE: 41-120-27. RVW 01SEP99 DRV D DC.
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 011052Z SEP 79 STAFF

C I T E HONG KONG 68178

T O IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TOKYO, BANG

W A C T TEHRAN, DIRECTOR

W I N T E L R BAT AJAJA

R E F: A. HONG KONG 68177

1. IDENTITY SHEET:

IRAN: 75 EAST ARYA APARTMENTS,
KENNEDY SQUARE
TEHRAN
TELEPHONE: 934-274

B. IDEN B: AGHDASSIEH, KH, FARID, KH,
BASTAN K, KAYHAN
(HOME IS OWNED BY MR. DJANNATI ATA, WHO IS
SUBJECT'S RELATIVE AND ALSO RESIDES THIS
ADDRESS WITH HIS FAMILY)

S E C R E T FILE: 41-120-27. RVW 01SEP99, DRV D DC.



SEP 79 13 05Z

R E T 311Ø5Z S P 7 STAFF

HONG KONG 68179

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN, TOKYO, BANKKOK.

YBAT AJAJA INTEL

A. DIRECTOR 505513
B. TOKYO 86880

RET CONFUSION ON LOCATION "KIBISI," WHICH WAS PLACE NAME
CK FROM MAP AS SUBJECT REFS INDICATED AREA TO BE AVOIDED BY
AN GROUND TROOP. SUBJECT CLARIFIED SEP THAT GROUND ASSAULT
PS WOULD AVOID ENTIRE BORDER REGION FROM MANDALA SOUTH TO THE
A GULF. GROUND FORCE INFILTRATION WOULD TAKE PLACE NORTH OF
. THROUGH MOSTLY MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN.

E: 41-120-7 R W 11SEP79 DRV P 90.1

T

S E C R E T Ø3Ø354Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54Ø99

TO: IMMEDIATE HONG KONG INFO DIRECTOR, TOKYO, BANGKOK

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REF: HONG KONG 68177

1. IF TIME PERMITS, PLS ASK SUBJECT REF FOR NAME BY WHICH TEHRAN C/O SHOULD IDENTIFY HIMSELF IF CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD REQUIRE STATION TO INITIATE PHONE CONTACT. IF THIS NOT PRACTICABLE, ASSUME HE WILL ACCEPT AS BONA FIDES NAME BY WHICH TOKYO C/O KNOWN TO HIM, PLEASE ADVISE.

2. APPEARS THAT WITHIN UNAVOIDABLE TIME CONSTRAINTS, PREPARATION OF SUBJECT REF HAS BEEN ADMIRABLY THOROUGH. IF ALL GOES WELL, HE WILL BECOME VALUABLE ADDITION TO AGENT STABLE HERE. WILL ADVISE ADDRESSEES WHEN CONTACT ESTABLISHED.

3. REQUEST HQS ASSIGN 201 NUMBER AND CRYPTONYM.

4. FILE: 4Ø-12Ø-47. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

This document was retyped because of pale origin



2 SEP 79 1 1 1 9Z

SECRET 021097Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE HONG KONG 6 182

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR INFO TOKYO, BANGKOK.

NIACT TEHRAN

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54099
B. HONG KONG 58177

1. SUBJECT REFS APPEARED PROMPTLY AT FINAL HONG
ING SCHEDULED MEETING GRPP HOURS 2 SEP. HIS TOUR GROUP
D UNFORTUNATELY ARRANGED ACTIVITIES WHICH HE FELT
IGED TO JOIN, THEREFORE MEETING LASTED ONLY 15 MINUTES.
IEVE, HOWEVER, THAT ALL CRITICAL ELEMENTS IN PLAN
TRANSFER SUBJECT TO TEHRAN HANDLING HAVE BEEN SATISFIED.
JECT EXPRESSED NO RESERVATIONS OR HESITATION IN BEING
IN TEHRAN AND RESTATED HIS FIRM INTENTION TO CONTINUE
LANDESTINE RELATIONSHIP. HE DEPARTS FOR IRAN THIS EVENING

2. REF A NOT RECEIVED IN TIME TO ACT UPON. NAME BY
TOKYO C/O KNOWN TO SUBJECT IS "ALAN." REALIZE ATTEMPT
ELECTRONIC CONTACT WITH SUBJECT IN TEHRAN WOULD ONLY
IF OTHER SYSTEMS FAIL. IN SUCH EMENT, CALL SHOULD
TO HIS OWN HOME, WHERE PARENTS WOULD BE ABLE TO PASS
HIM. SUBJECT DID NOT RECALL PHONE NUMBER AT
WHERE HE CURRENTLY RESIDING ON TEMPORARY BASIS WITH
HOWEVER FOR SECURITY REASONS CALL SHOULD NOT RPT
TO THAT ADDRESS.

REVIEW SUBJECT'S TEHRAN CONTACT PLAN
HE HAD PLAN DOWN PAT. HE AGAIN AFFIRMED
CALL TO ACTIVATE CONTACT PLAN SOMETIME
S SEP.

ROVIDED FRONT FACE PHOTO OF HIMSELF
ED TEHRAN AND HQS.

PAGE 2 HONG KONG 68182 S E C R E T

5. REGRET TIME DID NOT PERMIT IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF HIS INTEL REQUIREMENTS, AS PLANNED. SUGGEST TEHRAN PURSUE IT IS SUBJECT AT LATER DATE. SUBJECT DID MAKE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

A. ANOTHER REASON HE BELIEVES MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANS FROM SHAH'S TIME NO LONGER VALID IS THAT THE KURDS COOPERATED WITH SHAH REGIME AT THAT TIME AND WERE FIGURED INTO THE PLANS, BUT KURDS WOULD NO LONGER COOPERATE.

B. C/O TRIED TO PIN SUBJECT DOWN ON SPECIFIC MILITARY TARGETS IN IRAQ, HOWEVER HE HAD NO RECALL AS RELATED IN INTEL DISSEMINATION, PILOTS HAD SPECIFIC TARGETS WITH THEIR BASES IN IRAN. TARGETS WITHIN ATTACK ZONE OF EACH PARTICULAR BASE WERE SHOWN ON MILITARY MAPS. PILOTS FROM ONE BASE WOULD NOT KNOW TARGETS ASSIGNED PILOTS FROM OTHER BASES.

C. IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAD PROVIDED SUPPORT TO [illegible] GOVERNMENT AGAINST REBELS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

6. SUBJECT REPS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN US GOVERNMENT PERCEPTION OF SHAH'S ROLE IN FUTURE OF IRAN. HE STATED THAT IF HE KNEW US PERCEPTION, HE MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO SERVE US INTERESTS IN IRAN. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID THAT MANY OFFICERS AND MEN WHOM HE KNEW ARE SUPPORTERS OF THE SHAH AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM RETURN, BUT, AS THEY LACK ANY FEEL FOR WHAT THE CHANCES ARE OF THE SHAH EVER RETURNING, THEY ARE RAPIDLY LOSING CONFIDENCE AND HOPE. SUBJECT SAID THAT MANY OF THESE MILITARY MEN MAY DROP OUT OF SIGHT, I.E. RESIGN, FLEE, IF THEY ARE NOT GIVEN A REASON TO STAY ON AND BE THERE WHEN THEY MIGHT BE NEEDED. SUEJECT WAS SUGGESTING THAT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THESE SHAH-SUPPORTERS TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY IN THE MILITARY FORCE. C/O SAID HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMENT, EXCEPT TO RECOMMEND TO SUBJECT THAT HE DISCUSS THIS WITH TEHRAN CONTACT, WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD DO.

7. WISH TEHRAN BEST OF LUCK. FROM C/O'S TIME WITH HIM, SUBJECT APPEARS TO HAVE THE COURAGE, [illegible] CHARACTER, AND RIGHT ATTITUDE TO DEVELOP INTO

PAGE 3 HONG KONG 68182 S E C R E T

FIRST-RATE ASSET. ALSO WISH TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION TO [illegible] STATION AND DEMOFFICE FOR HAVING BEEN ALERT TO THIS [illegible] WAS ABLE TO PICK IT UP WITHOUT PROBLEM.

B. FILE: [illegible]

SECRET 40-120-47 VW 02 SEP 99 DRV D9[illegible]



S E C R E T 02 1105Z SEP 79 STAFF

FM HONG KONG 68183

PRIORITY TOKYO INFO DIRECTOR, TEHRAN, BANGKOK,

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA PERS

HONG KONG 68182

INOCHIO CONFIRMED ON NWA FLIGHT DEPARTING

KONG 1110 HOURS 3 SEP FOR TOKYO.

FILE. RVW 02 SEP 99 DRV DOC.

T

5 SEP 79

S E C R E T 042030Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 507116.

TO: TEHRAN INFO HONG KONG, TOKYO, BANGKOK.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REFS: A. TEHRAN-54099
B. DIRECTOR 501657

1. SUBJECT REFS ENCRYPTED SDCAT/1, X 201-96 5070. PER REF B, POA GRANTED 28 AUGUST 1979.

2. FILE: 201-96 2507. RVW 04SEP99 DRV D9C 1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#2657

5 Sep 79 04 24E

S E C R E T 050353Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TOKYO 86582

TO: HONG KONG INFO DIRECTOR, BANGKOK, TEHRAN.

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REF: HONG KONG 6882

1. TOKYO STATION WISHES TO EXPRESS ITS APPRECIATION TO HONG KONG STATION FOR EXCELLENT SUPPORT TO GINOCHIO DURING 30 AUG - 3 SEP TDY. TDY WAS COINCIDENT WITH VICE PRESIDENT'S HONG KONG STOPOVER. REALIZE THIS PUT ADDED BURDEN ON OVERWORKED STATION, WHICH NEVERTHELESS WAS MOST HELPFUL IN ALL RESPECTS.

FILE: 40-120-47. RVW 04 SEP 99, DRV D9C1.

SECRET

6 Sep 79 01 50Z

E R E T 052009Z SEP 79 STAFF

TE DIRECTOR 507810.

O: PRIORITY TOKIO, HONG KONG, BANGKOK INFO TEHRAN.

NTEL RYBAT AJAJA

1. HQS CONGRATULATES ALL INVOLVED WITH SUCCESSFUL EFFORT ST BLISH SDCAT/1 AS CLANDESTINE FI REPORTING ASSET. BELIEVE IS DESIRE ACCOMMODATION CONVERSION AND HIS FRANK ANSWERS RE- UIREMENTS RE IRANIAN MILITARY MAY WELL LEAD TOWARD HIS EVENTUALLY CCEPTING COMPENSATION. HE APPEARS VERY WILLING MEET CLANDESTINELY N TEHRAN, AND WHEN AND IF HE DOES SO SHOWS GREAT PROMISE AS RE- ING SOURCE ON IRANIAN MILITARY WHICH CONTINUES AS HIGH- RITY TARGET.

2. WELL DONE.

3. FILE: 201-962507. RVW 04SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S C R E T
BT
#2 13

CAUTION–BLANK FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE IN FIELD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR HQS. PROCESSING
- INDEXING REQUESTED
- NO INDEXING
- APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO: Chief of Station, Tehran

INFO: Chief, Near East Division ,Chief,Vital Documents
Chief, East Asia Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Hong Kong

SUBJECT: RYBAT AJAJA - SDCAT/1 (201-962507)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: REFERENCE: HONG KONG 68171

WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Transmitted under separate cover is a front-face photograph of SDCAT/1.

Leonard A. GINOCHIO

Attachment: USC
Photograph, usc

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RVW 14 Sep 99 DRV D9C1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	FCHA-34488	14 Sep 79
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-962507

SECRET 250947Z SEP 79 STAFF

E TEHRAN 54300

TO: DIRECTOR INFO HONG KONG, BANGKOK, TOKYO.

WNINTEL SDCAT

1. NABIEE REACHED SDCAT/1 BY PHONE EVENING OF 24 SEPTEMBER WHICH, UNFORTUNATELY, WAS ALSO DAY OF FATHER'S DEMISE. C/O EXPRESSED REGRETS AND THEN TOLD C/1 THAT WE WERE SORRY WE HAD NOT SEENAHIM SINCE HIS RETURN. C/1 STATED THAT HE ALSO WAS SORRY WE HAD NOT GOTTEN TOGETHER, THAT HE STILL HAD OUR NUMBER, AND THAT HE WOULD BE CALLING AS SOON AS HE WAS ABLE. C/O AGAIN OFFERED SYMPATHIES AND TOLD C/1 WE LOOKING FORWARD VERY MUCH TO SEEING HIM AGAIN.

2. C/1'S GRIEF WAS EVIDENT OVER PHONE, BUT LIKEWISE BELIEVE HE WAS SINCERE IN STATING HE WILL CALL. WE ARE HOPEFUL THIS WILL FULFILL THE PROMISE INITIALLY SHOWN.

3. FILE: 201-962507. RVW 25 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

NOTE: HONG KONG, BANGKOK AND TOKYO ADDED AS INFO ADDEES ATION REQUEST.

S E C R E T 180822Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54510

TO: DIRECTOR INFO HONG KONG, BANGKOK, TOKYO.

WNINTEL SDCAT

REF: TEHRAN 54300

1. NABIEE CALLED HOME SDCAT/1 (C/1) EVENING 15 OCTOBER. MAN ANSWERED, C/O ASKED FOR C/1, MAN RATTLED SOME FARSI AND HUNG UP. POSSESSED OF UNMITIGATED TEMERITY, C/O CALLED BACK, ASKED IF ANYONE THERE SPOKE ENGLISH. RESPONDENT GAVE FORTH WITH VEHEMENT TORRENT OF (PROBABLY PROFANE) FARSI AND SLAMMED RECEIVER.

2. NUMBER CALLED WAS HOME OF C/1, ALTHOUGH STATION RECORDS SHOW ONLY PARENTS OF C/1 LIVING THERE (FATHER ALLEGED TO BE LATELY DECEASED, AS REPORTED REF). FILE ALSO GIVES ADDRESS BUT NOT PHONE NUMBER OF RELATIVE WITH WHOM C/1 AND FAMILY SUPPOSED TO BE STAYING.

3. STATION PLANS TO BURY C/1'S NAME IN LIST OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS AND ASK DAO IF THEY CAN DETERMINE STATUS. FUTURE STATION ACTION THIS CASE DEPENDS UPON OUR ABILITY DETERMINE LOCATION AND STATUS C/1.

4. FILE: 201-962507. RVW 18 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 19 Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TOKYO 88035 (GRESHINSKY ACTING)

TO: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR, HONG KONG, BANGKOK.

WNINTEL SDCAT

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54510
B. HONG KONG 68177

1. REGRET STATION UNABLE AS YET TO MAKE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH SDCAT/1 (C/1). WISH REMIND THAT REF B PARA 4- CONTAINED INSTRUCTIONS FOR SENDING SW LETTER TO C/1 USING SCO PROCEDURES. PLEASE NOTE THAT LETTER SHOULD BE SENT TO HIS OWN ADDRESS IF WHICH IS IDEN OF REF B.

2. APPRECIATE STATION KEEPING TOKYO ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

3. FILE: 201-962507. RVW 19 OCT 79 DRV D9C1.
S E C R E T

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

S E C R E T NOV 79 STAFF

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BANGKOK, HONG KONG, TOKYO.

WNINTEL SDCAT

REF: TEHRAN

1. PER REF DEFENSE ATTACHE INQUIRED ABOUT SDCAT/1 AMONG OTHERS, AT DINNER WITH SENIOR IRANIAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS ON 1 NOVEMBER. WE WAS TOLD THAT C/1 HAS NOT BEEN RECALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY, AND THERE ARE NO PRESENT PLANS TO DO SO. STORY AS PRESENTED TO DATT IS THAT BAGHERI'S PREDECESSOR, AS CHIEF OF STAFF HAD IN FACT INTENDED TO BRING C/1 BACK TO SAME OR SIMILAR JOB WHICH HE HELD JUST BEFORE RETIREMENT. BAGHERI ELECTED NOT TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON THIS PLAN, AND THAT NOT INDICATED ANY INTENTION TO REVIVE IT.

2. SEEMS LIKELY THAT ABOVE EXPLAINS C/1'S UNAVAILABILITY. AS WE RECALL IT DEBRIEFING OF C/1 INDICATED NO USEFUL ACCESS IN HIS STATUS AS A RETIRED OFFICER,AND THERE IS THUS NO APPARENT UTILITY IN CONTACT WITH HIM AT THIS TIME EVEN WERE HE INTERESTED. WE WILL THUS SEND DOWN ON THIS ONE.

3. FILE: 201-

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

Name: Cyrus Ramtin

Code: S. D. Quick / 1

Last Position, Director, international services of National Iranian Radio and Television before the victory of the Islamic Revolution.

Cyrus Ramtin was one of important agent of CIA in the late 1979 and the begining of 1980.

He who is likely to have joined the radio T.V. in 1964, was the director of international services during 1977-1979, and due to his responsibility, the role and huge volume of activities of radio and T.V. as a medium with regard to foreigners especially Americans living in Iran, he was in contact with elements of the U.S. embassy. For instance in a meeting, on November 14, 1978 he informed one of the public affairs officer of the U.S. embassy about a dictum emanating from the court, according to which, NIRT international TV must offer French and German and other foreign film/serial fare proportionate to that which is U.S. — supplied, and without English subtitles.

Ramtin expressed regret and concern that this would seriously affect the American community which in the absence of low-brow recreational outlets (bars, hostesses, English language cinemas, Etc.) might cause the Americans to depart from Iran.

After Ramtin's first contact with the CIA he was hired in Jan. 1979, just a week before the downfall of the Shah's regime. He was then dismissed from NIRT in February.

Following his dismissal from NIRT his access to the required information by CIA changed and practically his performance had no value for the CIA until late June 1979. Since June, as CIA commented, "Ramtin was reporting on activities and views of PGOI leaders concerned with intelligence and internal security". As a friend of some of these people he continued to spy on the clerical leadership's division, new intelligence appartus and internal security matters.

He also informed the CIA of misellaneous matters such as, a Bulgarian national as a manager of the clandesting Tudeh broadcast station "Peyke-Iran".

In the summer of 1979, Ramtin informed the CIA of his association with groups consisting mostly of the deserted military officers and the elements of the dissolved SAVAK

whose objectives were to overthrow the government and conduct sabotage actions. The CIA while encouraged Ramtin to maintain his contacts with such groups, warned him to avoid serious and deep involvement in their activity. This was mostly because the CIA believed that if Ramtin works on his PGOI contacts the result could be more valuable than to get involved in opposition plotting.

Moreover, while the CIA was aware of existence of anti-revolutionary centers, believed that their influence and capabilities were grossly exaggerated. It was very clear that for this reason the CIA paid less attention to such groups rather than the non-conformity of these roups with the U.S. objectives.

An interesting point regarding Razmara group which exists in the documents, is the CIA evaluation through one of its agents called Nowzar Razmara who was also one of the experienced elements of the SAVAK.

Nowzar Razmara had mentioned a plan, ostensibly with the aid of Egyptian and Israeli intelligence services, to lunch seaborne invasion of Kuzistan to gain control of Iran's oil production capacity and thus gain control of Iran for moderate pro-western forces within Iran.

This is a significant point with regard to the attack of the Zionist regime of Iraq a year later, and clarifies the motives of the Iraqi regime in its aggression to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Ramtin also informed the CIA that Hassan Shariatmadari was reviving a project for a daily newspaper in Farsi, he said whether or not this project get the ground, he has some contacts who could place items for him if CIA desired. This matter was appreciated by CIA.

In the margin of Ramtin's file, there are some indications to the records of general Jam a retired element of Shah's army and his connection as the agent of the British Intelligent Service.

The salary paid to Ramtin was 500 U.S. Dollars per month for his espionage activities. However as the final existing documents indicate, the accuracy of the reports given by Ramtin seemed to be causing doubt for the CIA.

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Tehran, Iran

Copy to NEA/IRN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Cyrus Ramtin, Director, International Relations Dept.
National Iranian Radio Television
Jack H. Shellenberger, PAO

DATE & PLACE: Intercontinental Hotel, 14 November

DISTRIBUTION: AMB, DCM, POL, POL/MIL, ECON, CONS, OR, ICA/NEA

At Ramtin's request, we met on relatively neutral ground. He shared with me his deep misgivings about the Iran situation. He spoke of this day's disorders in Tehran and in several provincial cities. He said the NIRT staff is either radicalized ("by Marxists posing as Muslims or Khomeini adherents") or intimidated. There have been several demonstrations, "massive demonstrations on the NIRT compound" in the past week. Soldiers are now stationed inside the compound even in the corridors. Their presence adds to the general nervousness, but, "just the over day, an activist broke into a TV studio and attempted to shout a proclamation. He was dragged back, but not arrested--treated with care, in fact."

Ron Bagnulo and two other Americans have submitted resignations. They are nervous and uncomfortable. The martial law inhibition on news gathering and dissemination plus the attitude towards them on the part of NIRT activists makes their situation intolerable and Ramtin can understand their discomfiture.

He held a meeting today with his expat staff and promised to provide them personal security, but apprehension persists.

The main reason for our conversation was Ramtin's concern about a dictum emanating from the Court, according to which, NIRT International TV must offer French and German and other foreign film/serial fare proportionate to that which is U.S.-supplied, and without English subtitles. Ramtin believes that this would seriously affect the American community which in the absence of normal low-brow recreational outlets (bars, hostesses, English-language cinemas, etc.) might be more prone to either depart or cut-up.

He wonders whether this advisory really has been thought through and is seriously concerned that, if implemented, in the next 2-3 weeks, it could seriously affect an already damaged American morale in Iran. He thinks it is based on a very unrealistic reading of the political bias in this country. Adding hours of French and German, Indian, Korean, TV fare without

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subtitles in English would be a political act with minimal return in terms of the Shah's standing and would only further alienate an already restive English speaking community (including Iranians).

Ramtin added that the new Minister of Information, General Saadatmand, was a former Savak official charged with press censorship. He is the least likely presence to instill any confidence among journalists that all this too shall pass away.

JHShellenberger:mh
11/15/78

S E C R E T 1.Ø715Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53911

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDQUICK

REF: A. TEHRAN 539Ø4 (NIT-1Ø,682)
B. TEHRAN 539Ø9 (NIT-1Ø,683)

1. REFS OBTAINED FROM SDQUICK/1 DURING MEETING ON 12 AUG. Q/1 SAID THAT HE DISCUSSED COVERT ORGANIZATION WITH NADER MOTAZED ABOUT TEN DAYS AGO AND AGREED TO PUT HIM IN TOUCH WITH SHAPUR ZAND-NIA, WHICH HE DID ON 11 AUGUST. MOTAZED WAS FORMERLY SAVAK OFFICER IN DEPARTMENT VIII, WITH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RADIO AND TV. MOTAZED TOLD Q/1 THAT HE WAS IN HIDING IN IRAN FOR ABOUT THREE MONTHS AFTER THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION. DURING THAT TIME, THE PASDARAN TOOK HIS CAR AND STOLE THE FURNITURE FROM HIS HOUSE. HIS WIFE EVENTUALLY RECOVERED THE CAR.

2. AFTER THREE MONTHS IN HIDING, MOTAZED LEARNED THAT IT WOULD BE SAFE TO COME TO AN INTERVIEW WITH MOSTAFA CHAMRAN, NEW CHIEF OF IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE. AT INTERVIEW IN MAY, CHAMRAN OFFERED MOTAZED POST IN NEW ORGANIZATION AT SALARY OF 5,ØØØ TOMANS PER MONTH (ABOUT $5ØØ PER MONTH). MOTAZED TOLD Q/1 THAT HE WAS INSULTED BY THE LOW SALARY AND TURNED DOWN THE OFFER. Q/1 IS AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT MOTAZED MAY BE ACTING AS PROVOCATEUR FOR CHAMRAN, BUT IN HIS JUDGEMENT, MOTAZED'S ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITY IS SINCERE.

3. MOTAZED WAS ACCOMPANIED TO BOTH MEETINGS BY A YOUNG FORMER SAVAK OFFICER OR AGENT WHO GAVE HIS NAME AS "FEKRI" (PHON). Q/1 THINKS IT IS AN ALIAS. "FEKRI" SAID THAT HE HAD TAKEN PART IN SAVAK OPERATION IN PARIS AGAINST KHOMEINI WHEN HE WAS THERE IN AUTUMN 1978. "FEKRI" CLAIMED THAT HE HAD RENTED HOUSE IN NEAUPHLE-CHATEAU ACROSS STREET FROM KHOMEINI'S RESIDENCE. STATION RECALLS REPORTING FROM SDJANUS ASSETS IN 1978 IN AN OPERATION AGAINST KHOMEINI. Q/1 GAVE FOLLOWING DESCRIPTION

OF "FEKRI" WHICH MAY BE ENOUGH FOR FORMER SDJANUS OFFICERS TO IDENTIFY HIM. "FEKRI" IS ABOUT 2.-28 YEARS OLD, ABOUT 6 FEET 2 INCHES TALL, THIN, BLACK HAIR, BLACK EYES, AND BLACK HANDLEBAR MUSTACHE, COMPLEXION IS TAN. DURING TWO MEETINGS WITH Q/1, HE WAS DRESSED IN SHIRT AND SLACKS OF GOOD QUALITY. FROM "FEKRI'S" SPEECH, Q/1 ESTIMATED THAT HE WAS UNIVERSITY GRADUATE WHO GREW UP IN TEHRAN.

4. MOTAZED MENTIONED TO Q/1 THAT HE HAD HEARED THAT ANOTHER FORMER COLLEAGUE IN DEPT VIII, FNU IZADI IS NOW A MEMBER OF THE FEDAYAN-KHALG (MARXIST CHARIKS).

5. INDEX: MOTAZED

6. FILE: 2Ø1-959Ø13. RVW 12 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET S E C R E T

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



S E C R E T 161246Z AUG 79 DEFFERED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53934

TO: WASHINGTON

FOR: C/NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL SDQUICK - SDQUICK/1'S SON

1. SDQUICK/1 HAS MENTIONED TO C/O THAT HIS SON (IDENTITY) NOW A STUDENT IN CALIFORNIA, IS ..... EMPLOYMENT AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN POSITION WITH NVBLAZON. C/O PROVIDED Q/1 WITH ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF ..... RECRUITMENT ORGANIZATION FOR SON'S USE AND SAID FURTHER THAT HE WOULD REPORT SON'S QUALIFICATIONS TO HQS.

2. Q/1 SAID THAT HIS SON HAS BACHELOR'S DEGREE, IS COMPLETING WORK ON MASTER'S DEGREE. SON IS MARRIED TO U.S. CITIZEN ..... CERTAIN OWN U.S. CITIZENSHIP IN ABOUT ONE YEAR. SON SPEAKS SEVERAL LANGUAGES, INCLUDING FARSI, ENGLISH, ...

3. IF HQS CHOOSES TO CONTACT Q/1 SON, NO MENTION SHOULD BE MADE OF Q/1 COOPERATION WITH ..... IS NOT WITTING.

4. FILE. 2Ø1-959Ø13. RVW 16 AUG 99 D9C.1. ALL SECRET S E C R E T

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



S E C R E T 180446Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEROUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 497711, SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEHRA.

FROM: NE, IRAN/R INFO ADCNE, NE/INTEL, DIPDS/EG/DDO/CE

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - REPORTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE GRADES AND COMMENTS FOR JULY REPORTS LISTED BELOW REVIEWED 15 AUGUST 1979.

S. 1.A.

NII-1/0.835 NO OFACT TDFIRDB-315/11654-79 RATING: 5
(UNCLASSIFIED) SD QUICK/1 SECRET/FULL CONTROLS
DISSEMINATED 1 JULY 1979
MOSTAFA CHAMRAN'S LEBANESE CONNECTION?
COMMENT: AS NOTED EARLIER, MUSTAFA CHAMRAN IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERED A KEY FIGURE. WE FOUND HIS LEBANESE CONNECTION OF INTEREST, ESPECIALLY THROUGH MUSA SADR. COULD SD QUICK/1 OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION FROM CHAMRAN ON POSSIBLE IRANIAN SUPPORT TO THE LEBANESE SHIITES? ALL WE HAVE NOW ARE FRAGMENTS.

S E C R E T 191422Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53966

TO: WASHINGTON

FOR: SE/BB, NE/IRAN, DC/NE/SAO

SUBJECT: WNINTEL SDQUICK CKLEG YKBAND -- ALEXANDER POPOV

1. DURING 18 AUGUST MEETING, SDQUICK/1 REPORTED THAT HE WAS SURE HE HAD SEEN ALEXANDER POPOV, A BULGARIAN SPECIALIST FO O-EAST RADIO, IN TEHRAN ON TUESDAY, 14 AUGUST. Q/1 EXPLAINED THAT YEARS AGO, IN THE COURSE OF HIS RADIO-TV DUTIES, HAD BEEN PART OF AN NIRT DELEGATION TO BULGARIA, WHERE HE MET POPOV. HE DESCRIBES POPOV AS A TALL BLOND, HEAVY-SET MAN. LATER IN TEHRAN, A FRIEND OF Q/1'S WHO HAD BEEN IN THE TUDEH IN EASTERN EUROPE AND IS NOW DEAD TOLD HIM THAT POPOV HAD BEEN THE MANAGER OF THE CLANDESTINE TUDEH BROADCAST STATION "PEYKE-IRAN".

2. Q/1'S OFFICE IN THERAN IS ABOUT TWO BLOCKS FROM THE BULGARIAN EMBASSY. ON 14 AUGUST 79, HE SAW THE BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR'S CAR WITH POPOV INSIDE DRIVING PAST HIS STREET.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO ON POPOV THAT MIGHT EXPLAIN MISSION IN TEHRAN.

4. INDEX: POPOV. FILE; 201-95901 . RVW 19 AUG 99 DRV D9C
ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

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

S E C R E T 2Ø12452 AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53973

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDQUICK QRBOLSTER

1. SDQUICK/1 SAYS THAT SHARIAT-MADARI'S SON, ENGINEER HASSAN SHARIAT-MADARI, IS REVIVING A PROJECT FOR A DAILY NEWSPAPER IN FARSI, WHICH WOULD BE BACKED BY S-M'S AZERBAIJANI SUPPORTERS. 12 MILLION TOMANS (ABOUT 1.2 MILLION DOLLARS) WHICH WAS DEPOSITED IN BANK ACCOUNTS TO GET THE NEWSPAPER STARTED WHEN THE PROJECT WAS FIRST PROPOSED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO IS STILL AVAILABLE. AT THAT TIME, KHOMEINI FORBADE IT. HASSAN SHARIAT-MADARI'S BROTHER-IN-LAW (FNU) SHOJADINI, HAS INVITED SDQUICK/1 TO DISCUSS THE PROJECT WITH HASSAN.

2. SDQUICK/1 SAID THAT WHETHER OR NOT THIS PROJECT GET THE GROUND, HE HAS SOME CONTACTS WHO COULD PLACE ITEMS FOR HIM IF WE DESIRED. C/O SAID THAT WE WERE INTERESTED IN THIS AND WOULD RETURN TO SUBJECT IN FUTURE MEETINGS.

3. FILE: 2Ø1-959Ø13 RVW 2Ø AUG 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET S E C R E T

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

S E C R E T 2Ø.331Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53975

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDQUICK SDJANUS

REF: TEHRAN 53911

1. ON .. AUGUST ALIAS ..... OF REF HAD MEETING WITH SDQUICK/1 (Q/1) AT WHICH HE ASKED Q/1 TO OBTAIN DETAILS OF LOCATION OF THE PRINCIPAL RADIO AND TV TRANSMITTERS IN IRAN, AS WELL AS ASSOCIATED POWER SUPPLIES, GENERATORS, AND .....INES. Q/1 ASSUMES THAT HE ..... WANT THESE DETAILS FOR SABOTAGE O.....ONS. Q/1 SAYS THAT HE STALLED ALIAS FEKRI IN ORDER TO .....NSWERS FROM C/O AS TO WHAT HE SHOULD DO.

2. Q/1 SAYS THAT HE CAN C.....DEN THAT HE HAS ACCESS TO THE KIND OF DETAIL THAT FEKRI .....
...LD OBTAIN ALL OF IT AND KNOWS ..... IT FROM HIS OWN EX-PERIENCE. C/O TOLD Q/1 THAT HE WAS .. T SU.. THAT HE SHOULD NOT GIVE THIS KIND OF INFORMATION TO A.....RI, EVEN THOUGH WE WERE INTERESTED IN KEEPING Q/1'S .... TO THE MOTAZED GROUP.

3. AT NEXT MEETING, C/O WILL CONFIRM TO Q/1 THAT HE SHOULD REPLY TO ALIAS FEKRI THAT HE, ..., HAS NO ACCESS TO DETAILS OF THIS KIND ..., IN ANY CASE IS ..... TO BECOME INVOLVED IN SOLITARY ACTS OF SABOTAGE, WHICH ..... CAUSE SOME EMBARASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT, BUT .. TO BE INVESTIGATED VERY THOROUGHLY. BELIEVE THIS PROPOS .... WILL PRESERVE Q/1'S ACCESS WHILE KEEPING HIM FROM DANGER OF INVOLVEMENT.

4. FILE: 2Ø1-959Ø13. RVW 2Ø AUG 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET. S E C R E T

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

S E C R E T 2Ø13442 AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53977

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: SDQUICK - PAYMENTS TO SDQUICK/1

1. ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE MATERIAL IN SDQUICK/1'S FILE AND Q/1'S OWN STATEMENT ON 18 AUGUST, HE HAS NOT BEEN PAID SINCE MARCH 1979, WHEN HE RECEIVED USD 500. HE PROPOSED TO C/O THAT IN LIEU OF COMPENSATION, HE FORWARD TO HIS SON A VALUABLE RUG, WHICH COULD BE SOLD IN USA FOR CASH.

2. RATHER THAN BECOMING INVOLVED IN EXPORT OF PERSAIN RUGS, STATION PROPOSES TO PAY SDQUICK/1 USD 500 PER MONTH, RETROACTIVE TO APRIL 1979. IF HQS APPROVES THIS ARRANGEMENT, SDQUICK/1 REQUESTS THAT OF THE $2500 FOR FIVE MONTHS APRIL-AUGUST 1979, $1000 BE SENT TO THE IDENTITY A BANK ACCOUNT, AND $1500 BE SENT TO IDENTITY B BANK ACCOUNT.

3. FILE: 2Ø1-959Ø13. RVW 1Ø AUG 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET S E C R E T/ETX3977

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

S E C R E T 21Ø757Z DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53978

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/NE/IRAN

REF: TEHRAN 53977

SUBJECT: SDQUICK

1. IDENTITY A: MR. SYAMAK RAMTIN
SAVINGS ACCOUNT NO, 1Ø.41-3994
SCR.IPPS MIRAMAR OFFICE
BANK OF AMERICA
935 KEARNY MESA ROAD
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA ..26

2. IDENTITY B: MR. SOHRAB RAMTIN
ACCCUNT NO. Ø7Ø37Ø.
SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK
POINT LOUA OFFICE
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 9212.

3. FILE: 2Ø1-959Ø13. RVW 21 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

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

11 Sep 79 06 51 Z

S E C R E T 110637Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 510981.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL SDQUICK/1-FSAR

FOLLOWING IS OUR SUGGESTED FSAR FOR SDQUICK/1 FOR REPORT IN PERIOD JANUARY 79-OCTOBER 79. PLEASE MAKE ANY COMMENTS OR CORRECTIONS YOU FEEL APPROPRIATE, AND PLEASE SUPPLY REQUESTED IN FORMATION SO FSAR CAN BE COMPLETED. WE ARE POUCHING COPY OF DIOF 2300-6 ATTACHMENT 3, DATED 29 AUGUST 77, FYI ON FSAR REQUIREMENTS.

REPORTING PERIOD: JAN 79-OCT 79

1. IDENTIFICATION:
   A. ACTIVITY: SDQUICK
   B. AGENTS: SDQUICK/1
2. FAN 33004949
3. OBJECTIVE: S.I.,
4. OPERATIONAL DATA:
   A. OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS, CLEARANCES ETC.
SDQUICK/1 (Q/1) WAS DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICES FOR THE NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION FROM 1964 UNTIL HIS DISMISSAL LATE IN FEB 79. HE WAS FIRST MET BY GANJIAN ON 14 DEC 78 AND GIVEN POA 5 JAN 79. RECRUITMENT AND PLANS FOR MOC WERE ANNOUNCED BY THE STATION 5 FEB 79, BUT SUBSEQUENT REVOLUTION AND DESTRUCTION OF FILES INTERVENED. MOC REQUESTED AUG Q/1'S ACCESS CHANGED WITH HIS DISMISSAL FROM NIRT IN LATE FEB AND HIS ASSIGNMENTS AND REPORTING FELL OFF BETWEEN APRIL AND JUNE 79. SINCE JUNE HE HAS BEEN REPORTING ON ACTIVITIES AND VIEWS OF PGOI LEADERS CONCERNED WITH INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY, AND HIS BACK SALARY TO MARCH HAS BEEN PAID.
   B. ACCESS AND TARGETS
Q/1'S FRIENDSHIP WITH MEHDI T A L E G H A N I, SON OF THE PROMINENT AYATOLLAH, GAVE HIM ACCESS TO THE CLERICAL LEADER

SHIP'S PLANS AND INTERNAL DIVISIONS DURING THE MONTHS SURROUNDING THE REVOLUTION. HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER MOSTAFA C H A M R A N AND WITH DEPUTY INTERIOR MINISTER SADEGH T A B A T A B A I GAVE HIM ACCESS TO THE NEW INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS HEADED BY CHAMRAN AND TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. HIS MEMBERSHIP ON AN INFORMAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE STATUS OF IMAM MUSA S A D R HAS CA POTENTIAL, AND IF HE CONTINUES TO WORK ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW PRESS OFFICE FOR TABATABAI HE SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO SENSITIVE MATERIALS NOT LATER FORWARDED TO THE PRESS.
   C. MOTIVATION AND CONTROL
Q/1 IS MOTIVATED BY HIS NEED TO PASS FUNDS, EITHER HIS OWN OR THOSE PROVIDED AS SALARY BY RTACTION, TO HIS STUDENT SONS IN THE UNITED STATES. HIS SALARY PAYMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE SONS' ACCOUNTS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, AND AMOUNT TO USD 500 MONTHLY. (STATION PLEASE COMMENT FURTHER ON HIS MOTIVATION AND DEGREE OF RTACTION CONTROL.)
   D. CONTACT AND MEETING INFORMATION
DURING EARLY 1979 Q/1 WAS CALLED AT HIS HOME AND MET FOR CAR PICKUPS. IN APRIL HE MISSED SEVERAL MEETINGS AND LED THE CO TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAD "OPTED OUT". NOW THAT HIS PERSONAL SECURITY SITUATION SEEMS TO HAVE IMPROVED, Q/1 IS BACK IN CONTACT. (STATION PLEASE PROVIDE CURRENT CONTACT INFO.)
   E. SECURITY
Q/1 AGREED TO TAKE AN SGSWIRL EXAMINATION IN EARLY FEBRUARY, BUT REVOLUTION INTERVENED. (STATION PLEASE PROVIDE CURRENT INFO, INCLUDING ANY PLANS FOR SGSWIRL.)
   F. TRAINING
NO TRAINING HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO Q/1, AND NONE IS PLANNED. (STATION PLEASE COMMENT.)
5. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PLANS
Q/1 HAS BEEN VERY PRODUCTIVE DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. FROM JANUARY TO AUGUST 1979 HE PROVIDED 15 REPORTS, FOUR OF WHICH WERE GRADED 1C, AND TWELVE 3. HIS TALEGHANI CONNECTION RESULTED IN USEFUL INFORMATION IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE REVOLUTION, DRAWN FROM THE AYATOLLAH'S SON MEHDI WHO IS A COLLEGE CLASSMATE AND "DOWREH" OR SEMI-SECRET FRIENDSHIP GROUP COLLEAGUE OF Q/1'S. HIS LINKS TO CHAMRAN AND THUS TO THE NEW IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS WHICH THE LATTER HEADS WILL BE EXPLOITED FURTHER. THE TABATABAI FRIENDSHIP HAS ALSO PROVIDED GOOD REPORTS

GE 3 WASHINGTON 51098 S E C R E T
IRANIAN-LIBYAN TENSIONS OVER THE MUSA SADR CASE, AND IAS
FINITE CA POTENTIAL WHICH WILL BE EXPLOITED. (STATION PLEASE
MMENT.)
CC STS:
A. FUNDS (SALARY) USD 500 MONTHLY $4,500
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES (STATION PLEASE SUPPLY.)
B. PAYMENTS ARE MADE TO SONS' BANK ACCOUNTS IN U.S.
C. MAN YEARS (STATION PLEASE SUPPLY.) RVW 10SEP99 IRV DSC
L SE RET.
E C E T

EPORT LASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFOR N--NOCON ACT--ORCON

OUNTRY : IR N

UBJECT : FO MAT ON OF OPPOSITION GROUP AMONG IR IAN MILITAR Y
(DO I: 15 SEP 79)

OURCE : AN IRANIAN POLITICAL OBSERVER (F PRESE LY UNDETERM NED
RE LIABILITY. HE RECEIVED THI REPORT FOM AN INFOR MANT
OF UNKNOWN RELIABILITY WITH G D PERSO L CONNECTI NS I
THE MILITARY.

1. A GRO UP OF IRANIAN MILITARY OFFI RS, PRI RILY RETIRED
GENERAL S HAS BEEN FORMED TO CARRY OUT A ROGRAM OF OPPOSITION TO THE
PROVISI NAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI). HE PRIN PAL OFFICERS
INVOLVED ARE GENERAL FERIDUN J A M, NOW IN LOND ; GEN
AMIR-BA HMAN B A G H E R I, CURRENT CHIE OF STA OF THE AIR FORCE
GEN. (FNU) B A Y A N, FORMER MILITARY A TACHE IN PAKISTAN; G N
(FNU) P E E S H K P U R, BROTHER OF THE LEADER OF THE PAN- IRANIS
PARTY; GEN. (FNU) N A Z E M, FORMERLY GEN. JAM'S DEPUTY; BRI .
GEN. KH OROU D A N E S H V A R; AND GEN. ASGHAR S E P E H R .

2. IN E RLY SEPTEMBER 1979, HORMOZD R A Z M R A, SON OF THE
FORMER PRIM MINISTER WHO IS DOING THE ORGANIZATI N WORK FOR THE
GROUP, SPOK AT A MEETING OF SOME OF THE OFFICERS INVOLVED AT TH
HOME OF GEN RAL SEPEHR IN TEHRAN. RAZMARA ALLEGED THAT HE HAD A
GREEN LIGHT FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE GROUP'S PLANS.
THE PRO GRAM CALLS FOR BOMBINGS IN PROVI CIAL CITI S FOLLOWED BY AN
ATTACK IN T HRAN. THE GROUP ALLEGEDLY AS EQUIPPED A SHIP WI TH
EROAD C STIN EQUIPMENT, WHICH WOULD BE STATIONED IN THE PERS AN
GULF TO TRA SMIT OPPOSITION PROPAGANDA INTO IRAN.

3. (FIE D COMMENT: GEN. BAGHERI IS THE ONLY OFFICER ON THE LI
WHO IS KNOW TO BE ON ACTIVE DUTY.)

4. ACQ: TEHRAN, IRAN (17 SEP 79). FIELD REPORT NO. NIT 1) 73

5. FIEL DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFA T AT TEHRAN. SENT TO AMMAN
BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DELHI
TEL AVIV, LONDON.

S E C R E T 170804Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE: TEHRAN 54233

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDQUICK INTEL

REF: TEHRAN 54234 (NIT 10,731)

1. SDQUICK/1 (Q/1) OBTAINED REF ON 15 SEPTEMBER FROM HORMOZD R A Z M A R A WHO TOLD HIM THAT THE GROUP HAD INVESTIGATED Q/1 CAREFULLY AND WANTED HIM TO TAKE CHARGE OF THE SHIP-BORNE TRANSMIT PROJECT. RAZMARA SAID THAT Q/1'S WIFE WOULD BE BROUGHT TO CHAH BAHAR OR SENT OVERSEAS TO PROTECT HER, IF HE DESIRED. VISAS FOR FOREIGN TRAVEL WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY.

2. RAZMARA SAID THAT HE WAS IN DAILY TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH HIS BROTHER, NOWZAR R A Z M A R A, FORMERLY A HIGH-RANKING SAVAK OFFICER WHO IS NOW LIVING IN BALTIMORE. HORMOZD CLAIMED TO Q/1 THAT HE HAD MET A US REPRESENTATIVE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER IN TEHRAN WHO HAD LATER CALLED HIM FROM LONDON IN MID-SEPTEMBER TO SAY THAT THE TRANSMITTER PROJECT HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE US GOVERNMENT.

3. RAZMARA ASSERTED THAT HIS GROUP HAS ORGANIZATIONS IN PARIS, LONDON, THE UNITED STATES, AND WEST GERMANY, AND IS RECEIVING FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES.

4. Q/1 ASKED C/O FOR HIS OPINION OF RAZMARA'S OFFER OF CONTROL OF THE PROPAGANDA PROJECT. C/O TOLD Q/1 THAT HE SHOULD DECLINE.

5. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH RAZMARA MAY BE TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT IRANIAN OFFICERS' GROUP, STATION BELIEVES THAT HE IS EXAGGERATING LYING ABOUT THE GROUP'S US CONTACTS. IN ANY CASE, SDQUICK/1 IS MORE VALUABLE TO US IN TEHRAN WORKING ON HIS PGOI CONTACTS THAN DETECTED IN OPPOSITION PLOTTING.)

6. REQUEST TRACES HORMOZD RAZMARA AND NOWZAR RAZMARA.

7. INDEX HORMOZD AND NOWZAR RAZMARA.

8. FILE [illegible] RVW 17SEP99. DRV DS. ALL SECRET.

20 SEP 79 [illegible] Z

S E C R E T 1920317Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 516749.

TO: TEHRAN.

WNINTEL SDQUICK INTEL

REFS: A. NIT-10,730 TDFIRDB-315/16233-79
B. NIT-10,731 TDFIRDB-315/16214-79

1. IN VIEW RATHER SENSATIONALIST AND CONTROVERSIAL NATURE OF REF REPORTS, WE HAVE BEGUN REVIEW SDQUICK/1'S REPORTS OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS. PLS PROVIDE AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE ON SDQUICK/1'S ACTUAL JOB ACCESS, SOCIAL ACCESS, AND FAMILY ACCESS. FOR TIME BEING, PLS ALSO ZRWAHOO SDQUICK/1'S REPORTS.

2. FILE 221-959013. RVW 19SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
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#0848

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

20 SEP 79 [illegible]

S E C R E T 1922352Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 516893.

TO: PRIORITY LONDON INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDQUICK GNSIGHT INTEL

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54234 (NIT-10,731)
B. LONDON 17890 (DEL-74,174)

1. PENDING TEHRAN CONCURRENCE, PLS SHARE REF [illegible] WITH BRITISH AND ASK FOR THEIR COMMENT ON POSITION OF [illegible] GEN. JAM DESCRIBED THEREIN. IT PAINTS PICTURE OF JAM [illegible] OPPOSITE OF RATHER SEDENTARY ONE WE HAD UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE CASE (REF B REINFORCES THIS). DO BRITISH FEEL STRONGLY THAT JAM IS LEVELLING WITH THEM?

2. FILE: 221-3151147. RVW: 9 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRE
E C R E T
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?

S E C R E T 201314Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54263

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDQUICK INTEL

REF: TEHRAN 54234 (NIT-10,751)

1. ON MONDAY, 17 SEP, KORMOZD RAZMARA PRESENTED HIS GROUP'S PLANS FOR ARMED UPRISING TO MEETING IN TEHRAN AT THE HOME OF SHAFI MOGHTADER-SHAFIA, AN ENGINEER LIVING IN THE DARROUS AREA OF TEHRAN. OTHERS AT THE MEETING WERE GEN (RET.) BAGHI FATEMI, HIS COUSIN COLONEL FNU FATEMI, AND DR. FNU BENZADI. DR. BENZADI FORMERLY WORKED FOR COLONEL FNU TABATABA'I, A SAVAK OFFICER WHO SUCCEEDED PARVIZ SABETI JUST BEFORE THE REVOLUTION.

2. RAZMARA REPEATED THE PLANS REPORTED IN REF, THAT ARMED UPRISINGS WOULD TAKE PLACE FIRST IN THE PROVINCES OF BALUCHESTAN, KURDISTAN, AND KHUZESTAN. AFTER THAT GROUPS IN TEHRAN WOULD BEGIN ARMED ATTACKS. RAZMARA ADDED THAT THE GROUP IS CONSIDERING A TEACHERS STRIKE IF THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOTHING TO PROTECT WOMEN TEACHERS IN STRONGLY MOSLEM AREAS OF TEHRAN. RAZMARA REITERATED REF REPORT THAT HIS GROUP HAD A SHIP EQUIPPED WITH TRANSMIT INC EQUIPMENT FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.

3. SDQUICK/1 WAS THE ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT AT THIS MEETING.

4. FILE: 201-959051. RVW 20 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 201314Z SEP 79 STAFF

ITE TEHRAN 54264

O: DIRECTOR.

NINTEL SDQUICK

FF: DIRECTOR 516749

1. APPRECIATE REF. STATION WELL AWARE OF SENSATIONALIST ATURE OF REPORTS WHICH ARE LEADING TO REVIEW OF SDQUICK/1'S REPORTING. WE HAVE BEEN SEEING SUPPORTING EVIDENCE AND REVIEW OURCING AND SUBSOURCING WITH Q/1 FOR THESE AND EARLIER REPORTS T EACH RECENT MEETING, WE HAVE ASKED HIM TO PROVIDE COPY OF YANDEGAN ARTICLE WHICH WAS IMMEDIATE REASON FOR NEWSPAPER'S LOSURE, ACCORDING TO HIS REPORTS. HE KEEPS SAYING HE FORGOT. ET ING, WE WILL CONFRONT HIM WITH REQUIREMENT TO PRODUCE IT RT HWITH.

2. RECENT FSAR NOTED THAT SDQUICK/1 WAS WILLING TO MAKE SW IRL IN FEBRUARY 1979. IF AND WHEN WE OBTAIN AYANDEGAN MATE F WILL RAISE SUBJECT OF BGSW IRL WITH Q/1, TELLING HIM THAT BE F IMPORTANCE OF HIS REPORTI G, HE IS BEING RAISED TO SPECIAL ATEGORY OF REPORTER AND THAT THIS IS NECESSARY PRELIMINARY.

3. SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOWS ON MOST RECENT MEETING WITH RMOZD RAZMARA'S GROUP. WE JUDGE THIS NOT DISSEMINABLE AS IT CAUSE IT ONLY ADDS SOME NEW NAMES, BUT WISH CALL IT TO YOUR TE NTION IN CONNECTION WITH REPORTING REVIEW.

4. FILE: 201-959031. RVW 20 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

E C R E T

S E C R E T 210854Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 4265

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL SDQUICK INTEL

REF: TEHRAN 54266 (NOTAL-10,734)

1. SDQUICK/1 OBTAINED REF INFO ON SUNDAY, 16 SEP, FROM A MR. BABAN, WHO SAID THAT HE WAS CALLING ON BEHALF OF MOHAMMAD AMIN NAGHSHBANDI (N). N ALSO PASSED MESSAGE THROUGH BABAN THAT HE WOULD BE KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH Q/1, POSSIBLY BY TELEF FROM BEIRUT.

2. Q/1 SAID THAT HE HAD MET N WHEN N SERVED AS HIS ADVISER ON KURDISH AFFAIRS, WHILE Q/1 HEADED NIRT IN WESTERN IRAN. WHEN HE WENT TO TEHRAN IN 1976, HE BROUGHT N WITH HIM AN ASSISTANT. Q/1 DOES NOT KNOW WHY QOTBAZADEH KEPT N AS AN ADVISER AFTER THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN FEBRUARY 1979.

3. FILE: 201-959013. RVW 20SEP99 DRV DSC.1. ALL SECRET.
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I C A 7 (12830 Z) SEP 79 STATE

I E DIRECTOR 31 (C) L

O: PRIORITY TEHRAN

N INTEL SDQUICK INTEL

I FS A. TEHRAN 54233
B. TEHRAN 54234

1. TO BEST OUR KNOWLEDGE, THE NUBLAZON CONTACT CLAIMED BY IZMARA I CALLS, HAS BEEN IN TOUCH, ONCE PERSONALLY AND SEVERAL TIMES BY TELEPHONE, WITH NOWZAR R A Z M A R A, WHO IS DEN A N, SUBJECT 201-0238407. CONTACT WAS TO DETERMINE NOWZAR IZMARA'S ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE TARGETS OF CURRENT NTEREST AND LATTER ONE DAY MEETING IN EARLY JULY. WE DETERMINED IF DID NOT, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL TELEPHONE CALLS LAST OF WHICH IN LATE JULY ON DAUGHTER'S VISA PROBLEM, BUT NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE DISCUSSED AND NO MENTION WAS MADE OF PROJECT OUTLINED REFS. NOWZAR RAZMARA HAD MENTIONED PLAN, OSTENSIBLY WITH AID EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, TO LAUNCH SLABORNE INVASION OF KHUZISTAN TO GAIN CONTROL OF IRAN'S OIL PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND THUS GAIN CONTROL OF IRAN FOR MODERATE, PRO-WESTERN FORCES WITHIN IRAN. WITH NO CONFIRMING EVIDENCE, WE DISMISSED, AND STILL DO, INFORMATION AS WISHFUL THINKING.

2. HAVE NO TRACES ON HORMOZD (HORMUZ) R A Z M A R A BUT DO KNOW THAT NOWZAR HAS BROTHER PARVIZ, WHOSE BIO DATA IS IDEN B.

3. FILES: 201-0959013; 201-0259407. RVW 21 SEP 99 DRV DSC.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#4373



E C R [illegible] 79 STAFF

ITE DIRECTOR 5[illegible]

O: PRIORITY TEHRAN

NINTEL SDQUICK 1 ITEL

EF: DIRECTOR [illegible]

1. [illegible] SDJARVIS/27 - DPOB: 3 MARCH 1931, KERMINSHAH; GRADUATE OF SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, 1949; WIFE: NATEREH RAZMARA, DPOB: JUNE 1936, TEHRAN, UNIVERSITY, 1949; WIFE: NATEREH RAZMARA, RESEARCH SECTION, DEPT Y, JOINED SAVAK 1957; SERVED TURKEY 1958-60; SAVAK H/S, TEHRAN, DEPT Y, 1960-65; SAUDI ARABIA (COS) 1965-70; INSPECTION, DEPT 7, 1970-71; PAKISTAN 1972; CHIEF, OFFICE OF [illegible] 1975+ [illegible] FEB 1976, CUR 1973; EGYPT (COS AND SPECIAL REP OF THE SHAH); AVE., BALTIMORE, MD. CURRENTLY RESIDING WITH COUSIN AT 3829, DUNDALK

2. IDEN B: TEHRAN 49103, 22 OCT 79, REPORTED BROTHER, PARVIZ RAZMARA, DPOB: CA 1943, IRAN, AS LIAISON OFFICER BETWEEN CIVIL AVIATION ASSISTANCE GROUP AND IRANIAN CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION; STUDIED MBA FROM BERKELEY; SPENT FOURTEEN YEARS IN U.S. FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF FATHER, GEN HAJEB ALI RAZMARA, 1951, WHEN HE WAS PRIME MINISTER. PARVIZ ALSO MANAGES CONSULTING FIRM, DENJON IRAN. IAA OFFICER WAS TO MAKE SOCIAL INTRODUCTION TO STATION OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-0959013; 201-0259407. RVW 21 SEP 99

S E C R E T ALL SECRET.

BT

#4431

S E C R E T 181536Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54524

TO: DIRECTOR.

quick - r

WNINTEL (SD QUICK)

1. SD QUICK/1 CALLED CASE OFFICER FEW HOURS BEFORE LAST SCHEDULED MEETING ON 1 OCT TO CANCEL AND HE SEEMED AGITATED IN VERY BRIEF CONVERSATION. S/1 DID NOT GET IN TOUCH AGAIN UNTIL 17 OCT WHEN HE LEFT MESSAGE FOR C/O TO CALL. S/1 HAS NOT BEEN HOME FOR C/O CALLS ON 17 AND 18 OCT. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

2. FILE: 201-959013. RVW 18 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

Name: Hashem Kambakhsh

Code: S. D. TUNDRA

Position: Colonel in the ground force.

On 9th September 1979 the above person travels to Italy with his family and contacts ths U.S. embassy in Rome and in there he vows to be *"at the service of the Americans"*.

The CIA. station in Rome with the coordination of CIA's headquarter, begins to investigate about his background and biography and as the first step, request him to gather information regarding the continuation of purchase contract of sub-marine from West Germany and gun-boat from the Netherlands, as well as the information indicating the ability of the Iranian armed forces against Iraqi invasion.

Following a series of contacts and survey in his mental characteristics and individual behaviour as well as his professional background and also his accessibilities to classified documents required by the CIA for identifying the second in rank colonels who are to form the nucleus of the future army, they then decide to hire this man.

Allthough the evaluations of his biography which was conducted more thoroughly later, produced doubts on this man's capabilities to meet the needs, Kambakhsh left Rome and hopped to be in further contacts with the CIA through his mailing address in Iran.

The training record of this man in America reveals that he had an unstable personality and obsequious to his superiors. The main reason he failed to succeed in his education career was due to pleasure seeking life (sex abuse) he had there.

Nevertheless, this treacherous henchman while talking to the CIA, expressed his hatred to the recent events in Iran (victory of Islamic Revolution) and insisted on the necessity of collaboration of "sensible fellows" to upset the situation. He said that the responsibility of the army officers is to rescue Iran from this miserable situation.

Kambakhsh, indirectly confirmed that at least 60% to 70% of the masses are supporting the government, and contended that his tendency for acting as a spy for the U.S. is just for the benefit of the country and claimed that he did not want to be regarded as an agent for America, however he then forgot his comments and unskillfully raised the question of his remuneration and advantages of such coorperation. While he was undergoing tests of the CIA in Rome, Kambakhsh furnished the Americans with whatever information he was

aware of, and perhaps one of the reasons that they were reluctant to investigate further on this agent, was the insignificance and low quality nature of such information and his personal inabilities.

However, after the seizure of U.S. Espionage Den, the activities and employment of this agent came to an end, and order for his prosecution was issued by the judicial authorities and he fell in the hands of justice.

The extent of investment of CIA stations in Europe for this man's employment and the information, they required concerning the preparedness of Iran for confronting the Iraqi's invasion is quite significant and noticeable.



6 SEP 79 03 4 62

S E C R E T 050017Z SEP 79 STAFF

T: DIRECTOR 508050.

: IMMEDIATE ROME INFO TEHRAN.

WINTEL AJAJA

EF: ROME 77637

1. FOLLOWING ARE REQUIREMENTS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN
BRIEFING SUBJECT REF:

A. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE AGREEMENTS TO PURCHASE
EST GERMAN SUBMARINES AND SEVERAL DUTCH FRIGATES WHICH WERE
NG NEGOTIATED BY THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT? HAS THE BAZARGAN
ERNMENT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN RECEIVING THE SUBMARINE
CHASE? WHAT DOES SUBJECT KNOW ABOUT PAST GERMAN-IRANIAN ARMS
REEMENTS?

B. WHAT WAS THE LAST IRANIAN ARMY UNIT SUBJECT SERVED
IN? WHAT WAS TO BE THIS UNIT'S FUNCTION IN EVENT OF WAR WITH
IRAQ? IF IRAN ATTACKED? IF IRAQ ATTACKED? BE AS SPECIFIC AS
POSSIBLE. DID THE UNIT PRACTICE THESE DUTIES? HOW OFTEN?
DISCRIBE MORALE IN THE UNIT? OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS? DID THE
EQUIPMENT WORK? COULD THE IRANIANS USE IT?

C. ANY INFORMATION SUBJECT IS ABLE TO PROVIDE ON THE
IRAQI ARMED FORCES, OR IRANIAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE IRAQIS, WOULD
BE APPRECIATED. PLEASE BE SPECIFIC AND IF SUBJECT GIVES IRANIAN
PERCEPTIONS, PLEASE PROBE TO FIND OUT HOW AND WHY THE IRANIANS
CAME TO THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE IRAQIS.

D. WE ARE INTERESTED IN ANY DETAILS ON MILITARY
RELATIONSHIPS WHICH CONTINUE BETWEEN THE NEW IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
AND THE GERMANS. IRANIAN OFFICERS OR EM TRAINING IN GERMANY?
PLANS TO SEND IRANIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL TO GERMANY?

E. ANY INFORMATION SUBJECT IS ABLE TO PROVIDE ON THE
STRUCTURE, STRENGTH, OR ETHNIC MAKEUP OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD

AGE 2 DIRECTOR 508050 S E C R E T
R INFORMATION ON KURDISH FORCES OPPOSING THE GOVERNMENT WOULD
E OF INTEREST.

F. WHICH OFFICERS (LT. COLONELS OR COLONELS) DOES
SUBJECT THINK MIGHT COMMAND A PERSONNEL FOLLOWING IN THE MILITARY
ND WHY? IF SUBJECT HAS INFORMATION ON MORE SENIOR OFFICERS WE
OULD BE INTERESTED, BUT ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN LITTLE
NOWN MIDDLE LEVEL OFFICERS.

2. FILE DETER. RVW 05 SEP 99 DRV DOC.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#2683

6 Sep 79 13 40Z

C R E T 0600442 SEP 79 STAFF

E DIRECTOR 508094.

IMMED TE ROME INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, ROUTINE FRANKFURT.

INTE AJJA TRACE SGSWIRL

F: ROME 7637 (NOT SENT/NEEDED FRANKFURT)

1. FOLLOWING INFO ON COL. HASHEM KAMBAKHSH TAKEN FROM DEA
O REPORT WHICH PREPARED DURING KAMBAKHSH'S STAY AT FT. HOLABIRD
AP - 5 AUG 1968. SUBJECT WAS CAPT AT THIS TIME. (NOTE
EFERENCE) SPELLING OF SURNAME VICE KAMBAKASH.) DPOB: 1 JAN 1936,
ORO UR) IRAN, POSITION GIVEN AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CHASE (SIC)
CTION, OUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS. SPOUSE'S NAME FARIDEH,
IVORCED AFTER 16 MONTHS OF MARRIAGE, REASON UNKNOWN. ONE
AUGHTER SHAHLA. EXTREMELY EXTROVERTED INDIVIDUAL ALMOST TO THE
OINT OF MAKING A NUISANCE OF HIMSELF. IN GENERAL A PLEASANT
ERSON (ED) MIXED WELL WITH OTHERS IN SOCIAL SITUATIONS. EX-
REMELY RANK CONSCIOUS AND NOTED FOR "PLAYING UP" TO HIGHER
ANKING PERSONNEL IN ORDER TO GAIN FAVORS. ABOVE AVERAGE INTEL-
IGENCE (THOUGH HE RANKED LOW ACADEMICALLY IN THE COURSE. IT WAS
ELIEVED THAT LACK OF ACADEMIC SUCCESS DUE TO EXTRACURRICULAR
CTIVITIES; SUBJECT WAS NOTED AS BEING "LADIES MAN". HIS LOYALTY
O H S COUNTRY AND GOVERNMENT UNQUESTIONED. EXTREMELY PROUD OF
EING A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND CONSIDERS CIC TO BE THE
ELITE OF THE ARMY. CONSIDERS HIMSELF TO BE FLUENT IN ENGLISH
AND FOND OF SPEAKING IN AMERICAN SLANG AND MILITARY ABBREVIATIONS.
ACTUAL ABILITY TO EXPRESS HIMSELF ORALLY AND IN WRITING IN ENGLISH
IS SOMEWHAT PRIMITIVE. SPOKE FAVORABLY OF PREVIOUS STAYS IN U.S.
IN MOSLEM ENVIRONMENT SUBJECT IS PROBABLY "STRAIGHT-LACED"; HOW-
EVER, OUTSIDE THIS ENVIRONMENT SUBJECT DRINKS AND SPENDS CON-
SIDERABLE TIME CHASING AVAILABLE WOMEN. WAS SEEN SEVERAL TIMES
BY HIMSELF ON EAST BALTIMORE ST., "THE BLOCK", WHERE A SERIES OF
STRIP TEASE ESTABLISHMENTS ARE LOCATED. DID NOT DISPLAY HIGH
ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT IN THE COURSE AND HAD MINIMAL PARTICIPATION
IN CLASSROOM DISCUSSIONS.

2. NO ADDITIONAL INFO HQS. TEHRAN STATION CARDS, WHICH



DIRECTOR 508094 S E C R E T
HQ . ALSO CHECKED.

3. PE DING TEHRAN STATION CONCURRENCE. THERE IS RPT IS OPS
TIRE T N KA BAKESH AS POTENTIAL PENETRATION IRANIAN ARMY. DUE
IT OPERATING CONDITIONS TEHRAN. FURTHER DEBRIEFING,
SSIENT AND RECRUITMENT WOULD NEED BE DONE OUTSIDE IRAN. IF
BLE, ROME SHOULD ALSO AIM FOR SGSWIRL AND BASIC COMMO TRAININ
AMBAKESH. SEPARATE CABLE WITH DEBRIEFING REQUIREMENTS
WS.

4. INDEX RAMBAKESH. FILE: 41-120-27. RVW 5SEP99 DRV

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

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O R E T 06123 SEP 79 STAFF

E ROME 7765A

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN

INTEL AJAJA

FS: A. DIRECTOR 508094
B. DIRECTOR 508050

1. SUBJECT REFS (REQUEST CRYPTONYM) MET BY STATION
FFICER ANAGLARE UNDER ALIAS "JAMES LITTLE" FOR ONE HOUR
EBRIEFING & SEPT. TALKS LIMITED TO ONE HOUR AS SUBJECT HAD
ROUGHT ENTIRE FAMILY WITH HIM TO EMBASSY AND WIFE AND THREE
HILDREN WERE WAITING IN RECEPTION ROOM WHILE SUBJECT AND
/O TALKED. FULL DEBRIEFING OF SUBJECT ON ITEMS CONTAINED
F B SCHEDULED FOR MID-DAY 7 SEPTEMBER. WILL ADVISE INFO
SAP.

2. SUBJECT WASTED NO TIME IN FRANKLY DISCUSSING HIS
REASONS FOR CONTACTING (VPLAZON. HE STATED HE WAS "A
PROFESSIONAL" WHO WAS USING HIS VACATION IN ITALY TO TRY AND
MAKE CONTACT WITH THE "RIGHT PEOPLE" IN THE U.S. EMBASSY. HE
TATED HIS COMPLETE CONTEMPT FOR THE RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN,
AND THE NEED FOR "SANE PERSONS" TO WORK TOGETHER TO REVERSE
THE SITUATION. HE STATED THAT BECAUSE OF HIS CLOSE CONNECTIONS
WITH THE U.S. MILITARY, HE FELT HIMSELF "ALMOST AMERICAN," AND
WAS HOPING TO BE ABLE TO WORK WITH THE U.S. TO HELP HIS OWN
COUNTRY. HE STATED HE WAS READY TO SPEND THE REST OF HIS
TIME IN ROME (HE WILL DEPART 16 SEPTEMBER) HELPING IN ANY WAY
HE COULD.

3. C/O EXPLAINED THE NECESSITY TO CHECK OUT A PERSON
LIKE SUBJECT WHO UNEXPECTEDLY COMTACTED THE EMBASSY, AND SOME
TIME WAS SPENT GOING OVER SUBJECT'S RECENT HISTORY. HIS FULL
CAREER DETAILS WILL BE OBTAINED IN FIRST DEBRIEFING 7 SEPTEMBER.
SUBJECT LEFT FT. HOLABIRD IN 1968 AND RETURNED TO TEHRAN WHERE
HE SERVED AS MAJOR IN OPERATIONS GROUP OF SUPREME COMMANDER STAFF
UNTIL 1971. HE WAS TRANSFERRED TO SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION





S E C R E T 06 2058Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 508616.

TO: IMMEDIATE ROME INFO TEHRAN.

WINTEL AJAJA

REF: ROME 77654

1. SUBJECT REF ASSIGNED 201-952683. WILL BE ENCRYPTED IN SDTUNDRA/1. IPOA IN PROCESS. WILL ADVISE. (DUE TIME SPENT IN U.S. POA WILL REQUIRE NVCANOPY TRACES, WHICH HAVE BEEN RE-QUESTED.)

2. HQS IRAN BRANCH OFFICER NOWIKOWSKY CURRENTLY TDY LONDON EN ROUTE BONN CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE ASSIST ROME IF REQUIED. WILL BE EASIER TO JUDGE FOLLOWING 7 SEPTEMBER DEBRIEFINGS. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-952683. RVW 06SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

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E C R E T 061447Z SEP 79 STAFF

TE ROME 77659

O: IMMEDIATE ATHTECH, TEHRAN INFO IMMEDIATE FRANTECH, DIRECTOR, IRTECH.

NTEL AJAJA TECHS

EF: A. ROME 77637 (NOT SENT ATHTECH, FRANTECH, DIRTECH)

B. DIRECTOR 508098 (NOT SENT ATHTECH, FRANTECH, DIRTECH)

1. REFS CONCERN IRANIAN ARMY COLONEL IN EARLY FORTIES WHO WALKED INTO EMBASSY 5 SEPTEMBER WITH VIEW TO WORKING FOR AMERICANS. HE IS IN TOWN UNTIL 16 SEPTEMBER PRIOR RETURN TO TEHRAN FOR PCS ASSIGNMENT. SUBJECT WILL BE GIVEN SGSWIRL ON 10 SEPTEMBER.

2. GIVEN TIGHT TIME FRAME THIS REQUIREMENT, WISH SOLICIT ADDEE INPUTS REGARDING TECHNICAL TRAINING SUBJECT SHOULD BE GIVEN, PROVIDED SGSWIRL RESULTS SATISFACTORY. INITIAL THOUGHTS INCLUDE SECRET WRITING AND SHORT-RANGE ELECTRONIC COMMO, BUT WE UNFAMILIAR WITH CURRENT CAPABILITY OF TEHRAN STATION TO SUPPORT EITHER TYPE OF SYSTEM, OR FACILITIES OF USING IRANIAN POSTAL SYSTEM FOR LOCAL OR INTERNATIONAL MAILING.

3. REQUEST TEHRAN EVALUATE CASE AND INITIATE SOONEST APPROPRIATE REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL SYSTEMS AUTHORIZATION. ZVIVID WOULD HANDLE SYSTEMS RECOMMENDATION, WHILE EZNOVA WOULD PROVIDE SPECIALIST TRAINING OFFICERS AS APPROPRIATE AND SUPPLY TECH HARDWARE AS NEEDED. SUGGEST FRANKFURT SGSWIRL OFFICER WHO DUE ARRIVE ROME 10 SEPT, MAY BE ABLE TO HAND-CARRY SUPPLIES AS NEEDED TO MEET DEADLINE.

4. FILE DEFER. RVW 6SEP99 DRV D9C.1.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 0709402 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE ATHTECH 23989

TO: IMMEDIATE ROME INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, FRANTECH, DIRTECH.

W/INTEL AJAJA TECHS

REFS: A. ROME 7765S
B. TEHRAN 5411

1. PER REFS, IF SWIRL RESULTS ARE SATISFACTORY, PLEASE
INFORMATION KEYED TO SWIRL REQUEST FORM 30-5R TO EZVIVID SELECTION CAN BE MADE.

2. FILE: 41-120-27. RVW 07 SEP 99, DIV D9C.1.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 101124Z SEP 879 STAFF

CITE RAHTECH 77748

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, TEHRAN INFO DIRTECH, FRANTECH.

WNINTEL AJAJA EZWIZARD SDTUNDRA

1. EZNOVA EXWIZARD OFFICER KITTOCK ADMINISTERED THE JBMINIUM TO WALK-IN SDTUNDRA/1 (T/1), ON 7 SEPTEMBER. T/1 MADE A GENERALLY FAVORABLE IMPRESSION. HE HAS EVOLVED A HEALTHY PERSONALITY ADJUSTMENT WHICH SHOULD ALLOW HIM TO PERFORM EFFECTIVELY AS AN INTELLIGENCE AGENT RUN INTO HIS OWN ENVIRONMENT/CULTURE.

2. T/1 IS ONLY MODESTLY ABOVE AVERAGE IN LEVEL OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE, PRESUMABLY LESS SO THAN MOST U.S. MILITARY OFFICERS OF COMPARABLE RANK. HOWEVER, THIS DIFFERENCE IS PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING AS SEEN FROM THE WESTERN VIEWPOINT, AND COMPARED TO HIS OWN COLLEAGUES T/1 LIKELY RANKS HIGH IN COMPETENCE. FURTHER, SEVERAL OF HIS BASIC CHARACTERISTICS ARE "NATURALS" FOR AN OFFICER IN A HIGHLY AUTHORITARIAN MILITARY STRUCTURE. THIS IS, HE DOES NOT HAVE TO "ACT" IN ORDER TO FIT THE PART.

3. THE ADJUSTMENT IS BOTH PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND PHYSICALLY TENSE AND CONSEQUENCES ARE THAT HE MAY TIRE EASILY AND THAT HE MAY EXPERIENCE HEALTH COMPLAINTS. HOWEVER, T/1 IS INDEPENDENT, SELF-CENTERED AND TOUGH MINDED. HIS STUBBORNESS WILL HAVE A TOUCH OF ARROGANCE AND HE MAY APPEAR MORE NEGATIVISTIC THAN HE INTENDS. HE OPERATES WITH A GREAT DEAL OF HIDDEN HOSTILITY, HOSTILITY WHICH IS USUALLY EXPRESSED IN VERBAL FORM AS SARCASM AND BITTERNESS.

4. T/1 IS SOCIALLY ACTIVE AND AGGRESSIVE, THRIVES UPON (AND REQUIRES) SOCIAL CONTACT AND SHOULD BE GOOD AT MOVING/MIXING/DEVELOPING IN HIS FAMILIAR CONTEXT/CULTURE. HE IS, HOWEVER, NOT APT TO PERFORM WELL IN UNFAMILIAR SOCIAL SITUATIONS, FOR HIS STYLE IS RELATIVELY INFLEXIBLE/STEREOTYPED FOR THIS REASON HE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED VERY DECEPTIVE.

PAGE 2 ROME 7748 S E C R E T
IS HE CAN BE "READ" FAIRLY WELL. T/1 CAN CERTAINLY LEE WITH SOME SUCCESS BUT HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO REPRESENT HIMSELF IN THE GRANDIOUS MANNER WHICH WOULD SUGGEST PATHOLOGICAL LYING.

5. HE WILL TEND TO EXAGGERATE HIS SELF-IMPORTANCE AND COMPETENCE, AND THE GREATEST DANGER WOULD BE IF HE DID NOT KEEP HIS ARROGANCE AND CONFIDENCE UNDER ADEQUATE CONTROL. CYNICISM AND CONTEMPT ARE JUST UNDER THE SURFACE, AND SECRET VINDICTIVENESS BECOMES T/1'S STYLE WHEN HE FEELS HE HAS BEEN HUMILIATED/UNDERESTIMATED/BETRAYED. HE IS, THEREFORE, AN INPLACE TYPE, AND HE WOULD APPEAR CAPABLE OF PERFORMING WELL IN SUCH CAPACITY.

6. T/1 SHOULD BE A SATISFACTORY SGSWIRL SUBJECT. THAT IS, HE IS A REACTOR, AND A VALID TEST SHOULD BE OBTAINED.

7. T/1 IS TRAINABLE IN A TECHNICAL SENSE. HE IS LESS APT TO HAVE AN IMMEDIATE NATURAL FEEL FOR A TECHNIQUE OR PROCEDURE, BUT HE IS HIGHLY MOTIVATED TO BE PRECISE AND WILL, THUS, LEARN. HE SHOULD PRACTICE A PROCEDURE UNTIL IT BECOMES ALMOST HABIT.

8. JB MINIMUM FORMULA: 11 KE MINUS C PLUS C FCC PLUS U PLUS C OD L.

9. FILE: 201-962683. RVW 10SEP99 DRV D9C14.

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S E C R E T 101124Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE ROME 7749

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN.

WINTEL AJAJA SDTUNDRA

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 508050
B. TEHRAN 5414
C. DIRECTOR 508616
D. ROME 7654

1. SDTUNDRA/1 (T/1) DEBRIEFED 7 SEPTEMBER ON SUBJECTS CONTAINED REF A WITH RESULTS BEING SENT SEPARATELY. ALSO BEING SENT SEPARATELY IS A FULL REVIEW OF T/1'S MILITARY CAREER AND JBMINIMUM TEST RESULTS.

2. SECOND DAY OF TALKS WITH T/1 ALLOWED SOME RAPPORT TO BUILD BETWEEN C/O AND T/1 WITH T/1 LOOKING BETTER ALL THE TIME. AS CAN BE SEEN FROM T/1'S RESPONSES TO DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS, HE IS NOT PARTICULARLY WELL INFORMED AS TO MILITARY JOB OR OTHER SPECIFIC MILITARY DETAILS. HE HAS SPENT ALMOST TEN YEARS IN SECURITY WORK WITH A SPECIAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE DEFENSE MINISTRY AND HAS NEVER HELD A FIELD COMMAND. IT WOULD SEEM T/1'S VALUE MIGHT LIE IN FACT THAT HE IS NOW A SENIOR OFFICER, WHO RECENTLY HAS ATTENDED STAFF COLLEGE AND SHOULD KNOW TO ONE DEGREE OR ANOTHER MOST OF THE IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICERS BETWEEN THE RANK OF LTCOL AND BRIGADIER GENERAL, WHO ARE NOT IN TROUBLE, AND WHO WILL BE THE NUCLEUS FOR TOMORROWS IRANIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP. AS SUCH, HE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE RTACTION INFORMATION ON WHO IS PLANNING WHAT, AND WHY. (FOR EXAMPLE, T/1 STATED NEW CHIEF OF THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, APPOINTED AT END OF AUGUST, BGEN ALI ASGHAR E N T E G A M I , IS A CLOSE FRIEND.)

3. IN COURSE OF DAY-LONG TALKS, T/1 CONTINUALLY VOICED HATRED OF "THE MULLAHS" STATING THAT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MILITARY OFFICERS WILL BE TO LEAD IRAN OUT OF THE MESS THE COUNTRY IS PRESENTLY IN. HE STATED THAT HE AND HIS

ELLOW SENIOR OFFICERS ARE SITTIN BACK PATIENTLY WATCHING
KHOMEINI "DIG HIS OWN GRAVE", AND WAITING FOR THE TIME WHEN
HE MAJORITY OF THE POPULACE HAVE HAD ENOUGH OF WHAT IS GOI G
ON BEFORE MAKING ANY MOVES. T/1 SAID, WHILE HE HATED TO AD IT
IT, "60-75 PERCENT OF IRANIANS AR TOTAL IDIOTS" AND WERE
SWEPT OFF THEIR FEET BY THE COMBI ATION OF RELIGIOUS FERVOU
AND ANTI-SHAH EXCITEMENT AND THUS BACKED KHOMEINI'S CALL FO A
RELIGIOUS REPUBLIC. T/1 BELIEVES ALL THIS WILL WITHER AWAY
IN THE FACE OF ECONOMIC DISASTERS CAUSED BY THE COLLAPSE OF
CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN IRAN. HE BELIEVES ONLY THE MILITARY WILL
HAVE THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PERSONAL LOYALTIES TO SURVIVE
THIS COLLAPSE AND WILL BE IN A POSITION TO RALLY THE COUNTRY
TO A MORE DEMOCRATIC AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT LATER ON.
T/1 STATED "THE SHAH WILL NEVER RETURN" BUT THAT THE "MULLAHS
MUST GO." HE PREDICTED "THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE WILL DIE" IN THE
PROCESS OF CLEARING OUT KHOMEINI BUT THAT THIS WAS AN
ACCEPTABLE PRICE TO PAY FOR THE REBIRTH OF IRAN.

3. SEVERAL TIMES DURING DAY, T/1 ANXIOUSLY ASKED C/O
WHETHER OR NOT HE WAS GOING TO BE ABLE TO START "TRAINING."
T/1 SAID HE AND HIS CLOSE FRIEND (SUBJECT PARA 4 REF D) HAD
PLANNED TOGETHER TO "CONTACT THE AMERICANS" AND T/1 WANTED
TO BE CERTAIN THAT THERE WOULD BE ENOUGH TIME FOR HIM TO BE
TRAINED FOR CONTINUED CONTACT WITH AMERICANS" IN TEHRAN."
T/1 SAID HE WAS FULLY AWARE THE ONLY PRACTICABLE CONTACT FOR
FUTURE COOPERATION BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
WOULD HAVE TO BE IN TEHRAN, AS HE "LIVED AND WORKED THERE,"
BUT HE WANTED TO HAVE SECURE CONTACT AND THIS WOULD REQUIRE
TRAINING FOR HIM. HE EXPRESSED WORRY THAT WE WERE WASTING
TIME. T/1 WAS TOLD HE HAD TO "BE CLEARED" WHICH HE SHOULD
UNDERSTAND, GIVEN HIS OWN SECURITY SPECIALTY, AND THAT
NOTHING COULD BE STARTED UNTIL THIS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. THIS
OPPORTUNITY ALLOWED C/O TO DISCUSS THE JBMINIMUM TEST AND THE
SGSWIRL EXAM PLANNED FOR 10 SEPTEMBER. T/1 INDICATED HIS FULL
AGREEMENT TO THESE TESTS AND SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK THE JBMINIMUM
TEST BY EZWIZARD OFFICER KITTOCK. T/1 WAS TOLD THAT IF ALL
TESTS WERE POSITIVE, HIS TRAINING WOULD BEGIN 11 SEPTEMBER,
AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE ENOUGH TIME TO TRAIN HIM ADEQUATELY.
DURING THIS CONVERSATION, T/1 ASKED "AS A FRIEND" DID C/O THINK
"YOU" (MEANING RTACTION) WOULD WANT TO WORK WITH HIM. C/O

REPLIED THAT FRANKLY "WE" WERE VERY PLEASED WITH OPPORTUNITY
TO TALK WITH T/1 AND IF TESTS WENT WELL WE WOULD VERY LIKELY
WANT TO WORK WITH HIM. T/1 STATED HIS READINESS TO TAKE ALL
AND ANY TEST TO PROVE HIS SINCERITY AND REITERATED HIS
PLEASURE AT MAKING CONTACT WITH AMERICANS.

4. FROM OUR OPTIC, T/1 LOOKS PRETTY GOOD, AND WE WOULD
BE SURPRISED IF T/1 FLUNKED HIS SGSWIRL. BELIEVE IT IS
TIME TO GET PREPARED FOR A HECTIC FIVE DAYS BEFORE T/1 MUST
RETURN TO TEHRAN, PROVIDING ADDEES AGREE T/1 IS WORTH FINAL
RECRUITMENT. ROME STATION CAN PROVIDE BASIC TRAINING TO
T/1 ON REPORTING AND COMMO PROCEDURES AS SUGGESTED BY REF B,
HOWEVER OUR EXPERIENCE IN TRAINING OTHER AGENTS INDICATES
THAT IT IS ALMOST A NECESSITY FOR SOMEONE FROM STATION INVOLVED
TO DISCUSS CONTACT SITES IN OPERATIONAL CITY WITH AGENT PRIOR
HIS DEPLOYMENT INTO WHAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE A BLIND CONTACT
WITH AN RTACTION OFFICER IN DIFFICULT SITUATION. BELIEVE IF
WE ARE IN ACCORD T/1 IS WORTH IT, OPS OFFICER, EITHER FROM
TEHRAN OR AT LEAST OFFICER FULLY FAMILIAR WITH TEHRAN ENVIRON-
MENT, ARRANGE TDY TO ROME FOR TALKS WITH T/1 SO THAT REALISTIC
AND SECURE CONTACT POINTS IN TEHRAN CAN BE MUTUALLY WORKED OUT.
(WE WOULD STRONGLY FAVOR ACTUAL TEHRAN CASE OFFICER WHO WILL
HANDLE T/1 MAKING TRIP, BUT THIS MAY NOT BE FEASIBLE BECAUSE
OF OTHER FACTORS WHICH ROME NOT AARE.) ALSO CONCUR IN
SUGGESTION PER REF A THAT IRAN DESK OFFICER NOWIKOWSKY
ARRANGE COME ROME WEEK 10-15 SEPT TO WORK WITH T/1. HIS
ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY IN REPORTING TECHNIQUES, WOULD
BE INVALUABLE AID IN FOCUSING TRAINING FOR T/1 PRECISELY TO
FIT IRANIAN REALITIES, WHICH ROME STATION OFFICERS NOT
FAMILIAR.

5. WE NOTE IN REF B NO MENTION WAS MADE OF TRAINING T/1
IN SW. QUERY ONCE MORE IF ADDEES DO NOT WISH TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF T/1 PRESENCE IN ROME TO PROVIDE HIM WITH SECURE
COMMO. TRTACTION OTHER THAN PERSONAL CONTACT IN TEHRAN, WHICH
SUBJECT TO MANY DELICATE FACTORS, MOST IMPORTANT THE PHYSICAL
PRESENCE OF T/1 IN TEHRAN. HE EXPECTS TO BE ASSIGNED TO AMOS
IN TEHRAN, BUT WE HAVE NO ASSURANCE THIS WILL ACTUALLY OCCUR.
IF T/1 IS SW, HE CAN AT LEAST COMMUNICATE WITH RTACTION FROM
WHEREVER HE MIGHT BE SENT UNTIL PERSONAL CONTACT CAN BE
ESTABLISHED AT SOME LATER DATE. PLEASE ADVISE, AS SW
CLEARANCES WILL BE NECESSARY IF THIS TRAINING DESIRED.

6. FILE: 201-962683. RVW 10SEP 99 DRV D9C.1.

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10 Sep 79 12 48Z

S E C R E T 1011242Z SEP 79 STAFF

SITE ROME 77750

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN.

ZNINIL AJAJA SDIUNDRA

REFS: A. ROME 77749

B. DIRECTOR 303050

1. FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS OF SDIUNDRA/1 BRIEFINGS ON 7 SEPT, PER REF B. ALL RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO REF B PARAGRAPHS. WHERE APPLICABLE, T/1 COMMENTS ARE ADDED IN PARENTHESES:

A. T/1 HAD NO INFORMATION CONCERNING WEST GERMAN SUBMARINES OR DUTCH FRIGATES. HE STATED HIS ORGANIZATION HAD STOPPED FUNCTIONING ("LIKE THEY TURNED OFF THE SWITCH") WHEN THE COLLAPSE OF THE SHAH BEGAN, AND NOTHING HAS PASSED THROUGH THE OFFICES IN THE WAY OF REAL BUSINESS SINCE MARCH 1979. ON-GOING ORDERS WERE STILL TRICKLING IN, BUT THESE WERE ITEMS CONTRACTED BEFORE THE END OF THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT. SO FAR AS T/1 KNEW, THINGS IN HIS ORGANIZATION HAD NOT STARTED UP AGAIN, ALTHOUGH HE HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT OUT OF TOUCH SINCE NOVEMBER 1978. (T/1 COMMENTED THAT IT WAS NOT HIS JOB TO BE AWARE OF THE ACTUAL BUSINESS OF HIS ORGANIZATION, AS HE WAS RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE OPERATION. HE KNEW THE CASE HISTORIES OF EVERYONE IN THE ORGANIZATION, BUT DID NOT NECESSARILY KNOW WHAT THEY WERE ALL DOING. HE STATED THAT COMPARTMENTATION WAS FAIRLY STRICT. HE FELT HE COULD KNOW A LOT MORE ABOUT HIS ORGANIZATION, IF THAT WAS WHAT WE WANTED, SINCE ONE OF HIS BEST FRIENDS HAD RECENTLY BEEN APPOINTED IN CHARGE OF THE WHOLE ORGANIZATION.)

B. T/1 DID NOT KNOW MUCH OB INFO. HE STATED THAT IN GENERAL, MAINTENANCE WAS POOR IN THE MILITARY AND MUCH OF THE EXPENSIVE EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE IN THE VARIOUS MILITARY BRANCHES WAS INOPERATIVE AT THE BEST OF TIMES, AND AT THIS STAGE IN THE MILITARY, HE FEARED THINGS WERE MUCH WORSE. MORALE BEFORE THE COLLAPSE OF THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT WAS GOOD. T/1 ESTIMATED AT THAT TIME 95 PER CENT OF THE MILITARY WERE

SATISFIED, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, WERE "RESPONSIBLE" TO THEIR DUTIES AND THEIR ORDERS. NOW THINGS HAVE CHANGED, AND HE ESTIMATED ONLY 25 PER CENT OF THE ENLISTED RANKS WERE STILL ON DUTY, MOST HAVING EITHER QUIT AND JOINED THE RANKS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS OR JUST GONE BACK TO THEIR HOMES. THE NCO RANKS AND ABOVE ARE ON DUTY, MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY NEED TO BE PAID. THIS ALLOWS TECHNICAL BRANCHES OF THE MILITARY, TO SUCH AS MECHANIZED EQUIPMENT AND THE AIR FORCE, TO FUNCTION TO SOME DEGREE SINCE THE NCO'S ARE STILL ON THE JOB. MORALE IS TERRIBLE, BUT NO ONE KNOWS WHAT TO DO, SO THINGS AT THE PRESENT ARE ROLLING ALONG ON THEIR OWN MOMENTUM.

C. T/1 HAD NO IDEA OF WHAT THE CAPABILITIES OR INTENTIONS OF THE IRAQIS MIGHT BE. HE HAD NO IDEA OF PRESENT IRANIAN POLICY VERSUS THE IRAQIS BUT OPINED "THERE WAS NONE."

D. THE ONLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH T/1 WAS FAMILIAR WAS THE TRAINING OF 30 TRAINEES OF THE IADO IN WEST GERMANY. THE TRAINEES ARE BEING INSTRUCTED IN INDUSTRIAL TECHNIQUES AND ORGANIZATION AND ARE SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO IRAN AT THE END OF 1979. TO T/1'S KNOWLEDGE, THE TRAINING HAS NOT BEEN INTERRUPTED BY THE REVOLUTION, NOR HAVE ANY OF THE TRAINEES BEEN RECALLED. T/1 HAS NO INDICATION THAT TRAINING WILL BE RESUMED, ONCE THE PRESENT TRAINING GROUP RETURNS.

E. T/1 BECAME HIGHLY EMOTIONAL OVER THIS QUESTION AND STATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES WERE NOTHING BUT "YOUNG PUNKS" ARMED WITH IRANIAN MILITARY WEAPONS WHICH THEY HAD STOLEN FROM THE MILITARY WAREHOUSES. T/1 BELIEVES THESE GROUPS ARE TOTALLY DISORGANIZED AND INCAPABLE OF ANY REAL FIGHTING CAPABILITY. (T/1 STATED THAT ONE "GOOD LOYAL BRIGADE OF ARMY TOOPS, COULD TAKE OVER THE ENTIRE COUNTRY." HE ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS NO "GOOD BRIGADE" LEFT, BECAUSE THE ENLISTED MEN HAD ALL DESERTED, BUT THIS WOULD BE CORRECTED IN TIME. T/1 SAID THERE HAD BEEN SO MANY ACCIDENTS INVOLVING REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADE PERSONNEL SHOOTING EACH OTHER THAT ORDERS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO TRY AND KEEP THE WEAPONS UNLOADED BY KEEPING MAGAZINES OUT OF THE SEMI-AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, BUT THAT THIS WAS NOT VERY SUCCESSFUL.

PAGE 3 ROME 7775Ø S E C R E T
PARTLY BECAUSE THE "TROOPS" LIKE TO SQUEEZE OFF ROUNDS OCCASIONALLY FOR THE FUN OF IT. WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT THE MILITARY MOBILIZATION AGAINST THE KURDS, T/I SAID THIS WAS MOSTLY THE NCO AND ABOVE FACTION OF THE ARMY THAT STILL RESPONDED TO ORDERS, AND DID NOT INVOLVE THE "REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS." T/I FELT THE ARMED COMMUNIST GROUPS DID NOT NECESSARILY RESEMBLE THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, AS THEY WERE MORE PROFESSIONAL AND HAD SOME KIND OF DISCIPLINE. HE PREDICTED THAT THIS WOULD BE THE GROUP WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE DESTROYED WHEN THE ARMY TOOK POWER LATER ON.

F. THIS PART OF THE DEBRIEFING IS BEING DELAYED PENDING SOME "HOMEWORK" BY T/I. THE SUBJECT OF COMPETENT MILITARY OFFICERS WAS ONE WHICH VERY MUCH APPEALED TO T/I, AND IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT HE THINK ABOUT SOME OF HIS IDEAS ON THIS PROBLEM DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS, WITH A VIEW TO A MORE INDEPTH DISCUSSION OF WHO WAS A "GOOD" OFFICER AND WHO WAS NOT. PER REF, IT IS IN THIS AREA WHERE T/I MAY HAVE HIS BEST UTILITY, BUT THIS IS GOING TO TAKE A BIT OF WORK WITH T/I TO ORGANIZE HIS RESPONSE TO INCLUDE ALL "GOOD" OFFICERS AND NOT JUST HIS FRIENDS. THIS REQUIREMENT WILL BE ANSWERED IN MORE DEPTH LATER IN SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH T/I.

2. FILE: 201-962683. RVW 10SEP99 DRV D9C.1.
S E C R E T

10 SEP 79 5 42

ET 101124Z SEP 79 STAFF

E 77751

MEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN.

AJAJA SDTUNDRA

OME 77749

FOLLOWING IS PROFESSIONAL HISTORY OF COLONEL HASHEM
A K H S H AS OBTAINED 7 SEPTEMBER:

DPOB: 24 DECEMBER 1935, TEHRAN, IRAN
1954 - GRADUATED AS SECOND LIEUTENANT FROM "WEST POINT" OF IRANIAN ARMY. ASSIGNED THIRD DIVISION, SEVENTH REGIMENT, IN MARAGHEH, OUTER AZARBAIJAN. WAS ASSIGNED TO TEACH INFANTRY TACTICS. AFTER SIX MONTHS, PASSED ENGLISH EXAM AS NUMBER ONE EXAMINED AND ASSIGNED ENGLISH LANGUAGE SCHOOL IN TEHRAN. COURSE LASTED 24 WEEKS. AFTERWARDS WAS RETURNED TO THIRD DIVISION.
1956 - REASSIGNED TO ADVISORY GROUP, SECOND CORPS, IN ZANZAN, OUTER AZARBAIJAN. AMONG OTHER DUTIES SERVED AS LIAISON OFFICER WITH US. MAAG OFFICERS, WHO RECOMMENDED SUBJECT FOR LANGUAGE TRAINING IN U.S.
LATE 1959-1960 - SENT FORT BRAGG IN U.S. FOR TRAINING IN SPECIAL FORCES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. UPON RETURN TO IRAN, WAS ASSIGNED FIRST CORPS, FIRST BRIGADE IN TEHRAN AS TRAINING OFFICER AND ALSO IN INTELLIGENCE (G-2) SECTION. WAS LIAISON OFFICER FOR AMERICAN MAAG CONTACTS.
1962 - PROMOTED TO FIRST LIEUTENANT
1963 - TRANSFERRED TO SHIRAZ INFANTRY CENTER, STILL WITH FIRST BRIGADE. IN CHARGE OF

PREPARING TEACHING PROGRAMS AND TRAINING SCHEDULES. PASSED AIR FORCE EXAMINATIONS.

1963 - SENT FOR HELICOPTER TRAINING AT LAKLAND AFB IN SAN ANTONIO TEXAS. DID NOT COMPLETE PROGRAM AND FINISHED ASSIGNMENT IN LANGUAGE SCHOOL. STAYED EIGHT MONTHS. ASSIGNED TO SEVENTH DIVISION, MASHHAD, KHORASAN UPON RETURN TO IRAN, WHERE HE WAS IN G-2 SECTION IN CHARGE OF TRAINING.

1964 - PROMOTED TO CAPTAIN (SEPTEMBER)

1965 - ASSIGNED TO MILITARY COUNTER INTELLIGENCE, TEHRAN FOR BASIC CI TRAINING FOR SIX MONTHS. UPON COMPLETION OF TRAINING, SUBJECT WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY REASSIGNED, BUT STAYED ON AT CI CENTER HANDLING CLEARANCE REQUESTS IN THE SECURITY SECTION FOR ABOUT ONE YEAR.

1968 - SENT TO FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND, FOR INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT COURSE LASTING 16 WEEKS. UPON COMPLETION OF COURSE, RETURNED TO IRAN WHERE HE WAS ASSIGNED AGAIN TO CI CENTER, HANDLING CLEARANCE REQUESTS.

1969 - ASSIGNED TO OPERATIONS GROUP, SUPREME COMMANDER STAFF (SCS) WORKING IN PLANS SECTION.

1971 - PROMOTED TO MAJOR AND REASSIGNED TO MILITARY INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION (MIO) SECURITY SECTION. DEALT WITH CLEARANCES FOR CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT, CHECKED ON BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE CONTACTS WITH FOREIGNERS, THEFT, SABOTAGE, IDENTIFICATION PROCEEDURES AND PHYSICAL GUARD FORCE ORGANIZATION.

1973-1974 - BECAUSE OF COMPETENCE IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN ENGLISH, SUBJECT WAS DETAILED TO BE PART OF IRANIAN FORCE SENT TO VIETNAM AS PART OF THE FIRST GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL COMMAND OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (ICCS). REMAINED EIGHT MONTHS IN VIETNAM AND

RECEIVED MEDAL FOR SERVICES FROM IRAN GOVERNMENT. RETURNED TO ORIGINAL ASSIGNMENT IN MIO SECURITY SECTION AFTER VIETNAM. REMAINED IN MIO ASSIGNMENT UNTIL LATE 1978.

1974 - PROMOTED TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL.

1977 - PROMOTED TO COLONEL (SEPTEMBER).

1978 - DETAILED TO AIR FORCE STAFF COLLEGE FOR SENIOR OFFICERS SEMINAR FOR TEN MONTHS, FINISHING COLLEGE IN MID-AUGUST, 1979.

2. TRAVEL: IN ADDITION TO MILITARY ASSIGNMENTS TO U.S. 1959-60, 1963 AND 1968, SUBJECT VISITED U.S. AS TOURIST 1978, VISITING CALIFORNIA. SUBJECT HAS ALSO SPENT A FEW AYS IN PARIS, FRANKFURT AND LONDON DURING THESE TRAVELS. IS TED ROME, ITALY WITH FAMILY OF WIFE AND THREE CHILDREN EPTEMBER 1979.

3. FILE: 201-962683. RVW 8SEPT99 DRV D9C.1.

SEP 19 05 14Z

C R E T 102042Z SEP

E DIRECTOR 51[illegible]

IMMEDIATE BONN [illegible] AY, ROME, TEHRAN, YR/SAN FRANCISCO.

INTEL AJAJA SDTUNDR

REFS: A. BONN 8455[illegible] E/NEEDED ROME)
B. ROME 7774[illegible] BNR BONN, GERMANY)

1. PENDING RE[illegible] GRIENCE, REQUEST NOVIKOWSKY TDY
OME AS SOON AS WORK[illegible] D GERMANY TO ASSIST IN NEWLY-
EVELOPING SITUATION[illegible] NOVIKOWSKY SHOULD THEN RETURN
IRECTLY TO U.S.

2. FOR RONNA: [illegible]1/1 IS IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICER
WALK-IN WHO ROME IS[illegible] FOR RETURN TEHRAN AND COMMENCE
CLANDESTINE AGENT[illegible]. HE IS IN FINAL STAGES TESTING
AND TRAINING. NON[illegible] N PROVIDE NEEDED AREA KNOWLEDGE
ASSISTANCE AND ANO[illegible]SSMENT OF CASE POTENTIAL. ALL
BACKGROUND TRAFFIC[illegible] E AVAILABLE ROME.

3. FOR ROM[illegible]RA/1 IS SO CURIOUSLY DESIROUS OF
CONTACT IN TEHRAN[illegible]GEST POSSIBILITY HE IS PROVOKING US
TO SMOKE OUT ATAC[illegible]ENCE. PLS PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION
TO THIS SECURITY[illegible] N FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND UPCOMING
SIGSWIRE.

4. DEFER[illegible] OPINION RE SW TRAINING. ASSUMING
ABOVE-NOTED SECU[illegible]ERN ALLAYED, HQS TENDS CONCUR IT WOULD
BE USEFUL RESERV[illegible]

5. FALE[illegible] RVW 10 SEPT 99 DRV D90.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#7916

SEP

S E C R E T 1216 02 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE ROME 77769

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDTUNDR

REF: ROME 77749

1. PER REF, SDTUNDRA/1 (T/1) CONTACTED STATION MID-DAY 0 SEPT, AND ASKED FOR A SHORT TALK IN THE EMBASSY. T/1, ALONG WITH FAMILY, ARRIVED AT EMBASSY AT 1630 WHERE ANACLARIO AND T/1 HAD THIRTY MINUTE TALK IN WALK-IN RECEPTION ROOM.

2. DURING TALKS, T/1 EXPLAINED THAT LONG SESSION HE HAD HAD WITH C/O AND WIZARD OFFICER ON FRIDAY HAD PROVOKED DEEP RESENTMENT ON PART OF T/1'S WIFE, WHO HAD BEEN LEFT ON HER OWN WITH CHILDREN AT HOTEL. AS FAMILY SPEAKS ONLY FARSI, THEY ARE TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON T/1 FOR COMMUNICATIONS WITH ITALIANS, AND THUS ACCORDING TO T/1 HIS ABSENCE CAUSED WIFE TO BECOME ALMOST PHYSICALLY ILL FROM FRIGHT AND NERVOUSNESS OVER BEING LEFT ALONE. ACCORDING T/1, UPON RETURNING TO HOTEL FROM MEETING WITH C/O ON FRIDAY (IT HAD LASTED SEVEN HOURS, INCLUDING LUNCH) THERE WAS A GREAT SCENE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS WIFE, AND T/1 DOES NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WISE TO REPEAT ANY ABSENCE FROM HIS WIFE FOR THE REST OF HIS VACATION.

3. C/O ARGUED IN VAIN THAT THIS WOULD MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR ANYTHING SERIOUS TO BE ARRANGED BETWEEN T/1 AND C/O OVER CONTACTS IN IRAN, SINCE IT WOULD BE NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE ANY PLANS FOR TEHRAN CONTACT. T/1 SAID THIS WOULDN'T BE ALL THAT DIFFICULT, AS HE WOULD PROVIDE HIS HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER AND ADDRESS IN TEHRAN, AND HE COULD BE CONTACTED BY TELEPEOPLE AND SOMEONE COULD DRIVE OUT TO HIS HOUSE AND MEET HIM THERE. T/1 AGAIN LAUNCHED INTO A MONOLOGUE ABOUT HOW MUCH HE ADMIRED THE U.S. AND WANTED TO HELP HIS "CLOSE FRIENDS." HE THEN CAME OUT WITH A NEW SLANT, WHICH PROBABLY MIRRORED HIS INNER FEELINGS, THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO BE AN "AGENT" AND THAT HE KNEW ALL ABOUT "CASE OFFICERS AND AGENTS" AND HE WANTED IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS "COOPERATING" WITH THE "AMERICANS" ONLY BECAUSE IT WAS FOR

PAGE 2 ROME 7776 S E C R E T
HIS COUNTRY, AND THAT HE WOULD NEVER BE AN AGENT.

4. CONVERSATION WENT ON IN THIS VEIN FOR SEVERAL MORE MINUTES, WITH C/O TRYING TO GET T/1 TO SPEND A FEW HOURS DURING THE WEEK WORKING WITH HIM, AND T/1 TALKING TO HIS DECISION NOT TO LEAVE HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN ALONE. A COMPROMISE FINALLY WAS WORKED OUT WHEN C/O SUGGESTED HE HOST T/1 AND FAMILY FOR DINNER ON FRIDAY NIGHT, 14 SEPTEMBER AT WHICH TIME IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT TO DO OVER POSSIBLE CONTACT IN TEHRAN. SINCE NONE OF FAMILY CAN SPEAK ENGLISH, CONVERSATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE WHILE FAMILY PRESENT. T/1 LIKED THIS IDEA AND AGREED FOR DINNER AT THAT TIME.

5. JUST PRIOR TO RETURNING TO THE EMBASSY RECEPTION ROOM WHERE HIS FAMILY AWAITED HIM, T/1 STOPPED C/O TO INQUIRE WHAT WOULD BE HIS "PRIVILAGES" IF HE WORKED FOR THE AMERICANS. C/O REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD BE SOMETHING THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL, BUT WOULD BE IF POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE IN THE SHORT TIME WE HAVE TO TALK WITH T/1 IN ROME. T/1 SAID HE WOULD WAIT UNTIL HE MET HIS CONTACT IN TEHRAN.

6. NEEDLESS TO SAY STATION SOMEWHAT CAST DOWN BY TURN OF EVENTS. IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT APPEAR THAT T/1 IS AS INTELLIGENT AND SINCERE AS HE INITIALLY APPEARED FOUR DAYS AGO. IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE HIM IN THIS SITUATION, BECAUSE WE HAVE SUCH SHORT CONTACT WITH HIM. HIS LACK OF CONTROL OVER HIS WIFE IS DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN (SHE APPEARS THE ROUND, FAT UNIMPOSING WIFE). SHE MAY HAVE THE MONEY IN THE FAMILY, AS T/1 HAS MENTIONED HAVING A MERCEDES AND A SWIMMING POOL AT HIS HOUSE, AND SHE THUS IS ABLE TO HOLD THE PURSE STRINGS OVER HER HUSBAND. IT MAY ALSO BE T/1 THOUGHT THAT UPON HIS RETURN HOME HE WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO A SEVERE GRILLING BY HIS SUPERIORS OVER THE WEEKEND, AND DECIDED HE DIDN'T WANT THE EXPERIENCE.

7. IN LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, STATION CAN NO LONGER MAINTAIN PREVIOUS OPTIMISM OVER T/1 POTENTIAL. THUS WE JUST DEFER TO ADDEES AS TO FURTHER ACTION IN THIS CASE. IF DEEMED USEFUL, NOWIKOWSKY CAN STILL COME ROME AND ATTEND FRIDAY DINNER FOR LOOK AT T/1. GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES, IT

PAGE 3 ROME 7776 S E C R E T
WOULD NOT SEEM DESIRABLE FOR T/1 TO BE INTRODUCED TO TEHRAN STATION OFFICER AT THIS TIME. WE WOULD PLAN IN ANY CASE TO GET T/1 ADDRESS AND PHONE NUMBER IN TEHRAN FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT, AND THEN LET HIM AND HIS (CENSORED) WIFE AND FAMILY GO BACK TO IRAN ON 16 SEPTEMBER.

8. FILE: 21-962683. RVW 10SEPT99 IRV DOC.1.

SECRET
#7769

C R E [illegible] 262327 SEP 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 512694.

IMMEDIATE BONN INFO IMMEDIATE GERMANY, ROME, TEHRAN.

TEL AJAXA SDTUNDRA

: ROME 77769 (NOT SENT/NEEDED BONN, GERMANY)

1. IN VIEW REF, NOWIKOWSKY SHOULD NOT NOW PLAN TDY
E FOR SDTUNDRA/1 CASE.

2. FOR ROME: REGRET RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE MUST
LIEVE YOUR ABLE HANDLING HAS NOW PREVENTED OUR BEING LED
RTHER DOWN THE GARDEN PATH BY A WALK-IN WHOSE MOTIVATIONS
MUST BE JUDGED HIGHLY SUSPECT. T/1'S BEHAVIOR VERY FISHY
D MAY PERHAPS MOST LIKELY BE EXPLAINED BY FEAR OF SGSWIRL.
NCUR STATION PLANS FOR 14 SEPTEMBER DINNER AND ACQUISITION
/1 TEHRAN PHONE NUMBER AND ADDRESS.

3. FILE: 201-962683. RYW 10 SEPT 79 DRV DOC.2 ALL SECRET
E C R E T
BT
#2187

20 Sep 79 [illegible]

[illegible] 13367 SEP 79 STAFF

ROME 77769

DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

NTEL AJAXA SDTUNDRA

FS: A. ROME 77769
B. DIRECTOR 512694

1. PER REF A, SDTUNDRA/1 (T/1) AND FAMILY HOSTED FOR
NER AND OPERA ON NIGHT OF 14 SEPTEMBER. EVENING PASSED
RY PAINLESSLY, WITH T/1 HANDLING TRANSLATING CHORES, AND
S VERY NICE AND POLITE FAMILY BEING EXTREMELY PERSONABLE
AND CHARMING, GIVEN TEN LANGUAGE BARRIERS. T/1 WIFE PROVED
TO BE A VERY PLEASANT PERSON AND T/1 OBVIOUSLY WAS VERY
ROUD OF HIS FAMILY, ESPECIALLY HIS SON.

2. IN RETROSPECT, C/O REGRETS VERY SHORT TIME
FRAME WE HAD TO WORK WITH T/1 AS THERE LITTLE DOUBT HE MIGHT
HAVE WORKED INTO SOME KIND OF AGENT POSSIBILITY. HAD THERE
BEEN ENOUGH TIME TO MASSAGE HIM AROUND TO THE RIGHT POINT
OF VIEW. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT HIS "IN CHARGE" ATTITUDE
DID NOT EXTEND TO THE REALITIES OF BEING DEBRIEFED,
BEING UNMINIMIZED AND SGSWIRLED. IT APPEARS HE THOUGHT HE COULD
BE SOMEONE WHO COULD PROMOTE U.S. WEAPONS SALES TO THE IRA
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT MILITARY, AND PARTICIPATE IN THE PROFI
THEREFROM. AT THE SAME TIME, HIS TRAINING IN INTELLIGENCE
AIM TO COUCH HIS APPROACH IN CLANDESTINE TERMS, WHICH IN TU
TRIED OFF HIS C/O WHO HOPED A REAL-LIVE AGENT POSSIBILITY
APPEARED. HAD THERE BEEN MORE TIME TO WORK TOGETHER, PERHA
T/1 AND HIS C/O COULD HAVE GOTTEN ON THE SAME WAVE-LENGTH.

3. T/1 REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE TO SET UP S
KIND OF CONTACT WITH REACTION. (IN PROCESS OF ENDING, HE
STATED HIS AWARENESS OF WHO HE WAS DEALING WITH). ANY C/O
EXPLAINED THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER FOR THE NEXT FEW MONTH
LET THINGS STAY AS THEY WERE, AND NOT RISK ANY PROBLEMS.







S E C R E T 201315Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54257

TO: ROME INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDTUNDRA

REF: ROME 77987

1. DEFER TO HQ FOR JUDGMENT AS TO UTILITY OF PROPOSED EXCH OF LETTERS.

2. WE NOTE THAT SDTUNDRA/1 HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED TO MAKE SECUR CONTACT WITH NVBLA ON AT TIME OF HIS CHOOSING. WE DOUBT THAT, ABSENCE OF PRE-ARRANGED SIGNALS, WE COULD SECURELY INITIATE CON IN TEHRAN. SUGGEST HE BE ADVISED ACCORDINGLY.

3. FILE: 201-[illegible]2683. RVW 20 SEP 99 DRV DSC.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T



Z SEP 79 09 2[illegible]Z

E C R E T 2291126Z SEP 79 STAFF

TE DIRECTOR 518912.

): ROME INFO TEHRAN.

WINTEL AJAJA SDTUNDRA

EF: ROME 77987

1. SUGGEST STATION NOT SEND LETTER TO SDTUNDRA/1'S SON EHRAN. IF T/1 BELIEVES HE MAY BE OF SERVICE STATION IN TUT E CAN REPEAT AS NOTED REF. S IME PROCEDURE HE USED IN ROME T IME TO GET IN TOUCH WITH US; OR HE CAN INITIATE LETTER CHANN IMSELF. APPRECIATE ROME VETTING THIS CASE, WHICH INITIALLY OOKED PROMISING.

2. FILE 201-[illegible]82683. RVW 21SEP99 DRV DSC.1 ALL SECRET

E C R E T
BT
4738



26 SEP 79

E C R E T 251624Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE ROME 78181

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDTUNDRA

REF: DIRECTOR 518812

1. WILL COMPLY REF. STATION WILL CONTINUE MONI
AA AND WILL ADVISE IF SDTUNDRA/1 (T/1) INITIAL ES MAIL
CONTACT. SENT BY T/M ARE A SERIES OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF
T/1 OBTAINED FROM HIS PASSPORT AND A SEPARATE PHOTOGRA
HE PROVIDED ANACLARIO. IT IS BEING POUCHED AI DEES FOR
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATIO OF T/1 IN CASE HE SURFACES SOM
AGAIN.

2. FILE: 2001-9 52683. RVW 25SEPT99 DRV 9C1

S E C R E T
BT
#8181

Hushang Nahavandi

According to the existing documents Nahavandi who was one of the key elements of the Shah's regime and the principal organizer of the "Rastakhiz Party", had been arrested and kept in custody right at the begining of the victory of Islamic. Revolution. He then managed to escape from temporary prision and went into hiding near Tehran and northern part of the country. Later on in April 1979 he fled to Turkey via Kurdestan. In spite of his French background and education he often was in contact with the American ambassadors. Nahavandi saw embassy's cultural affairs officer, a personal friend, on July 28, 1979 and claimed dissatisfaction against the Revolution is growing rapidly. He cited the Kurds, as one of the only military forces in the country. He foresaw a coup attempt by certain generals within 6 to 8 weeks with support from the Kurds unless this succeeds Nahabandi foresees deeper chaos and eventually a communist takeover. He viewed that the Kurds probably have the support of Israeal and the Saudi Arabia. A week later in another meeting he said *"he knows of no specific plans for a coup but he has been describing a hypothetical scenario. He then repeated the subject of overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran and counted the following items for such attempt.*

1 - The support of foreign countries such as Israeal, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. He added however *"foreign intervention was not necessary for serious element to regain control of Iran, but on the other hand there sould at the very least have to be an agreement amounting to a green light or to the absence of a red light before the military would move in support of any Iranian political movement."*

2 - The Kurds and the dissatisfaction of Shariatmadari and his followers (sympathizers)

3 - Sympathizers of the former regime in the army.

4 - Finally he emphasized on the support of the U.S.A.

In response, the U.S. officer raised the non-intervention policy of America in the internal policy of Iran, the roots of which could be seen clearly in the succeeding documents.

In evaluating his remarks the U.S. embassy in Tehran almost refused his comments and described him as a political opportunist and among the most sycophantic of the Shah's close aids in recent years and also widely hated by both his colleagues in government and Iranians at large. The U.S. embassy in Tehran adds that we see little likelihood of his becoming the

nucleus around which opponents of the present order will rally.

In response to the U.S. embassy in Paris which asked *"does Department wish this contact to be maintained and if so at what level"*. There is a note which says Nahavandi views are preposterous and suggests future contact be at the concierge level.

The State Department by taking into account his past history and biography refuses his future leadership of Iran and informs all American embassies *"nevertheless, we will appreciate your staying in touch ...whithout encouraging... the various Iranians who show up on your doorstep. We need to know what they are up to even though it dosen't seem they have any real political future in a positive sense.*

Nahavandi later on informed the U.S. embassy that he was departing for Mexico to visit the Shah to brief him on the activities of the opponents, but the State Department stressed that there was no objection to responding to his contacts on occasion, however we have no interest in taking an initiative towards him.

S E C R E T

P-Memo # 116

10 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Political Section

FROM : CAS

SUBJECT : The Reputation of Dr. Hushang NAHAVANDI, Chancellor of Tehran University, among Shirazi's

The following information from a reliable source is for your information and use and need not be attributed to CAS.

Students in Shiraz were placid and well behaved until NAHAVANDI as Chancellor of Pahlavi University in Shiraz began to use the services of SAVAK to reduce student problems. Subsequent head beatings by SAVAK radicalized not only the students but their parents as well. (Comment: Previous reports indicate that SAVAK told NAHAVANDI that they would enter the campus at Pahlavi University.) In December 1971, NAHAVANDI planned to give a lecture at his old University in Shiraz. He was urged by many Shirazi's not to attempt to make this speech, but he ignored their advice and went to Shiraz. The heckling from a largely adult audience became so intense while NAHAVANDI was speaking that he left the hall unable to complete his speech.

S E C R E T

Secret

25 June 1978

SRF MEMORANDUM: 228

FOR : Counselor for Political Affairs

SUBJECT : Hushang Nahavandi

SRF files contain the following derogatory notations concerning a Hushang Nahavandi, who is probably identical with the person who is President of the Group for the Study of Iranian Problems.

August 24, 1954. Law student who had been a member of the Board of Directors of a pro-Mussadiq organization in Paris known as the Union of Iranian Students in France, which had cooperated with the Tudeh Party.

January 11, 1955. Law student who had attended a Tudeh Party meeting on October 31, 1954, in the apartment of a Miss Khanlari in Paris. Nahavandi was described as a Mussadiq sympathizer.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 58(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

Secret

John Stempel

From Tom Farrell

File Nahavandi BW

On May 2nd an Iranian friend, Rafi Javid - an Electrical Contractor- told me that the former chancellor of Tehran University(and former minister of the Queen's Secretariat), Mr. Nahavandi was leaving the country(probably that night) for Europe and that members of one of the Committees were helping him make his departure/escape.

The name of Nahavandi had come up in the conversation during a general discussion of the present post-revolutionary situation. Javid had, at the end of Jan., requested that I arrange a meeting between the ambassador and Nahavandi. Due primarily to Nahavandi's feelings of insecurity at this time the meeting he desired with embassy people never took place. I had read that Nahavandi had been convicted and sentanced by the Revolutionary Tribunal and I assumed that he had been executed I was therefore expreesing my condolences to his friend Javid.

Javid claims that Nahavandi was questioned by committee people soon after the 12th of Feb. but that he managed to elude capture and that he had been spending the last few weeks seeking refuge with different friends around Tehran. Javid believes that Nahavandi's most recent sanctuary was in the Caspian region.

At any rate, Nahavandi has departed Iran, or is departure is to take place very soon. Although he is on some wanted list the aid of the unnamed Committee's members is supposed to secure his exit.

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E.O. 12065 RDS-4 8/2/99 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-P
TAGS: IR, PINT, PINS
SUBJECT: FORMER IRANIAN MINISTER FORESEES COUP ATTEMPT IN IRAN

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: FORMER IRANIAN MINISTER OF HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT, HOUSHANG NAHAVANDI, TOLD US JULY 28 THAT RESENTMENT WAS BUILDING UP AGAINST THE PRESENT IRANIAN REGIME, AND WOULD GROW WORSE. HE CITED THE KURDS AS ONE OF THE ONLY MILITARY FORCES IN THE COUNTRY, WITH THE ARMED SERVICES IN GENERAL DECAY. HE FORESAW A COUP ATTEMPT "BY CERTAIN GENERALS" ABOUT SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS FROM NOW, WITH SUPPORT FROM THE KURDS. UNLESS THIS SUCCEEDS, NAHAVANDI FORESEES DEEPER CHAOS AND EVENTUALLY A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. END SUMMARY.

3. HOUSHANG NAHAVANDI, FORMER MINISTER OF HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT (ABOUT 1966) AND LATER CHANCELLOR OF TEHRAN UNIVERSITY (FROM 1971 UNTIL END OF THE SHAH'S REGIME) SAW EMBASSY'S CULTURAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, A PERSONAL FRIEND, ON JULY 28. NAHAVANDI, WHO WAS AWARE THAT HIS VIEWS WOULD BE REPORTED, GAVE A LENGTHY ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN. HE EXPLAINED THAT FOLLOWING THE SHAH'S DOWNFALL HE WENT INTO HIDING AND LEFT IRAN THROUGH KURDISTAN, WHERE HE HAD BROAD CONTACTS WITH KURD LEADERS, AND TURKEY.

4. NAHAVANDI DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN IRAN AS BAD AND DETERIORATING, AND THOUGHT NORMAL PERSIAN HABITS AND CONSUMER PRESSURES WOULD BE MAJOR FACTORS IN TOPPLING THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, AFTER WHICH CHAOS COULD DEEPEN. HE DESCRIBED TUDEH AS TOO SMART TO

LEAP INTO THE BREACH AT THIS TIME, BUT CAREFULLY BURROWING INTO KEY SECTORS, INCLUDING THE MILITARY, AND WATCEING FOR THE RIGHT TIME. THE RIGHT TIME FOR TUDEH IS NOT NOW BECAUSE OF A FAIRLY HEAVY ANTI-COMMUNIST TINGE AMONG THE POPULATION AT PRESENT. BUT A PERIOD OF FURTHER CHAOS COULD MAKE THE COMMUNISTS MORE APPEALING.

5. NAHAVANDI DESCRIBED THE KURDS AS HEAVILY ARMED (ABOUT 10,000 MEN UNDER ARMS, HE SAID), ORGANIZED, AND IN CONTROL OF A 100-150 KILOMETER WIDE STRIP OF LAND ALONG THE TURKISH AND IRAQUI BORDER. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO DISLODGE THEM, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE GENERAL DECAY OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES. HE ALSO SPECULATED ON WHERE THE KURDS WERE GETTING THEIR FINANCIAL SUPPORT (FROM ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA, HE THOUGHT).

6. NAHAVANDI REFERRED TO A SPECIFIC MILITARY COUP IN PREPARATION, TIMED, HE BELIEVED FOR ABOUT SIX-EIGHT WEEKS FROM NOW. THIS IS TO BE LED BY "CERTAIN GENERALS" AND, IF SUCCESSFUL, COULD AVOID CHAOS AND EVENTUAL COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. NAHAVANDI SEEMED TO THINK THE KURDS WOULD PROVIDE MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THIS COUP, IN RETURN FOR WHICH THEY HOPE TO RECEIVE GREATER AUTONOMY (PRINCIPALLY EDUCATION IN KURDISH, AND NO POLICE OR MILITARY IN KURDISTAN WHO ARE NOT KURDS). NAHAVANDI ADMITTED THERE WERE DANGERS IN THIS SCENARIO, BUT HE THOUGHT IT WAS LESS DANGEROUS THAN ONE MIGHT THINK. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, THERE WAS NO OTHER ORGANIZED BODY HE KNEW OF (OTHER THAN THE KURDS) IN IRAN AT THE PRESENT TIME.

7. NAHAVANDI DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS A MONARCHIST BUT NOT A ROYALIST. HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SHAH TO RETURN, BUT THAT THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR IRAN WOULD BE BRITISH-STYLE PARLIAMENTARY MONARCHY. HE PLANS TO REMAIN IN PARIS AND EVIDENTLY HOPES TO RALLY AN OPPOSITION NUCLEUS AROUND HIMSELF HERE. FULL MEMCON BY POUCH TO NEA/IRN. CHAPMAN
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

August 3, 1979

PARTICIPANTS: Houshang Nahavandi
Former Iranian Minister of Housing and Development

Moshir-Fatemi
Former Dean of Students, Pahlavi University Shiraz

Richard T. Arndt
Cultural Attache, Amembassy PARIS

DATE & PLACE: July 28, 1979 at Recamier Restaurant, Paris

SUBJECT: FORMER IRANIAN MINISTER FORESEES COUP ATTEMPT IN IRAN

COPIES: NEA/IRN POL-5
AMB CA-Mr. Arndt
MIN

BACKGROUND:

Houshang Nahavandi, born in Rasht I would say around 1926, was Minister of Housing and Development when I arrived in Iran in 1966. From there he became Chancellor of Pahlavi University in Shiraz; then in 1971 was named Chancellor of the powerful Tehran University, a post which has always been considered a cabinet-level job. He remained at this post until the very end, though in the last days of the Shah he was one of two candidates for the Prime Ministership which was given to Jaffar Sharif-Emami. (Under other circumstances, he would certainly some day have made Prime Minister.)

Nahavandi is French-educated. He did his econ doctorate in Paris in the very early fifties (perhaps 1952; title: Joseph Shumpeter, Theoretician of Capitalism). He has always been in touch with US Ambassadors, beginning with Armin Meyer, but especially with Helms and Sullivan, in spite of his French background. He was known to be an enemy of PM Hoveyda, but he had good support from the Queen, who enabled him to stay on. He had been, earlier, one of the early Western-educated technocrats who gathered around the figure of Ali Mansour, Prime Minister before Hoveyda, who was assassinated. Though an enemy of Hoveyda, and a friend of Hoveyda's successor

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Jamshid Amouzegar (US-trained PhD in Engineering from Cornell), he noted that the difference was glaring: Amouzegar, though his friend and in basic agreement, was a small-minded man; Hoveyda, though his enemy and in disagreement, was a big-minded, large-scale man.

Nahavandi sees himself as a man who resisted the corrupting influences of Iran. He says the only accusation they have found against him is that he received an unexplained sum of $250,000 in one of his jobs, probably at Pahlavi Univ.-which he said was to cover the costs of a major trip undertaken to the US by the Queen at the time they were arranging the famous Aspen Conference. He says his means here are barely enough to provide for him and his wife, as he said "in sharp contrast" to some of his former colleagues, whose European bank accounts are in the realm of the fabulous.

His English is not bad, but French is by far his preferred form of communication. His French is virtually native.

Moshir-Fatemi was Dean of Students when Nahavandi was Chancellor of Pahlavi University in Shiraz. But, more importantly, he was in charge of security and probably the university's link with SAVAK. He has since gotten himself into a profitable private business in US, Iran and Europe, in security equipment -- alarm systems, etc.)

CONVERSATION

He had arrived in Paris only recently after six months in hiding. Part of the time he was in hiding in Tehran, then he had traveled to the Kurdish territories with a full growth of beard. After that, he stayed in Kurdistan for a period and finally left, crossing the border on foot and walking about 600 yards, but basically transported the rest of the way. He has enough to live in Paris and has a small apartment with his wife. Fortunately all his children are launched and earning money so he needs little more than subsistence. He plans to stay in Paris and "work," which work I took to be dedicated to helping restore common sense to Iran. He said he was a monarchist, not a royalist, explaining that he thought it impossible for the Shah to return but he thought the ideal government for Iran was a British-style parliamentary monarchy.

He said that he felt quite secure in dating the future downfall of the present so-called government in Iran to

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a period between six and eight weeks from our meeting. He said consumer pressures and normal Persian habits would be major factors in toppling a government apparently determined to eliminate all pleasure. He said that the collapse of the Khomeini regime would lead to chaos that could only result, in the longer run, in Soviet domination, though at first it would not seem that way. Apart from a coup scenario detailed below, he thought the collapse would create a vacuum where only the Tudeh was organized in any sense. But he said the Tudeh was too smart to leap into the breach at this time. He said they were carefully burrowing into various sectors, including the military, and watching for the right time. He feels that the time is not right for a communist/Tudeh/Soviet takeover because the population's dissatisfaction at the present is accompanied by a fairly heavy anti-communist tinge. He indicated that the period following the collapse would probably result in further chaos, perhaps even worse with the winter coming on, after which the Marxist elements would begin to look more appealing. Still he did not think the Tudeh would move for the final solution for another year or two.

The coup to which he referred was part of his observations in Kurdistan. He says the Kurds are heavily armed: he used the figure of 10,000 men under arms. He says every variety of weapon imaginable is for sale in the open in the bazars of Kurdistan. He says the Kurds control a strip of land running from 100 to 150 kilometers into Iran along the Turkish and the Iraqui border. He offered the judgment that it would be virtually impossible to dislodge them, particularly given the total decay of the military in Tehran. He felt that the 10,000 men of Kurdistan, given the disorganization in Tehran, could perhaps pull it off, given the proper leadership. He said there was no question whatsoever in his mind that there was considerable foreign money going into Kurdish arms. He had no suspicion that it was US money; on the contrary, he thought it probably was not. But it was difficult to determine where it was coming from, and even then whether from a primary or a cut-out source. He suggested Israel, Iraq and Saudi Arabia as the most likely candidates, but was not closed to other possibilities. It was clear that his escape via Turkey was not impeded by the Turks. In any case, he refers to a specific military coup in preparation which is timed, he believes, for about six weeks from now. If it succeeds, as he believes it has a chance of doing, it might provide an alternate scenario to the above. It is to be led by "certain generals."

He apparently, in his travels throughout Kurdistan, made a point of meeting with the top Kurds as well as dozens of fellow-refugees from Tehran at all levels of prominence. He said that the mood of the refugees was for vengeance and that he had spent much of his time arguing for the least killing possible, in the event of a coup that would succeed, on the grounds that the emotional impact of further killing could only widen the conflict and lengthen it. The Kurds to whom he talked, and he gave the impression that he had talked with all of the major leaders, seemed quite conciliatory. He was impressed with the modesty of their program. In return for helping "liberate" Iran from the oppression of Khomeini, he said the Kurds want a certain amount of regional autonomy but are surprisingly modest in their other demands. Language is central: they want all education to be in Kurdish, with Persian introduced as a second language at high school. They would have no objection to governors-general being sent from Tehran and would not insist that the incumbents be Kurds. They would not of course want police or military in their territory who were not Kurds, though he indicated they seemed fairly intelligent in their understanding of the technical military problems of leadership and so forth.

Under questioning, he admitted that he personally was grasping at the Kurdish nationalist sentiment as one of the only organized forces that could set things aright in Tehran. He admitted it was a dangerous risk, but said he had concluded it was less dangerous than one might have feared. In any case, he said, there was no other organized body on which one might count that he knew of. Asked if other border regions were in a similar situation, he said he did not know but assumed there was a reasonable chance they were.

In the realm of past history, he said he felt that the Americans had made mistakes but that there were many factors involved. He had had numerous conversations with both Ambassadors (Helms and Sullivan), privately and in depth. Both had reported to him that they were not able to get the important messages through the screen surrounding the Shah; he was puzzled by this and felt that the Shah could have been reached.

He told the story of the Shah's last-minute attempt to save the situation. When the Sharif-Emami government was being considered, he was the other candidate. The Shah asked him and Sharif-Emami to present programs. His was rejected, he said, because the Shah found some of his strictures unacceptable. Among them, he said, he had asked for the

immediate departure of one sister and two brothers of the Shah; he had included two National Front figures in his cabinet, both of whom are now active in the Bazargan government, one as Minister of Justice; he felt the Shah had particularly balked at his insistence that all members of the Cabinet should be men "beyond reproach." Apparently something in his wording, he feels, set the Shah off on a complicated discussion of who was and was not beyond reproach. Without wanting to indulge in what-might-have-been games, he said that his demands were infinitely more modest than the points which the Shah conceded to Bakhtiar not a month later.

About the situation in Tehran, he related a variety of stories, But to sum up, he said that Jean Larteguy's piece in PARIS MATCH of two weeks ago (attached) was as good a reportage as could be written, that it was exact in every detail and that it covered the situation thoroughly.

It is clearly his hope to rally an opposition nucleus around himself here in Paris. In response to a feeler about a semester in a US university, he said he thought he could better do what he had to do in Paris, though he had no plans to rent in Neauphle-le-Chateau.

ICA:RArndt:rw

1) POL
2) CAO
rec'd 9.6.79

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

August 10, 1979

PARTICIPANTS: Houshang Nahavandi
Former Iranian Minister of Housing and Development

Richard T. Arndt
Cultural Attache, AmEmbassy PARIS

DATE & PLACE August 10, 1979 Cafe,Place des Ternes

SUBJECT: Iranian Emigre Activities

COPIES: NEA/IRN POL-5 AmEmbassy Tehran
AMB ICA-Mr. Arndt Mr. Tomseth
OSA MIN

Subject called CAO to request one-on-one meeting. He explained that our earlier meeting, conducted before a third person, had been constrained. He wanted to pin things down and go into more detail.

The allusive style of the first meeting had led me to a serious misconception, which we cleared up immediately. He knows of no specific plans for a coup in the near future. He is certain however that internal pressures will result in major changes in Iran in the very near future, as public understanding of the disastrous consequences of the present chaos becomes more universal. Without contrary leadership, this could only result in a leftward shift. The "coup" he mentioned was a hypothetical scenario. He said the situation in Iran was so fragile that very little organized force would be required to regain control. This indeed was the great danger: there were too many ambitious people in too many parts of the world who were capable of detonating some kind of action. He feared the Shah's sister Ashraf the most but said there were others. The problem: how to guide the energy into a single channel, uniting military and political elements. At the same time, certain facts had to be respected in order for any new control to be acceptable to the population of Iran. He sees no realistic scenario at

present which could involve the Shah, given internal conditions. Equally important, a government which will succeed in Iran will have to be built around people whose reputation and character are irreproachable. Too many of the key candidates have been so compromised by their past as to be unable to move into a situation which has been sensitized to the need for minimal honesty in government.

He was disappointed by Bakhtiar. He admired him as a man of courage and conviction; he had the honesty of his relatively powerless past. On the other hand he had always feared his naivete, stemming from inexperience. Worse, his press conference last week had told us unfortunate things about the man. He thought the conference had been badly handled, from an image viewpoint: he thought the effort to identify with De Gaulle in his years of exile was a dire mistake. More serious, the press conference made it clear that Bakhtiar's penniless condition had caused him to reach out to strange bedfellows for support. He said the entourage of Bakhtiar was filled with the wrong people. He cited for example Javad Davalou Alamir, former Tehran stringer for Le Monde, whose connections to the PLO and other unsavory facts about his life made him very much the wrong choice as Bakhtiar's press attache. He was equally horrified to find Amir Motaghi in Bakhtiar's camp: Motaghi for years was chief flunky and even pander to the late Asadollah Alam. Men like these would lose the game for Bakhtiar before it even began.

He said a Committee for National Liberation would shortly be announced,bringing together those of the emigres who had the courage to come out in the open. His own article would appear in Le Figaro this week, with others to follow. He said there were groups of important Iranians in Brussels, Munich, New York, Washington, as well as Paris. He said 40,000 Iranians in exile were living in the Cannes-Nice region.

Turning to the internal situation in Iran, he said that it was clearly fragile. This created dangerous temptations for at least five nations (and perhaps for others like France) whose tacit support for Bakhtiar had to be considered as a factor. Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt all had interests in stabilizing Iran, singly or in some joint effort combining two or more. Iraq's game was harder to read at the present time but its interests were obvious and high. He noted that Iraq would make a great mistake in

attempting anything in the Khuzistan area since this thrust at Iran's lifeline would unite the present government and the military as nothing else would. He felt that there was already foreign support going into Kurdistan but did not know where it came from. He said he thought foreign intervention was not necessary for serious elements to regain control of Iran, but on the other hand there would at the very least have to be an agreement amounting to a green light or to the absence of a red light before the military would move in support of any Iranian political movement.

He went into a little more detail about the strength of the Kurds. They were dug deeply into mountain strongholds from which it would be nearly impossible to dislodge them. He had been astonished at the extent of their preparation and their armament. He had seen mountain caverns prepared to land and hide three helicopters at once. He said huge supplies of weapons and light artillery were everywhere. He reiterated his impression that the program demands of the Kurdish leadership were rational and moderate.

Since our earlier discussion, he had had news of considerable unrest in Azerbaijan as well. Ayatollah Shariatmadari's dissaffection had important implications for Azerbaijan, where he is a supremely influential figure. The history of Iran in the last hundred years showed Azerbaijan to be the area of the country in which most important political movements began.

The key is the military. He says it is ready to act but needs to know when, how and in what direction. He wished there was more time for the military to be prepared, but it can be done when the time is right, as it seems to be. The key man: General Oveissi, now resident in New York. General Azmoudeh, a much older military figure who commands tremendous respect in the Iranian military hierarchy, gave his full blessing last week to Oveissi. The hierarchical structure of the Iranian military is its great strength and the factor which assures him of its unity of action, one the goals are decided. The systematic corruption of various military elements by the present government is serious but not yet widespread enough to be much of a negative factor. He mentioned a variety of spots in Iran where military units have been preserved intact, his example being Lavisan, the base just northwest of Tehran, reserved for the Imperial Guards. He said the base was so strong that the present

regime did not dare even approach it and that its loyalty to the old military order was intense. Since wives and children lived there, its defense in case of attack would be bitter. He said communications in military circles, both inside Iran and outside, were excellent. Various military figures moved in and out with ease under a variety of passports. He had had lengthy discussions with two of Oveissi's delegates during the last week and had been present when General Azmoudeh declared his support.

I asked him who the military were. He said they had told him they did not want their names circulated, out of sad experience. They believed, he said, that a military coup in Libya five years ago was destroyed and its leadership executed because they had confided in the U.S. Embassy and the Embassy had allegedly confided in Khaddafy. Challenged as to the accuracy of the SAVAK-originated story, he said he neither knew nor cared about its truth but that the military men in question believed it to be true hence were exercising extreme caution.

He had reservations about Oveissi, above all in the longer run. On balance, given the need to move quickly, he felt he was probably the best military leader they could get. His reputation as the Friday Butcher had negative and positive implications: it meant, for the purposes of this discussion, that he was the most feared man in Iran. He told this story: in hiding in Tehran (in the home of one of the Revolutionary Committee Chiefs!), a rumor had reached him that Oveissi was on the march towards Tehran. The reaction of his host was total panic: "If Oveissi comes, we can only run; he will decapitate us all." This reputation for brutality, while a mixed blessing, is an advantage in the dirty business of restoring order.

He said professional military circles are convinced that Tehran will be an easy prize. With the Kurds backing them up, he says they believe Tehran can be taken with 2000 men. There was little doubt the casualties would be heavy.

He then went into the message he wished me to deliver. During the last years in Tehran, he had confided more than once in Ambassadors Helms and Sullivan. He treated them, he said, as he would treat no Ambassador from another foreign nation because the future of Iran, like it or not, could only be affected by US actions. In the same way, he was speaking to me as to a channel of communication with Washington in the same spirit. His country was in dire need and only the US could help. Despite my demurs and my references to the new US era of non-intervention, he pressed forward.

The problem is not to provide the muscle but to motivate the coalition of the necessary forces: the military, the political stratum, and presumably the Kurds. The second aspect of this is to provide some kind of leadership over the other nations whose interest in a change of situation in Iran is known. The military will not move without some kind of green light, or at least the assured absence of a red light. The dangers of failure are too great. He said that control must be regained, that an immediate rise of oil production by two million barrels would then enable the country to pull in the capital and regain the confidence of the world economic establishment so that they could get the economy moving again. A statement, however private, of US support or at least non-intervention would permit Iranian elements to pull themselves together. His own role was to do what he could. He had no illusions about being the sole leader, but he can play an important role and wishes to do so. He said he could bring with him a following that he had built up since 1972 when he set up a think-team of intellectuals and political figures to do research and policy thinking on the social, economic and political problems of Iran.

He said that a critical mass of Iranian leadership could be pulled together at any time. He wondered whether a discreet meeting between key Iran emigre elements and some Washington figure who could speak with authority could be arranged in the near future. For such a gathering, it would be important to have one or more of the Kurdish chiefs present.

He picked up my theme of naivete in such matters. He said his was as great or greater. He does not know how to proceed at this point but believes that dialog with the US is the critical factor. Without it he fears not much will happen to prevent further decline into chaos and, ultimately, into the Soviet camp.

ICA:RArndt:lvh

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CLEAR: DAO:USCHAEFER
DISTR: CHHG

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E.O. 12065: RDS-4, 8/13/99 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
STBJECU: COUP AUUEMPU IN IRAN

REF: PARIS 24739

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. NAHAVANDI'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE SITUATION ALONG THE TURKISH AND IRAQI BORDERS WITH IRANIAN KURDESTAN ARE GENERALLY CONSONANU WITH OUR ADMIUUEDLY LIMIUED INFORMATION. MOST PEOPLE WE HAVE TALKED TO WHO HAVE VISITED UHE REGION RECENULY HAVE ALSO REPORTED THAT THE KURDS ARE IN DE FACTO CONTROL OF THE BORDER. WE ARE NOT STRE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ARE AS WELL ORGANIZED AS NAHAVANDI STGGESUS; UHERE ARE A NUMBER OF KURDISH GROUPS OPERAUING IN IHE REGION, AND IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THEY USUALLY COORDINATE THEIR ACTIVITIES VERY EFFECTIVELY.

3. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT NAHAVANDI'S PROGNOSUICAUION UHAU UHERE WILL BE A COUP LED BY DISGRUNULED GENERALS IN SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS. IT IS A SIMPLE FACT THAT THERE ARE FEW GENERALS LEFT ON ACTIVE DUTY TO LEAD IT. MOREOVER, UHE ARMED FORCES REMAINS IN STCH DISARRAY UHAU IT IS DIFFICULT UO CONCEIVE OF EVEN A COLONELS' COUP HAVING MUCH CHANCE OF STCCESS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. HOWEVER, HIS REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE KURDISH INVOLVEMENU IN MILIUARY ACUIVIUIES HAS A FAMILIAR RING. UHERE HAS LONG BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL KURDISH COMPONENT AMONG CAREER MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES, AND RUMORS ABOTND UHAU KURDISH AND NON-KURDISH MILIUARY PERSONNEL ALIKE MIGHT DESERT TO JOIN A MILITARY FORCE OUTSIDE UHE REGULAR ARMED SERVICES WHICH HAS SOME PROSPECT OF OVERTHROWING THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. SPECULATION IN THIS REGARD TENDS TO CENTER ON GEN. AZIZOLLAH PALIZBAN WHO IS FREQTENULY SAID UO BE ORGANIZING A MILIUARY FORCE IN KURDESTAN. (NOTE: WE HAVE NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT SUCH A FORCE EXISTS OR THAT PALIZBAN IS EVEN IN KURDESTAN.)

5. RE NAHAVANDI, HOWEVER HE MIGHT BE DESCRIBING HIMSELF AT THE MOMENT, HE IS FOREMOST A POLITICAL OPPORTUNIST. HE WAS AMONG THE MOST SYCOPHANTIC OF THE SHAH'S CLOSE AIDES IN RECENU YEARS AND WIDELY HAUED BY BOUH HIS COLLEAGUES IN GOVERNMENT AND IRANIANS AT LARGE. WE SEE LIUTLE LIKELIHOOD OF HIS BECOMING THE NUCLEUS AROUND

WHICH OPPONENTS OF THE PRESENT ORDER WILL RALLY. LAINGEN
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EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4, 8/14/99 (MARESCA, JOHN J.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJ: (S) MORE FROM NAHAVANDI ON IRANIAN EMIGRE ACTIVITIES

REF: A. TEHRAN 8990 B. PARIS 24739

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. BEARING IN MIND THE REPUTATION ASCRIBED TO NAHAVANDI IN REF A, WE REPORT THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS HE MADE TO CAO ON AUGUST 10. SINCE NO ONE ELSE WAS PRESENT, HE WAS ABLE TO BE EXPLICIT WHEN HE HAD BEEN ALLUSIVE BEFORE. FULL MEMCON POUCHED NEA/IRN AND TEHRAN.

3. NAHAVANDI CLARIFIED SOME ASPECTS OF HIS COMMENTS DURING THE PREVIOUS MEETING (REF B) IN PARTICULAR TWO POINTS. FIRST, HE DOES NOT SEE HIMSELF AS THE CENTRAL FIGURE AT ALL BUT ONE OF MANY WHO ARE ATTEMPTING TO REOALESCE PATRIOTIC ELEMENTS TO REGAIN CONTROL OF IRAN AND TO REBUILD THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY, WITHOUT THE SHAH. SECOND, HE KNOWS OF NO SPECIFIC PLANS FOR A COUP IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BUT HAD BEEN DESCRIBING A HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO.

4. NAHAVANDI WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH BAKHTIAR'S PRESS CONFERENCE. WHILE AN ADMIRER OF THE MAN, HE IS ESPECIALLY CRITICAL OF HIS ENTOURAGE. NAHAVANDI SAID THAT A "COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION," PRESUMABLY INCLUDING BAKHTIAR, WOULD SHORTLY BE FORMED AND ANNOUNCED IN PARIS. HE HIMSELF WILL PUBLISH AN ARTICLE IN MAJOR PARIS DAILY LE FIGARO THIS WEEK.

5. KEY TO A COUP IS THE MILITARY, AND KEY MAN IS GENERAL OVEISSI, NOW IN NEW YORK. SENIOR GENERAL

AZMOUDEH GAVE HIS BLESSING TO OVEISSI LAST WEEK IN PARIS. HE SAID OVEISSI HAD EXCELLENT COMMUNICATION WITH THE MILITARY INSIDE IRAN.

6. NAHAVANDI ASKED CAO TO DELIVER MESSAGE: HE SAYS THE PROBLEM IS NOT TO PROVIDE THE MUSCLE BUT TO MOTIVATE THE COALESCENCE OF NECESSARY FORCES: THE MILITARY, THE POLITICAL STRATUM, AND PRESUMABLYTHE KURDS. SECOND ASPECT IS TO PROVIDE SOME KIND OF LEADERSHIP OR CONTROL OVER OTHER NATIONS WHOSE INTEREST IN A CHANGE OF SITUATION IN IRAN IS KNOWN AND WHO MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO INTERVENE. THE IRANIAN MILITARY WILL NOT MOVE WITHOUT SOME KIND OF GREEN LIGHT, OR AT LEAST THE ASSURED ABSENCE OF A RED LIGHT. A STATEMENT, HOWEVER PRIVATE, OF US SUPPORT OR AT THE LEAST, OF NON-INTERVENTION WOULD PERMIT IRANIAN ELEMENTS TO PULL THEMSELVES TOGETHER. HE WONDERED WHETHER A DISCREET MEETING COULD BE ARRANGED, IN PARIS OR NEW YORK, IN THE NEAR FUTURE BETWEEN KEY IRANIAN EMIGRE ELEMENTS AND SOME U.S. FIGURE WHO COULD SPEAK WITH AUTHORITY. INTER ALIA ONE OR MORE KURDISH CHIEFS SHOULD BE PRESENT.

7. QUERY: IN VIEW OF REF A PARA 5 COMMENTS, DOES DEPARTMENT WISH THIS CONTACT TO BE MAINTAINED? AND IF SO, AT WHAT LEVEL?
CHAPMAN
BT
#5805

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DATE: August 17, 1979

TO: Mr. Victor Tomseth, AmEmbassy Teheran — For the Attention of

FROM: AmEmbassy PARIS

TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE	TO THE DEPARTMENT
☐ For Transmittal to Addressee at the Discretion of Post ☐ Post Information Only ☐ Transmit to Foreign Office ☐ Submit Report ☐ Reply to the Individual	☐ Dept. Information Only ☐ CERP Publications ☐ Enclosure to Previous Airgram ☐ Reply to Department Request

☐ Transmit to: (U. S. Agency)
☐ Inform:

REFERENCE
Attached is memcon referred to in para 2 PARIS 025805 EXDIS SECRET. 8/14/79.

ITEMS/REMARKS

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NUMBER AND DRAFTING OFFICE

FILE NO.	SIGNATURE JHK
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	OFFICE: POL: John H. Kelly

FORM DS-4 12-64

C+C

Hold for Dept's view

The "all are used as a signal" business may be used in Paris, but we hear it all the time here. In this instance I think it is indicative of the preponderance of what Nahavandi suggests his friends can do. Even if Oveissi's communications with the military in Iran are as good as claimed (which I doubt) what good will it do him given the current shape of the armed services? I suggest future contact be at the Concierge level.

COPY FOR VICTOR TOMSETH,
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECRET

August 14, 1979

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Richard T. Arndt, Esquire
Cultural Attache
American Embassy
Paris, France

Dear Mr. Arndt:

Thank you for sending us a full report of your conversation with Houshang Nahavandi. His remarks track closely those of Manucher Ganji, who you know was a member of the same liberal clique around the Empress.

In my time in Tehran, Nahavandi was considered widely unpopular in his university constituency. He thought of himself as a prime candidate for the Prime Ministry, but there were few Iranians in or outside the establishment who shared his appreciation of his own merits. Thus, like so many other emigres, his potential for assuming a leading role in an Iran in the future seems to me rather limited.

Nevertheless, we will appreciate your staying in touch --without encouraging--the various Iranians who show up on your doorstep. We need to know what they are up to even though it doesn't seem they have any real political future in a positive sense.

You may wish to share this with Warren Zimmerman. I am sending a copy of this together with your report to Tehran.

Sincerely,

Henry Precht
Director
Office of Iranian Affairs

cc: PolCouns - Amembassy Tehran

NEA/IRN:HPrecht:sw

SECRET
GDS, 8/14/85

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PP RUQMFP
DE RUFNPS #8978 2621646
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 171644Z SEP 79
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5345
INFO RUQMFP/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4384
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1596
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 28978

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 9/17/99 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJ: FORMER IRANIAN MINISTER IN EXILE IN PARIS TRAVELLING TO MEXICO TO TALK WITH SHAH

REF: PARIS 24739 (NOTAL)

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FORMER IRANIAN MINISTER OF HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT HOUSHANG NAHAVANDI WHO IS ACTIVE IN IRANIAN EMIGRE CIRCLES INFORMED THE CAO THAT HE IS DEPARTING PARIS ON MONDAY SEPTEMBER 17 FOR MEXICO TO VISIT THE SHAH. HIS MISSION: TO INFORM THE SHAH ABOUT THE BUDDING GOVERNMENT IN EXILE. IT IS A POLITICAL COALITION, GROWING STEADILY CLOSER, BUILT AROUND BAKHTIAR, JAMSHID AMOUZEGAR AND HIMSELF, PLUS OTHERS WHO DO NOT YET WISH TO BE IDENTIFIED, AND WITH THE SUPPORT OF EMIGRE MILITARY FIGURES OVEISSI AND JAM. HIS PURPOSE IS TO PERSUADE THE SHAH THAT HE MUST STAY OUT OF THIS, THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE OF HIS EVER RETURNING TO IRAN, THAT THE MOST HE CAN HOPE FOR IS A REASONABLE CHANCE FOR HIS SON TO PLAY SOME KIND OF ROLE IN THE FUTURE.

3. NAHAVANDI SAYS TEHIR REPORTS INDICATE GROWING DISAFFECTION, ECONOMIC PENURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHAOS IN IRAN. THEY ARE IN TOUCH WITH IMPORTANT NAMES INSIDE IRAN. HE IS NOT DISCOURAGED BY THE CRUSHING OF THE KURDS AND SAYS THAT IMPORTANT MILITARY FIGURES HAVE DEFECTED OVER THE EPISODE. HE REFERS TO LARGE NUMBERS OF PLO MILITARY IN TEHRAN, MANY OF WHOM TOOK PART IN THE KURDISH REPRESSION, E.G. ONE KEY MAN ABOARD EVERY HELICOPTER GUNSHIP.

CC1884

EXDIS

CHARGE

CHRN

9/21
HPL - See me Sometime.
TSL

4. NAHAVANDI SAYS THE MOMENT IS APPROACHING WHEN COUNTER ACTION MUST BE TAKEN. IF NOT NOW, THINGS WILL DRAG ON FOR YEARS, OR AT LEAST UNTIL THE DEATH OF KHOMEINI.

5. NAHAVANDI TOLD THE CAO THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK WITH AN APPROPRIATE USG OFFICIAL (PREFERABLY IN FRENCH) ON HIS WAY BACK FROM MEXICO EITHER IN WASHINGTON OR ELSEWHERE. NAHAVANDI SUGGESTED THAT IF A MEETING WAS DESIRED THAT HE BE CONTACTED AT THE HOME OF HIS DAUGHTER, MRS. AFSANEH MALEKZADEH IN SALT LAKE CITY WHERE HE WILL GO AFTER LEAVING MEXICO. MRS. MALEKZADEH'S TELEPHONE NUMBER: 801-261-2392. NAHAVANDI WAS NOT ENCOURAGED TO EXPECT MEETING WITH USG OFFICIALS.
HARTMAN
BT
#2978

002110

CHARGE'

HRN

Circulate this copy
POL - Swift
ECON - Kennedy
DAO - Holland
MAAG - Scott
POL - Ahern
Return Chase
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN 0199
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2197
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8592
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 9745
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2754
INFO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4677
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 249717

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4, 9/20/89(CLEMENT,)

TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR

SUBJECT: CONTACT WITH IRANIAN EXILES

REF: PARIS 28742 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN CONTACTS WITH IRANIAN EXILES IN EUROPE IT IS CRUCIAL THAT NO IMPRESSION BE LEFT THAT THE USG HAS ANY INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN INTERNAL IRANIAN AFFAIRS OR OF SUPPORTING GROUPS PLOTTING AGAINST THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. PLEASE MAKE THIS EXPLICITLY CLEAR TO CALLERS. WE EMPHASIZE THIS POINT BECAUSE OF DEEP-ROOTED SUSPICIONS OF US INTENTIONS ON THE PART OF THE NEW IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. ANY CONTACT, HOWEVER INNOCENT, CAN BE MISINTERPRETED BY THE GOI. IT SHOULD ALSO BE KEPT IN MIND THAT INDIVIDUAL IRANIANS HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO READ MORE INTO CONTACTS WITH USG OFFICIALS THAN IS WARRANTED, OR DELIBERATELY TO MAKE FALSE CLAIMS OF USG SUPPORT FOR THEIR PARTICULAR CAUSE.

3. THE FOREGOING SHOULD NOT BE READ AS AN ABSOLUTE INJUNCTION AGAINST CONTACT WITH IRANIAN EXILES. IN SOME INSTANCES SUCH CONTACTS ARE NATURAL ON THE BASIS OF

PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE EXILE. SOME CONTACTS WHICH ARE SOUGHT WITH EMBASSY OFFICERS CAN BE USEFUL IN DEVELOPING INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO THE USG, ALTHOUGH CIRCUMSPECTION AND CAUTION AS TO POLITICAL SIGNALS WILL

E
B NECESSARY. POSTS SHOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS IF
DOUBTFUL ABOUT SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS. AS TEHRAN HAS
REPORTED, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT ANY OF THE PRESENT
EXILE GROUPINGS OR PERSONALITIES HAS ANY SIGNIFICANT APPEAL
IN IRAN. NEVERTHELESS, POSTS SHOULD FOLLOW THEIR
ACTIVITIES AND REPORT AS APPROPRIATE. WE ARE ALSO
INTERESTED IN HOST GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS THESE
GROUPS.

4. FOR PARIS: RE NAHAVANDI'S ACTIVITIES, AS WE AND
TEHRAN HAVE INDICATED, HE IS ONE OF THE LEAST PROMISING
FIGURES ON THE EXILE SCENE. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR
RESPONDING TO HIS CONTACTS ON OCCASION, AND WE WILL SEE
HIM IF HE SEEKS A MEETING IN WASHINGTON. WE HAVE NO
INTEREST, HOWEVER, IN TAKING AN INITIATIVE TOWARDS HIM. VANCE
BT
#9717

Firooz Sharifi

The above mentioned person was ISIRAN project executive member and in connection with the armed forces.

In the exisiting document his name appears as one of leaders of pro-constitutionalist marches which was in support of Bakhtiar during the course of the Islamic Revolution.

The documents indicate his contacts and meetings with the staff of political section of the U.S. Espionage Den from April to September 1979. Although in these documents Sharifi has been introduced as a crazy, but the news of his activities which is said to be totally right wing was being followed by the U.S. very closely. Sharifi claims that he is planning an armed struggle against the Bazargan government, and is in contact with Dr. Sadighi one of the leaders of the National Front.

On 10th June 1979 he took one of the embassy staff to a meeting with a man known as "Fred" who boasts to be leading a small group of 200, struggling to restore monarchism. Few machine-guns were also in display in the very same room. Fred claims that he has already attacked stations of Committe and Pasdaran. He also talks about the support of the Baluchies as well as the activities of Palizban in Kurdestan area.

"Fred" claims that he knows 117 groups which are fighting the Revolution, each having from *50* to few thousands members and said that he is in communication with most of them. In the presence of Sharifi, Fred alleged that he could line up ethnic groups such as Turkomans and even the Kurds and the like minded political groups in Tehran, if sufficient financial resources are avaliable.

In respons to his comments, the U.S. offcial says that *"other factors such as leadership and purpose would be at least as important as the financial resources to any movement which hoped to oust Khomeini."*

Nevertheles, the aim of the U.S. embassy for continuation of such contacts was mainly to gather information about the project he was managing in the Navy. Moreover, American government believed it was possible for the Revolution to fail if the economic and welfare plans and promisses would not succeed, so the contacts with such elements was evaluated as to be a positive step.

The Americans while surreptitiously keeping the track of the armed activities of such elements against the Islamic Republic, continued their contacts with them, and since the chance for the success of such group was very weak, they never gave any promise support. The documents indicate that Sharifi was intending to leave the country and therefore the subsequent fate of this perfidious counter-revolution element remains in obscurity.

I 281110Z APR 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASPDC PRIORITY 1123
INFO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0073
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0078
RUSRQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0085
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 04435

CHRGE: STATE
APPRV: CHG:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CEG POL 2 OR MAAG DAO ECON

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LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: XGDS-4 4/29/99 (STEMPEL, J.D.)OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IP
SUBJ: LATEST FROM THE RIGHT WING

REF: A) TEHRAN 2739 B) TEHRAN 1991

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT) THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE.

2. SUMMARY: EX-ESTABLISHMENT TYPES ARE PLANNING SOME MILITARY CHALLENGES TO BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT. RIGHTISTS MAY BE LOOKING FOR MILITARY AID. END SUMMARY.

3. FIROOZ SHARIFI AND ACTING POL CHIEF REVIEWED POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OVER LUNCH 26 APRIL. SHARIFI HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN SEVERAL EFFORTS TO SAVE A PIECE OF THE POLITICAL ACTION FOR SUPPORTERS OF PREVIOUS REGIME (SEE REFTELS). HE ASKED TO SEE POLOFF TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS BECAUSE HE IS LEAVING ON MONTH-LONG TRIP ABOUT 3 MAY.

4. SHARIFI SAID GEN OVEISSI AND SEVERAL OTHERS OF THE SHAH'S GENERALS HAVE NO INTENTION OF QUOTE LETTING ISLAMIC REPUBLIC FRITTER AWAY COUNTRY TO COMMUNISTS UNQUOTE. ACCORDING TO SHARIFI, OVEISSI WAS BEHIND NAGHADEH REBELLION, WHICH WAS STAGED TO SEE HOW EFFECTIVE GOI RESPONSE WAS. (RESULT: NOTREALLY GOOD, IN SHARIFI VIEW.) THERE ARE QUOTE MODERATE UNQUOTE (EUPHEMISM FOR MONARCHIST FORCES WITHOUT THE MONARCHY) MILITARY GROUPS BEING FORMED AT FOUR LOCATIONS OUTSIDE IRAN WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE READY TO ACT IN LATE MAY. ONE IS IN PAKISTAN, TWO IN IRAQ AND ONE IN TURKEY. GROUPS HOPE TO RALLY FORCES WHO HAVE BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH KHOMEINI FOR STRUGGLE AGAINST LEFT.

5. SAHRIFI MADE NO DIRECT PLEA FOR AID AS HE USUALLY DOES (REFTELS) BUT DID SAY THAT GROUPS WERE ROUNDING UP MONEY AND ... WITH A QUIZICAL LOOK SUGGESTED USG MIGHT WANT TO CONTRIBUTE. POLOFF TURNED HIM OFF FIRMLY AND THIS TIME IT WAS SHARIFI WHO SAID, QUOTE WE'LL JUST HAVE TO WAIT A BIT AND SEE HOW THINGS DEVELOP, UNQUOTE WITH A CONFIDENCE HE HAS NOT SHOWN BEFORE. HE THEN SAID HE PLANNED TO SPEND ABOUT 30 DAYS ABROAD, BUYING MACHINERY FOR HIS CHICKEN FARM. POLOFF ADDED QUOTE AND OTHER KINDS AS WELL? UNQUOTE TO WHICH SHARIFI REPLIED WITH A GRIN, BUT SERIOUSLY QUOTE YES, SOME HEAVY WEAPONS AS WELL. UNQUOTE (COMMENT: WHILE SHARIFI IS PROBABLY NOT ON A FULL-

SCALE MERCHANTS-OF-DEATH MISSION, HE MAY WELL BE LOOKING FOR LIMITED ARMED HELP AND MAY SURFACE EITHER IN WASHINGTON OR IN THE MURKIER ARMS BAZAARS OF THE WORLD.)

6. ON A PERSONAL NOTE, SHARIFI HAD SOME INTERESTING THINGS TO SAY ABOUT ISERAN, WHERE HE IS A COMPUTER PROJECT MANAGER. IRANIAN ARMED SERVICES ARE ABOUT TO DISBAND ISERAN IN ITS PRESENT FORM, BUT PLAN TO KEEP SEVERAL OF ITS PROJECTS GOING, INCLUDING THE NAVY PROJECT WHICH SHARIFI HEADS. NEW REVOLUTIONARY PRESIDENT OF ISERAN IS SECOND-RATE SCIENTIST WHO QUOTE WAS ELECTED BY THE TEA-BOYS AND JANITORS BECAUSE HE PROMISED THEM ALL CARS AND HOUSES. UNQUOTE THERE IS CONSIDERABLE INTRAMURAL SQUABBLING BETWEEN THE NEW PRESIDENT AND SOME OF THE COMPANY'S LEADING PROJECT MANAGERS. SHARIFI THREW UP HIS HANDS AT PROSPECTS FOR EXECUTIVE HARMONY OVER NEXT SIX MONTHS, BUT THOUGHT KEY PROJECT MANAGERS LIKE HIMSELF COULD KEEP PRESENTLY SUCCESSFUL PROJECTS GOING, IF MILITARY RECOGNIZES ITS NEEDS BEFORE CHAOS DEGENERATES.

7. GENERAL COMMENT: MEETING WAS SHORTER THAN PREVIOUS SESSIONS, AND SHARIFI DID NOT PUSH AS HARD. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN BEFORE, AND CLEARLY THINKS SOMEONE HAS SOMETHING GOING. HE POINTED TO CONTINUED EFFORTS OF CHILDREN OF THOSE EXECUTED TO GREASE OUT REVOLUTIONARY GUARDSMAN AT NIGHT AS EXAMPLE OF QUOTE MODERATE UNQUOTE ACTIVITY BUT WOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION OF HOW CLOSELY THIS WAS LINKED TO HIS MOVEMENT. KILLINGS OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDIANS CONTINUE (OUR OWN SECURITY FORCE TOLD POLOFF OF SHOOTING OF FOUR GUARDS THAT OCCURED EVENING OF 26 APRIL JUST SIX BLOCKS NORTH OF EMBASSY. NAAS
BT
#4435

NNNN

4514

1

SECRET
STATE
CHG:CWNAAS
POL:JDSTEMPEL/BJH
NONE
POL

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: XGDS-4 5/1/99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJ: (S) LATEST FROM THE RIGHT WING

REF: ANKARA 3297, TEHRAN 1991, TEHRAN 12691

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY NO LONGER HOLDS TEHRAN 1991. MAJOR CABLE ON SUBJECT TRANSMITTED BELOW:

SECRET

SECRET

3. SUMMARY: SHARIFI, ONE OF LEADERS OF CONSITITUTIONALIST PARADES IN EARLY FEB, ASKED EMBOFFS TO SUPPORT A MOVEMENT AIMED AT MODERATING EXCESSES OF ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT. HE TOLD EMBOFFS POPULAR RUMOR HAS IS THAT U.S. ENGINEERED KHOMEINI TAKE OVER BY HAVING GEN. HUYSER NEUTRALIZE THE ARMY. HIS NEW SCHEME IS TO RUN A POPULAR CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC WITH U.S. HELP IN "MARKETING AND ADVERTISING." EMBOFFS FIRMLY DISCOURAGED HIM IN EXPECTING U.S. SUPPORT FOR HIS SCHEMES. END SUMMARY.

4. POLOFFS STEMPEL, PATTERSON AND TOMSETH SPENT OVER FOUR HOURS AT COCKTAILS AND DINNER EVENING MAR 4 WITH FIROOZ SHARIFI, ISERAN PROJECT EXECUTIVE WHO HAD COME TO STEMPEL'S ATTENTION ON REFERENCE FROM BAKHTIAR'S FOREIGN MINISTER AS ONE OF LEADERS OF PRO-CONSTITUTIONALIST MARCHES JUST BEFORE FALL OF BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. SHARIFI HAD ASKED FOR MEETING TO LAY OUT HIS IDEAS ON WHERE IRAN SHOULD BE GOING.

5. AN ARTICULATE MODERNIST, SHARIFI SAID PROBLEM WITH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IS THAT IT WILL DISCOURAGE TALENTED PEOPLE IRAN NEEDS TO RUN A MODERN COUNTRY. THOSE WHO ARE INTELLIGENT AND TRUE PATRIOTS COULD MOBILIZE POPULAR SUPPORT--IT IS THERE FOR THE TAKING (OR BUYING) AMONG TRIBESMEN AS WELL AS THOSE, EVEN IN KHOMEINI'S ENTOURAGE, WHO HAVE BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH NARROW ISLAMICISM ESPOUSED BY KHOMEINI. HE ALLUDED TO SEVERAL EUROPEAN-TRAINED INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD HIGH SUB-CABINET POSITIONS WHO WERE ALREADY DISCOURAGED AND VOCAL ABOUT IT. SHARIFI SAID MANY WHO DID NOT SUPPORT FEDAYEEN (COMMUNIST GUERILLAS) WERE TURNING TO FEDAYEEN BECAUSE IT OFFERED ONLY CHANCE TO COMBAT ISLAMIC RESTRICTIONS ESPOUSED BY KHOMEINI.

6. SHARIFI SAID U.S. SHOULD BE "IN THE MARKET" FOR THOSE WHO COULD RUN A GOVERNMENT MORE ATUNED TO U.S. VALUES. EMBOFFS INTERJECTED (AND REPEATED THIS THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION) THAT U.S. WAS NOT IN BUSINESS OF BACKING ANYBODY, BUT WAS INTERESTED IN HEARING ALL POINTS OF VIEW. U.S. WOULD WORK WITH GOI TO DEGREE GOI ITSELF WISHED. UNDETERRED, SHARIFI SAID U.S. WAS BEING BLAMED FOR IRAN'S PROBLEMS. "THOSE WHO KNEW" SAID U.S. HAD DELIBERATELY SABOTAGED SHAH'S ATTEMPTS TO FIND WORKABLE

SECRET

GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO SEE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT COME TO POWER. WHEN ASKED WHY BY ASTOUNDED EMBOFFS, SHARIFI SAID THIS WAS CLEVER CARTER SCHEME TO CREATE "ISLAMIC BELT" ACROSS MIDEAST TO CONTAIN COMMUNISM. IN THIS SCHEME, GEN. HUYSER'S DEC-JAN VISIT TO IRAN WAS DESIGNED TO SAP WILL OF IRANIAN MILITARY AND INDUCE IT NOT TO FIGHT. HE ADDUCED EVIDENCE FOR THIS VIEW IN FACT THAT SEVERAL BARRACKS WERE EVACUATED BY IRANIAN TROOPS BEFORE MUJAHIDIN ATTACKS BEGAN. EMBOFFS SUGGESTED OTHER REASONS FOR THIS, INCLUDING DEMORALIZATION OF TROOPS. SHARIFI REMAINED CONVINCED THAT U.S. HAD SOMEHOW CONNIVED TO DESTROY IRANIAN MILITARY BEFORE IT COULD GO INTO BATTLE. SHARIFI ALSO SAID SHAH HAD TOLD HIS GOOD FRIEND, DR. SADIQI, (SEE BELOW) THAT "AMERICANS HAD ADVISED HIM (SHAH) TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY." POLOFF SAID THAT WAS CANARD, BUT SHARIFI PERSISTED. (COMMENT: ABOVE RECOUNTED IN SOME DETAIL BECAUSE GENERAL THEME ADVANCED IS NOW BECOMING VERY POPULAR AMONG FAIRLY SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF IRAN'S MODERNIZED ELITE INCLUDING SOME MILITARY MEN. ELEMENTS OF SELF-DELUSION MAY SEEM OBVIOUS TO WESTERN OBSERVER, BUT SURFACE ELEMENT OF PLAUSIBILITY AND PERSIAN PENCHANT FOR SEEKING EXTERNAL VILLAINS HAS GIVEN STORY MUCH CREDENCE HERE.)

7. SHARIFI THEN UNVEILED HIS SOLUTION: IRAN NEEDED A GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD KEEP THE 20 PERCENT OF THE IRANIAN POPULATION WHICH COMPRISES THE MODERNIST ELITE HAPPY, YET HAVE MAJORITY SUPPORT. WAY TO DO THIS WAS TO ENLIST HELP OF TRIBES AND BUY POLITICIANS "IN SAME OLD WAY." SHARIFI SAID HE WAS VERY CLOSE TO DR. GHOLAM HOSSEIN SADIQI, WHO HAD BEEN PRIME MINISTER-DESIGNATE BRIEFLY IN DECEMBER. SADIQI WAS RESPECTED BY ALL CURRENTS IN IRANIAN POLITICS EXCEPT THE COMMUNISTS. WHEN ASKED POINT BLANK IF HE WAS PUSHING SADIQI FOR THE TOP JOB, SHARIFI REPLIED "PERHAPS, YES," AND WENT ON TO SOLILOQUY ON NECESSITY OF ELECTING A SOLID PERSON TO BE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC'S FIRST PRESIDENT (SHARIFI CONCEDES THAT IRAN WILL VOTE OVERWHELMINGLY FOR AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC).

8. BASIC PROBLEM WAS THAT NEW MOVEMENT NEEDED HELP ORGANIZING. IRAN'S INTELLIGENTSIA COULD EASILY MANIPULATE MASSES USING MODERN U.S. ADVERTISING METHODS AND MARKETING PRACTICES. U.S. SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN THIS.

EMBOFFS AGAIN POLITELY AND FIRMLY TOLD SHARIFI THAT U.S. WAS NOT IN BUSINESS OF MEDDLING IN INTERNAL POLITICS. WHILE WE WERE ALWAYS INTERESTED IN GETTING POLITICAL VIEWS OF MANY FACTIONS, WE WERE NOT GOING TO GET INVOLVED. SHARIFI COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW U.S. COULD DO SO LITTLE --WOULDN'T CIA WANT TO DO ANYTHING TO PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS? EMBOFFS REITERATED THAT U.S. WAS PLAYING IT STRAIGHT, AND AFTER AGREEING TO KEEP IN TOUCH, MARATHON MEETING ENDED.

9. COMMENT: SHARIFI SOUNDS LIKE HE IS EITHER CRAZY OR A GOOD CANDIDATE TO BE IRAN'S NEXT SHAH. CLEARLY EMBUED WITH HIS SYRACUSE-ACQUIRED FAITH IN U.S. MANAGERIAL METHODS, HE IS A FIRST-RANK ELITIST, WHICH MAKES HIS ESPOUSAL OF VIRTUES OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY SUSPECT. HE CLAIMS TO BE CLOSE TO DR. SADIQI AND PROBABLY IS, THOUGH IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER SADIQI WAS AWARE OF HIS DEMARCHE TO US (WE TEND TO THINK NOT). WHILE HE LACKS UNDERSTANDING OF DEGREE TO WHICH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HAS CAPTURED MARKET ON MASS POLITICS IN TODAY'S IRAN, HE DOES BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A FUTURE IN NON- OR ANTI-ISLAMIC POLITICS. IN THIS HE IS PROBABLY RIGHT, SUGGESTING THAT WHEN KHOMEINI FAILS TO FULFILL HIS PIE-IN-THE-SKY ECONOMIC PROMISES, THE MASS MAY TURN FROM HIM. THIS MAY BE TRUE, BUT IT IS NOT LIKELY TO HAPPEN FOR SOME TIME, AND THERE MAY BE MORE INTERESTING INTERVENING EVENTS TO INTERRUPT AND RECHANNEL THE PROCESS. SHARIFI ALLUDES TO FRIENDS AND SUPPORT IN THE MILITARY, BUT IS RELUCTANT TO COME FORTH WITH NAMES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO "KEEP IN TOUCH" TO SEE IF HIS EFFORTS DEVELOP EVEN THE MODEST HEAD OF STEAM THAT HIS PRO-BAKHTIAR FORCE MANAGED TO PRODUCE BEFORE BEING FLATTENED BY THE ISLAMIC STEAMROLLER.
NAAS##

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S E C R E T TEHRAN 05980

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 6/10/79
APPRV: CHARGE:GWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH:
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG POL OR

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-4 6/10/99 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: CLANDESTINE GROUPS OPPOSED TO KHOMEINI AND REQUEST FOR U.S. SUPPORT

REF: (A) TEHRAN 5932, (B) TEHRAN 1991, (C) TEHRAN 4514

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE.)

2. SUMMARY: POLCOUNS MET JUNE 8 WITH TWO INDIVIDUALS WHO CLAIMED TO REPRESENT A SMALL, UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATION OPPOSED TO KHOMEINI AND HIS ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. THE GROUP'S LEADER OUTLINED A PLAN INVOLVING RECRUITMENT OF SUPPORT AMONG ETHNIC MINORITIES AND BRIBERY OF KEY KHOMEINI COMMITTEE PEOPLE WHICH HE ARGUED WOULD RESULT IN KHOMEINI'S DOWNFALL WITH NO MORE THAN A SHOW OF FORCE. HE SOLICITED U.S. SUPPORT FOR HIS PLAN WHICH POLCOUNS TURNED DOWN. THIS CONVERSATION IS REPORTED IN SOME DETAIL BOTH BECAUSE IT PROVIDES INSIGHT TO THE TWILIGHT WORLD OF THE CLANDESTINE POLITICAL ACTIVITY WHICH CURRENTLY IS TAKING PLACE AND BECAUSE IT ILLUSTRATES SO WELL THE DILEMMA OF MUCH OF THE OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI AS ANALYZED IN REF A. END SUMMARY.

3. ON JUNE 8 FIROUZ SHARIFI (REFS B AND C) TOOK POLCOUNS TO MEET WITH LEADER OF GROUP WHICH SHARIFI HAD PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS INVOLVED IN EFFORTS TO PROVIDE A MODERATE AND MODERNIST ALTERNATIVE TO KHOMEINI'S REACTIONARY ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. BECAUSE OF SHARIFI'S EARLIER INVOLVEMENT WITH PRO-CONSTITUTION ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATION WITH DR. GHOLAM HOSSEIN SEDIGHI, POLCOUNS ASSUMED THAT IT MIGHT BE SEDIGHI WHOM HE WOULD BE MEETING. AFTER FOLLOWING A CIRCUITOUS ROUTE AROUND NORTHERN TEHRAN, HOWEVER, THE DESTINATION PROVED TO BE THE HOUSE OF AN ARMENIAN CIVIL ENGINEER IDENTIFIED ONLY AS "FRED."

4. FRED GOT RIGHT TO THE POINT. HE ASKED IF POLCOUNS AGREED THAT MONEY HAD BEEN THE KEY TO KHOMEINI'S SUCCESS. WITHOUT WAITING FOR AN ANSWER, HE SAID THAT HE WAS ABSOLUTELY OPPOSED TO THE COMMUNISTS AND THAT KHOMEINI'S EXTREMISM IS PLAYING INTO THEIR HANDS. BECAUSE OF THIS, HE HAD ORGANIZED A SMALL GROUP OF ABOUT 200 TO OPPOSE KHOMEINI WITH A VIEW TO RESTORATION OF THE MONARCHY. "SURE, THE SHAH MADE MISTAKES," HE SAID, "BUT DOESN'T EVERYBODY?" ONE HAD BEEN TO SURROUND HIMSELF WITH "A BUNCH OF THIEVES" WHO WOULD NOT TELL HIM WHAT WAS REALLY HAPPENING. "BUT HE DID A LOT FOR THE COUNTRY, TOO," FRED ADDED, "INCLUDING FOR THOSE BLOODY BASTARDS WHO ARE NOW DREAMING FOR HIS HEAD."

5. FRED SAID HE HAD POURED ABOUT $150,000 OF HIS OWN MONEY INTO HIS ORGANIZATION, BUT, HE ASKED, "DO YOU KNOW WHAT IT COSTS FOR A G-3? THIRTY THOUSAND RIALS." MOTIONING TO SEVERAL WEAPONS LYING ABOUT THE ROOM AND OPENING A BRIEFCASE WITH A QUANTITY OF AMMUNITION INSIDE, FRED CONTINUED: "WE'VE MOUNTED A FEW OPERATIONS, ATTACKED SOME COMMITTEE HEADQUARTERS, SHOT UP SOME PASDARAN (REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS) POSTS, THAT SORT OF STUFF." THEY HAD ALSO USED SOME OF THE MONEY TO BUY THE FREEDOM OF FRIENDS JAILED BY KHOMEINI'S COMMITTEES. "IF YOU THINK CORRUPTION WAS BAD UNDER THE SHAH," FRED GRUMPED, "ITS TEN TIMES WORSE TODAY. AND THE MULLAHS ARE THE WORST OF THE LOT." VENALITY, FRED HAD CONCLUDED, IS ONE OF THE ETERNAL VERITIES OF THE PERSIAN SCENE. "EVEN THE AMERICANS AREN'T IMMUNE," HE SAID. "WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF THEIR ARRIVAL IN IRAN THEY BECOME GOOD IRANIANS. THEY'RE ON THE TAKE WITH EVERYONE ELSE. IT MUST BE SOMETHING IN THE AIR."

6. THIS VENALITY WAS THE KEYSTONE OF FRED'S STRATEGY TO OUST KHOMEINI. A NUMBER OF GROUPS HAVE LITTLE USE FOR HIM IN ANY EVENT, HE CLAIMED, AND IT WOULD BE A SIMPLE MATTER TO ENLIST THEIR SUPPORT. THE BALUCHIS, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD FOLLOW ANYONE WHO FED THEM A FEW KABOBS AND A LITTLE RICE. THEY HAD ALREADY HAD SEVERAL DUST-UPS WITH KHOMEINI'S PEOPLE, AND HAD THOROUGHLY BATTERED THEM ON EVERY OCCASION. ONCE THEY HAD EVEN CAPTURED A PLO ADVISER ALONG WITH SOME OF KHOMEINI'S MILITIAMEN. THEY DISARMED THE LATTER AND FREED THEM, FRED SAID, "BUT THEY KILLED THAT ARAB S.O.B."

7. "THE KURDS ARE MORE SOPHISTICATED," FRED CONTINUED, "BUT THEY DON'T LIKE KHOMEINI EITHER." HE CLAIMED TO HAVE RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT EVERYTHING IN KURDESTAN BEYOND SANANDAJ IS UNDER TOTAL KURDISH CONTROL. GEN. HABIBOLLAH PALIZBAN, THE FORMER GOVERNOR GENERAL OF KERMANSHAH AND A KURD, IS HOLED UP THERE, HE SAID, AND KHOMEINI'S PEOPLE DO NOT DARE ENTER THE AREA. PALIZBAN, ACCORDING TO FRED, "IS BT
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NOT LIKE THE REST OF THESE CHICKEN S--- GENERALS. HE WILL FIGHT. HE COULD TAKE TEHRAN IN TWO DAYS IF HE WANTED TO. BUT HE DOESN'T KNOW WHAT TO DO. HE'S JUST SITTING ON HIS ASS.

8. SHARIFI INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT THE TURKOMANS HAVE CONTINUED TO ORGANIZE FOR A SHOWDOWN WITH KHOMEINI'S FORCES SINCE THEIR BLOODY ENCOUNTER WITH GONBAD KAVOUS COMMITTEE PEOPLE IN APRIL. SHARIFI SAID THAT THE MARXIST FEDAYIN HAVE BEEN ASSISTING THEM IN THEIR EFFORTS. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE TURKOMANS HAD WORKED OUT A DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS DURING THE EARLIER FIGHTING TO USE SOVIET TERRITORY FOR SANCTUARY. THEY HAD ESTABLISHED CONTACTS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BORDER AND HAVE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE AID THROUGH THESE CONTACTS. WITH THE HARVEST IN THE TURKOMAN SAHRA AREA NEARLY COMPLETE, THE TURKOMANS ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO ANOTHER ENCOUNTER WITH KHOMEINI'S FORCES. THEY SEE IT, SHARIFI SAID, AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CAPTURE MORE WEAPONS AND TO REPLENISH THEIR SUPPLIES OF AMMUNITION.

9. FRED SAID THAT THERE ARE MANY GROUPS IN TEHRAN LIKE HIS OWN THAT ARE ACTIVE AGAINST KHOMEINI. "WE KNOW OF AT LEAST 117," HE SAID, "AND WE ARE IN COMMUNICATION WITH MOST OF THEM." THESE GROUPS RANGE IN SIZE FROM FIFTY TO A COUPLE THOUSAND WITH THE AVERAGE BEING SEVERAL HUNDRED MEMBERS. SEVERAL GROUPS, FRED SAID, ARE COMPOSED OF ABSOLUTE MADMEN. ONE HAS AN ASSASSINATION PROGRAM IT PLANS TO IMPLEMENT SOON THAT WILL MAKE FORGHAN'S RECENT ACTIVITIES LOOK RETICENT. FRED ADDED THAT HIS GROUP HAS CONTACTS WITH SOME OF THESE EXTREMIST GROUPS, INCLUDING A FEW ON THE FAR LEFT, BUT THAT HIS GROUP LIMITS ITS COOPERATION TO LIKE-MINDED ORGANIZATIONS. "WE ALSO AVOID THE SAVAKIS AND THE GROUPS HEADED BY FORMER GENERALS," FRED SAID, "BECAUSE ALL THEY DO IS TALK." RECRUITS FOR FRED'S GROUP AND OTHERS AS WELL COME MAINLY FROM THE MIDDLE CLASS ("WE DON'T WANT THOSE RICH BASTARDS WHO FLED THE COUNTRY WHEN THEY SAW KHOMEINI COMING," FRED SAID) AND LOWER RANKING OFFICERS AND EVEN NCO'S ("THEY KNOW HOW TO FIGHT," ACCORDING TO FRED).

10. WITH ENOUGH FINANCIAL RESOURCES FRED CLAIMED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO LINE UP ETHNIC GROUPS LIKE THE BALUCHIS, TURKOMANS AND EVEN THE KURDS AS WELL AS LIKE-MINDED POLITICAL GROUPS IN TEHRAN. THEN, WITH A FEW PAY-OFFS TO SOME OF KHOMEINI'S KEY COMMITTEE PEOPLE, NO MORE THAN A SHOW OF FORCE WOULD BE NECESSARY TO END THE IMAM'S POLITICAL CAREER. FRED HAD SENT PEOPLE TO EUROPE, HE SAID, TO PUT THE BITE ON THE IRANIAN FAT CATS HOLED UP THERE("LIVING," AS SHARIFI PUT IT, "IN ABSOLUTE LUXURY AND DESPERATELY LONGING TO COME BACK TO THIS DUMP."), BUT PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY HAD ALREADY HAD TO LEAVE PART OF THEIR FORTUNES BEHIND IN IRAN, THEY WERE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO GIVE UP ANY MORE OF THEIR MONEY. EFFORTS HAD ALSO BEEN MADE TO APPROACH THE SHAH, BUT, FRED SAID, "WHAT AM I TO HIM? JUST A CONTRACTOR WHO HAS NEVER HAD A GOVERNMENT JOB OR ASKED HIM FOR A F------ FAVOR." IT WOULD NOT REQUIRE MUCH MONEY, HE CONCLUDED, NO MORE THAN $50,000,000. "AND WE HAVE TO MOVE FAST, BECAUSE SOMETHING BIG WILL HAPPEN WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE MONTHS."

11. TAKING HIS CUE, POLCOUNS RECITED THE HISTORY OF THE PAST TWO DECADES, POINTING OUT THAT EVEN IF IT WERE NOT U.S. POLICY NOT TO INTERFERE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, PUBLIC OPINION IN THE U.S. WOULD PRECLUDE THE SORT OF THING THAT FRED WAS SUGGESTING. A LONG DISCUSSION COVERING MANY OF THE POINTS FRED HAD ALREADY MADE FOLLOWED, WITH DARK HINTS ABOUT THE FATE OF U.S. INTERESTS IN IRAN AND THIS PART OF THE WORLD SHOULD WE REFUSE TO HELP OUR TRUE FRIENDS IN THIS COUNTRY. POLCOUNS FINALLY PUT AN END TO THE CONVERSATION BY SUGGESTING THAT OTHER FACTORS, SUCH AS LEADERSHIP AND PURPOSE, WOULD BE AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT AS FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO ANY MOVEMENT WHICHHOPED TO OUST KHOMEINI. HE THEN NOTED THAT HE HAD HEARD A NUMBER OF PEOPLE SPEAK RECENTLY ABOUT THE NEXT TWO OR THREE MONTHS BEING SOMEHOW CRITICAL, AND ASKED FRED JUST EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS THAT WAS THAT WAS

12. PERHAPS DISHEARTENED BY HIS LACK OF SUCCESS IN SELLING HIS PROGRAM, FRED STARED MOROSELY AT THE FLOOR AND REPLIED, "NOTHING. I'LL GO TO LONDON WITH MY FAMILY. THERE ARE 15 MILLION S.O.B.'S IN THIS COUNTRY HAPPY NOT TO HAVE TO WORK. I'VE BEEN IN CONSTRUCTION FOR TWENTY YEARS. I KNOW THEM. THEY CAN SURVIVE ON TWO LOAVES OF BREAD A DAY, ONE A DAY, HALF A LOAF A DAY. DAMN IT, THEY CAN GO HUNGRY AND LOVE KHOMEINI FOR THEIR MISERY. AND THE REST OF US DON'T KNOW WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT. WE HAD A PLAN TO BLOW UP NIRT. WE GOT A TANKER AND LOADED IT UP WITH 5,000 KILOS OF T.N.T. WE WERE GOING TO PARK IT IN FRONT OF NIRT AND SET IT OFF. KILL EVERYONE IN THE PLACE. BOOM. BUT THEN WE THOUGHT, 'FOR WHAT? FOR WHOM?' I'M NOT POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS. I DON'T WANT ANYTHING OUT OF THIS. I JUST WANT TO RUN MY ET
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

S E C R E T TEHRAN 0598/3

GOD DAMNED CONSTRUCTION BUSINESS. I WANT TO DRINK VODKA. IRAN IS IMPORTANT TO ME. I LOVE THIS STINKING COUNTRY. I WOULD DIE FOR IT. BUT I HAVE TO KNOW WHY. I'LL GO TO LONDON."

13. IN THE CAR ON THE WAY BACK TO THE EMBASSY, SHARIFI SAID THAT HE HAD WANTED TO TRY ONE MORE TIME. HE WOULD BE GOING TO THE U.S. SOON. HE WAS THINKING OF GETTING MARRIED. WOULD HIS WIFE BE ABLE TO GET HER GREEN CARD SINCE HE ALREADY HAD HIS? HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO GET SOME MONEY OUT OF IRAN -- "THERE ARE WAYS," HE SAID. HIS UNCLE WANTED TO OPEN A DISCOTHEQUE IN PARIS, AND HE MIGHT PUT SOME OF HIS OWN MONEY IN IT. IT WAS IN A GOOD AREA. A LOT OF APARTMENTS WITH YOUNG PEOPLE. HE HAD SEVERAL HAND GUNS AT HOME. HE OFTEN GOT THEM OUT, POLISHED THEM, RAN HIS HAND OVER THEM, THOUGHT HOW EASY IT WOULD BE TO USE THEM, BANG, ONE MULLAH, BANG, BANG, ONE IMAM. HE WOULD PROBABLY LEAVE WITHIN A WEEK FOR WASHINGTON. "BUT," HE INSISTED, "THE MINUTE THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE SITUATION HERE I'LL CATCH THE FIRST PLANE BACK TO THIS CRUMMY PLACE, THIS DUMP. DREAM ON, WALTER, DREAM ON. NAAS

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S E C R E T TEHRAN 0598/3

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S E C R E T //LIMDIS// TEHRAN 9897

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S E C R E T TEHRAN 09897

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 9/9/79
APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH
DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL CHG OR

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-4 9/9/99 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT:IRANIAN PLOTTERS

REF: TEHRAN 5980 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING LUNCHEON SEPTEMBER 6 WITH IRANIAN BUSINESSMAN FRIEND, POLOFF WAS ASKED IF USG WAS IN ANY WAY SUPPORTING FIROUZ SHARIFI IN HIS ATTEMPTS TO PUT TOGETHER A COALITION TO TAKE OVER THE PGOI. IRANIAN BUSINESSMAN SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN CALLED TO ONE OF HIS UNCLE'S HOUSES THE PREVIOUS NIGHT TO MEET "SOMEONE WHO MIGHT BE INTERESTING." THE INTERESTING FRIEND TURNED OUT TO BE FIROUZ SHARIFI WHO OVER THE COURSE OF AN INFORMAL EVENING APPARENTLY INFORMED THE GUESTS THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE AMERICANS TO FORM A GROUP TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT. SHARIFI WAS APPARENTLY LEAVING FOR PARIS IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS TO MEET WITH VARIOUS EXILE GROUPS THERE. BUSINESSMAN SAID THAT TWO OTHER BAKHTIAR CONNECTED INDIVIDUALS HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM PARIS AND ALSO ATTENDED THE GATHERING.

3. IN A CONVERSATION THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH BUSINESSMAN, POLOFF INFORMED BUSINESSMAN THAT POLITICAL COUNSELLOR TOMSETH HAD MET WITH SHARIFI, (REFTEL) THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR US ASSISTANCE AND THAT HIS REQUEST HAD BEEN REFUSED. POLOFF SAID WE FOUND SHARIFI'S ASSOCIATION OF US WITH HIS PLANS VERY DISTURBING. TOMSETH
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S E C R E T //LIMDIS// TEHRAN 9897

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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 28741

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 9/12/99 (CHAPMAN, CHRISTIAN) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJ: CONTACT WITH IRANIAN EXILES

REF: A) TEHRAN 9850 B) TEHRAN 9897 C) PARIS 25005

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE READ WITH INTEREST EMBASSY TEHRAN'S ANALYSIS (REF A) OF THE LIMITED ROLE POLITICAL EXILES IN FRANCE AND ELSEWHERE ARE LIKELY TO PLAY IN BRINGING ABOUT POLITICAL CHANGE IN IRAN. AS FOR FIROUZ SHARIFI (REF B), SHOULD HE ATTEMPT TO CONTACT THE EMBASSY WE WILL TREAT HIS APPROACH WITH EXTREME RESERVE IN VIEW OF HIS CLAIMS OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR HIS PLANS.

3. SINCE FRANCE HAS NOW BECOME A MAJOR CENTER OF IRANIAN ANTI-REGIME EXILE ACTIVITY (NO MATTER HOW INEFFECTIVE) WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE THE DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE TO OFFER ON HANDLING CONTACTS WITH EXILES. IN THIS REGARD, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A RESPONSE TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTION POSED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF REF C WHETHER WE SHOULD MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH NAHAVANDI.
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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978-258-344

Manouchehr Ganji

Ganji, the minister of education and training of the Shah's regime and a kin to the wife of the deceased Shah, in his meeting with the man responsible for the Iran affairs, in the State Department, alleges that for sometimes after the victory of the Revolution he was living with his relatives in Tehran and nobody came to arrest him. Later on, he fled the country via Turkish border.

State Department in May-June 1979 learns from a friend of his that Ganji is living in hiding in the U.S.A. and reflects the news to the U.S. embassy in Tehran as the moderates against the Islamic Revolution.

Ganji in his meeting in July, appeals to the American for intervention in Iran.

In response to the U.S. official who wants to know what the U.S. should do then, Ganji says *"We should look for someone to back who would protect our interests when Khomeini inevitably lost power in the next six month, one year or two years, when the U.S. official said that "none of the groups we could identify seemed to have any real organization, support or promise", Ganji points out Shariatmadary and another, person.*

No more information indicating Ganjis' subsequent contacts with the U.S. officials, is available. However, his explicit political activities, in America is a clear evidence of the U.S. support for Ganji and his activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

Manuchehr GANJI, Minister for Education

Manuchehr Ganji, 45, was appointed Minister of Education in November 1976. Following secondary school in Tehran he obtained BA and MA degrees in political science from the University of Kentucky, an international law diploma from Cambridge University and a Ph.D. from the University of Geneva. He remained in Geneva, working for the UN Secretariat until his return to Iran in 1966. He then joined the law faculty at Tehran University and became the first secretary-general of the Center for International Studies. In 1967 he was appointed alternate to GOI delegate Princess Ashraf at the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC). In his capacity as Special Rapporteur for the Commission, he produced a lengthy study on human rights aspects of apartheid. The report, heavily critical of Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal, reaped considerable publicity in Iran and led to a refusal by the Portuguese government to allow him to visit Portuguese African territories. In 1969 he became dean of the Faculty of Law at Tehran University; in that year he was also named by the UNHRC to undertake a study of results of the 1968 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1974 he was appointed an advisor to the Prime Minister on overseas student affairs but retained his position on the UNHRC as well as his professorship of International Law. It is believed that despite his elevation to the cabinet, he will continue to serve on the UNHRC.

Ganji has traveled widely, including a 1973 visit to the PRC, and speaks English and French. His wife, Soraya, (distantly related to Farmanfarmaian family) is active in women's affairs. In addition to his UN reports, Ganji has published numerous articles and a textbook on international law.

Officers of the Embassy have had extensive contact with him throughout his career. A short man, he has been described as bright, ambitious, mature, hardworking, desiring power for both personal and philosophical reasons. While very friendly to Americans, Ganji vigorously defends Iranian positions and takes an independent stance in international affairs, concentrating on the problems of the lesser developed countries. He advanced with the support first of Ashraf and more recently of the Empress. He is a member of Farah's study group of bright technocrats and was an advisor to the Empress at recent international conferences on Iranian affairs.

Reappointed Min for Ed + Science Aug 77

Dr. Ganji

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LIMDIS

E.O. 12065GDS (6/6/85, FRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINS, PORS, IR

SUBJECT: MODERATES AGAINST ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

REF: TEHRAN 5857

WASHINGTON FRIEND OF MANOUCHER GANJI CONFIRMS THAT HE IS IN THE U.S. AND IS LYING LOW. VANCE
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Ganji, Manoucher

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Manoucher Ganji, Former Iranian Minister of Education
Mr. Henry Precht, Director, Office of Iranian Affairs

DATE: June 28, 1979

SUBJECT: CONDITIONS IN IRAN

Mr. Ganji came to see me as prearranged by Ambassador Yost, his former host at the Aspen Institute. Ganji had been in hiding since February in Tehran and had recently walked across the Turkish border. He had stayed with relatives in Tehran, but no one had come looking for him.

Ganji's experience on the border had convinced him as much as his time in Tehran that Iran is headed for serious trouble In the villages he visited in the Kurdish area he had reports of weapons being smuggled into the country. His host in one village was an open supporter of the Tudeh Party who introduced Ganji as a delegate from East Germany. Ganji thought that the Kurds, the Arabs and the Left were gaining strength, the latter particularly in the armed forces.

In these circumstances and from a geopolitical standpoint the U.S. should "do something". Asked what we should do, he said we should look for someone to back who would protect our interests when Khomeini inevitably lost power in the next six months, one year or two years. When I said that none of the groups we could identify seemed to have any real organization, support or promise, Ganji said there were such people. He listed Shariat-Madari and General Farbod, Chief of Staff of the Army, whom he knew to be sympathetic to the U.S. and strongly anti-communist. If the U.S. did not have its supporters in place in Iran, the game would be won by Leftist elements (who had always been strong in a quiet way in the military) or by the Pasdaran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, that Khomeini's supporters were creating.

Ganji characterized the Bazargan Government as being decent but utterly weak. Many people who admired him thought Bazargan should have resigned in March. Ganji had no ideas about who might have succeeded him, however. He thought

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that Yazdi remained a man of influence but suggested that we also watch Dr. Chamran, an Iranian who had lived in exile in Lebanon and who was more intelligent and more eloquent than any of the present leadership.

Ganji discounted completely the Shah's support in Iran, but thought that the Crown Prince had a 20-30% chance of returning after a reaction had set in. Ganji said he was in touch with the circle of civil servants and other professionals that he had created in his days as a special advisor to the Queen. These were men of liberal persuasion who wanted decent government in Iran and who had been opposed to the Shah from within the system. A number of them now held positions in the PGOI. They were quite unhappy with the hard line religious influence being exercised over Iranian affairs.

The men in his circle had reported to him earlier the many things that were wrong with the Shah's government. He had relayed this information to the Queen but the Queen had been unable to change the Shah's practices because of the latter's arrogance and his insecurity. The Shah simply would not move against individuals who were important to him no matter how corrupt they had been.

Last summer the Queen had told Ganji that the Americans wanted the Pahlavis to leave Iran. Ganji believed that we had ordered the Shah out in January, telling him it would be "in his interest" for him to go. I disputed this strongly but he said it was true that the message had come from Washington probably through General Huyser. Ganji said he had told the Shah in late November of the extensive corruption of the Royal Family and the need to do something about it. The Shah had told him to report it to his subordinate, General Fardust, and the matter had died there. That had always been the way the system had worked. Everyone was afraid to act against the wrongdoers, particularly those in the Royal Family. The Americans had a special responsibility because we had installed and maintained the Shah and had an obligation to see that he ran a decent government.

I asked Ganji whether he thought it would be wise for the Shah to come to this country. He said he thought it would be a mistake. He asked whether the Crown Prince might not come here. I said I thought it could be managed if he wanted to attend a university, but that I thought it would be

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extremely difficult for him in terms of the desire of a young man to lead a normal life. There would be serious security and legal problems. I supposed that would be true anywhere, but knowing how the Crown Prince behaved, I thought he would find it intolerable to have tight security in the U.S. In political terms I thought his coming to the U.S. in the months ahead might be manageable. In fact I thought it entirely proper that the Shah himself should come here at a later date but that we needed time now to rebuild our position in Iran and the Shah needed time to let passions cool. I questioned if the Crown Prince had any hope of playing a political role whether a stay in the U.S. would do him any good. Ganji agreed that Iranians tended to honor a person who was having a hard time and that the Crown Prince's fortunes would be enhanced if he remained a homeless exile.

Ganji commented that the Shah was said to have carried a lot of money out of Iran. He thought it possible that the Shah had taken the enormous sums attributed to him by the Iranian Government; if so, he was "quite a thief". Ganji himself had stayed in Iran after the revolution in order to clear his name of having taken money out of the country. He said that had been done by the public prosecutor. Nevertheless, he was still tarred by association with "the corrupt regime". Ganji said he had only $6,000 in the bank and was looking for a teaching job in the U.S. He might also write a book about the Shah's regime, indicating he would point out all of its faults.

Ganji's main argument which he repeated several times during the two-hour talk was that the U.S. should become active in Iran or the game would go by default. In this his argument was like so many others; it was also like so many others in not having specific remedies for the problem at hand.

NEA/IRN:HPrecht:hm
6/28/79

Distribution: ✓Amembassy, Tehran (POL)
NEA: Mr. Saunders
NSC: Capt. Sick
CIA:
P: Mr. Suddarth
INR: Mr. Griffin

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Freydon Afshar - Palizban

The remaining document narrates the direct contact of the U.S. officials with those who were (explicitly) absolutely known as a "conspirator".

Ferydon Afshar was a professor who had studied in the U.S. He was a representative in a parliament session during Shah's regime. Following the telephone contacts, he talked about the U.S. support in his meeting with the political advisors of the U.S. embassy in September 1979. He asked for the U.S. support in order to run a millitary organization in Azarbayejan to overthrow the newly established revolutionary government. (As far as his success (Afshar's) was concerned, the U.S. response was more or less similar to the others. But in comparison with the others, it seemed that they had accounted on Afshar and prefered him to other military men, who fled the country, high rank aristocrates and stupid youngmen.

The second document was the result of discussing with Jahanshah Palizban, brother of the Palizban, who informed American officials from his illegal exit from the country. Jahanshah Palizban also talked about his brother whom at that time there was a large propaganda about his anti-revolutionay activities.

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LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-4 8/13/99 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN CREATING IRREGULAR MILITARY FORCE OPPOSED TO THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT

1 (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: FREYDOUN AFSHAR APPEALED TO POLCOUNS AUGUST 8 FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE IN ORGANIZING A MILITARY FORCE IN AZARBAIJAN WHICH WOULD BE USED TO DRIVE THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT FROM POWER. POLCOUNS REJECTED THE REQUEST, POINTING OUT IT IS U.S. POLICY NOT TO INTERFERE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. AFSHAR SAID HE ANTICIPATED RESPONSE, BUT WOULD GO AHEAD WITH PLANS ANYWAY. END SUMMARY.

3. ON AUGUST 8 FREYDOUN AFSHAR TWICE CALLED CHARGE TO REQUEST AN APPOINTMENT. CHARGE THOUGHT AFSHAR MIGHT BE THE "FARID" RAMSEY CLARK LAW PARTNER LEVINE HAD TOLD HIM SEVERAL WEEKS EARLIER WOULD CONTACT HIM REGARDING TREATMENT OF JEWS IN IRAN. TO BE ON THE SAFE SIDE, HOWEVER, CHARGE DISPATCHED POLCOUNS TO MEET AFSHAR AND DETERMINE HIS BUSINESS. AS IT TURNED OUT, AFSHAR HAD FAR DIFFERENT MATTERS THAN IRANIAN JEWS ON HIS MIND. HE TOLD POLCOUNS THAT HE HAD BEEN EDUCATED IN MISSION SCHOOLS IN URUMIEH AND TABRIZ AND THEN HAD ATTENDED SEVERAL UNIVERSITIES IN THE U.S. (IDAHO, OKLAHOMA, YALE, CHICAGO AND JOHNS HOPKINS), ULTIMATELY RECEIVING A PH.D. IN GEOLOGY. HE ALSO DID A STINT AT IRANIAN MILITARY ACADEMY BETWEEN COMPLETION OF HIS B.SC. AND RETURNING TO THE U.S. FOR GRADUATE WORK. WHEN OIL WAS NATIONALIZED IN IRAN, AFSHAR WAS CALLED HOME FROM A JOB AT THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTE TO HELP IN EFFORTS TO LOCATE FIELDS OUTSIDE THE BP CONCESSION AREA. HE WAS INVOLVED IN BRINGING IN THE FIRST PRODUCTIVE WELL IN THE QOM FIELD. LATER, HE WENT TO WORK AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY, AND IN 1956 WAS ELECTED TO THE MAJLES FROM URUMIEH (THEN KNOWN AS REZAIEH). HE BECAME DISILLUSIONED WITH POLITICS, HOWEVER, AND DID NOT RUN AGAIN IN 1961, PREFERRING INSTEAD TO TEACH AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY.

4. PEOPLE LIKE HIMSELF, AFSHAR SAID, WHILE NEVER HAPPY ABOUT THE SHAH, WERE ABSOLUTELY FED UP WITH THE MESS OF THINGS THE MULLAHS WERE MAKING IN IRAN. THEY SIMPLY COULD NOT RUN A MODERN ECONOMY. HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM URUMIEH, HE SAID, WHERE HE HAD BEEN A WITNESS TO SOME OF THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN

KURDS AT SEHO AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES. THE KURDS, HE CLAIMED, WERE IN FULL CONTROL OF THE AREA ALONG THE TURKISH AND IRAQI BORDER. THEY HAD TAKEN OVER SIX GENDARMERIE STATIONS ALMOST WITHOUT RESISTANCE AND HAD LOOTED THE PASDARAN SENT FROM URUMIEH TO RECAPTURE THEM. THE PASDARAN, HE SAID, ARE UNTRAINED AND UNDISCIPLINED AND NO MATCH FOR EVEN THE KURDS WHO ARE NOT PARTICULARLY WELL-ORGANIZED THEMSELVES. THE ARMY IN URUMIEH REFUSES TO FIGHT.

5. SUCH CONDITIONS, AFSHAR SAID, ARE IDEAL FOR WHAT HE PROPOSED TO DO. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE EASY TO RECRUIT A FORCE OF 20,000 TO 30,000 MEN IN AZARBAIJAN, ARM AND TRAIN THEM IN THE NO-MAN'S LAND ALONG THE TURKISH BORDER, AND THEN TAKE OVER NORTHWESTERN IRAN. THERE ARE 18 MILLION TURKS IN IRAN, AFSHAR SAID, INCLUDING THE 16 MILLION AZARIS STRETCHING FROM AZARBAIJAN ITSELF TO THE HEART OF TEHRAN AND ANOTHER TWO MILLION TURKOMAN AND QHASHQHAI TRIBESMEN IN THE NORTHEAST AND SOUTH, RESPECTIVELY. THERE ARE NO MORE THAN NINE OR TEN MILLION ETHNIC PERSIANS, ALL CONCENTRATED ON THE RIM OF THE GREAT BASIN OF CENTRAL IRAN, HAVING BEEN DRIVEN THERE BY THE MORE MARTIAL TURKS, KURDS, ARABS, AND BALUCHIS SURROUNDING THEM ON IRAN'S PERIPHERY. IT IS ONLY AMONG THE PERSIANS THAT THE ULEMA HAVE THEIR STRENGTH. IF THE TURKS TAKE THE LEAD IN CAPTURING THE NORTHWEST AND TEHRAN, THE OTHER NON-PERSIAN MINORITIES WOULD JOIN IN OUSTING THE CLERICS IN THE REST OF THE COUNTRY.

6. AFSHAR FRANKLY ADMITTED THAT HE NEEDED HELP IN CARRYING OUT HIS PLAN. IT WOULD TAKE AT LEAST MONEY TO GET STARTED. ASSISTANCE WITH WEAPONS AND TRAINING WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL. MANY TURKS HAVE LIGHT HAIR AND BLUE EYES, HE SAID, SO IT WOULD NOT DRAW UNDUE ATTENTION IF A FEW FOREIGN ADVISORS WERE PROVIDING INSTRUCTIONS. THE LACK OF ANY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL IN THE AZARBAIJAN BORDER AREA WITH TURKEY MADE IT UNLIKELY THERE WOULD BE SOMEONE TO DETECT THEM IN ANY EVENT. HE HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD SEE THE ADVANTAGE OF SUPPORTING SOMEONE LIKE HIMSELF. "I WAS EDUCATED IN YOUR SCHOOLS," HE SAID. "I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU BELIEVE IN AND I BELIEVE IN IT
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MYSELF." THE REAL DANGER IN ALLOWING THE ISLAMIC GROUP TO CONTINUE TO BOTCH THINGS WAS NOT THAT THE IRANIAN LEFT WOULD ULTIMATELY THROW THEM OUT AND TAKE POWER. MARXISM HAS LITTLE APPEAL TO IRANIANS, HE SAID. RATHER, CONTINUING CHAOS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIETS TO INTERVENE, SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE FAR MORE DANGEROUS TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD THAN A BUNCH OF IRANIAN LEFTISTS SITTING IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE.

7. POLCOUNS SAID THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT SUPPORT AFSHAR'S PROPOSAL. IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO U.S. POLICY OF NOT INTERFERING IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS TO DO SO. HE SAID THAT IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIETNAM AND WATERGATE FOREIGN ADVENTURES SIMPLY WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. AFSHAR SAID THAT HE ANTICIPATED POLCOUNS ANSWER, BUT THAT HE HAD THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT AT LEAST TO TRY TO CONVINCE HIM OF THE WORTHINESS OF HIS PLAN. HE WOULD PURSUE IT IN ANY EVENT.

8. COMMENT: AFSHAR WAS THE MOST IMPRESSIVE OF THE "CONSPIRATORS" WITH WHOM POLCOUNS HAS MET. HE IS A SCIENTIST BY TRAINING AND A MAN WHO HAS SPENT HIS LIFE LOOKING AT PROBLEMS IN OBJECTIVE TERMS. AS SUCH, HE FINDS THE LACK OF ORDER AND THE OFTEN APPARENT IRRATIONALITY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OFFENSIVE TO BOTH HIS SENSIBILITIES AND PERSONAL VALUES. HE DOES NOT STRIKE ONE AS THE SORT OF PERSON WHO HAS COME TO HIS DECISION TO ORGANIZE AN ARMY FOR THE PURPOSE OF OVERTHROWING THE EXISTING ORDER ON THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT. HE APPEARS TO HAVE CAREFULLY CALCULATED HIS ENEMY'S WEAKNESSES. WHETHER OR NOT HE HAS THE ABILITY TO ORGANIZE THE KIND OF FORCE HE PROPOSES IS PROBLEMATIC. BUT IF AND WHEN SUCH A FORCE IS ORGANIZED, IT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE DONE BY SOMEONE LIKE AFSHAR THAN ONE OF THE PERSIAN MILITARY PEACOCKS WHOSE WILL FAILED THEM IN FEBRUARY OR UPPER CLASS DILETTANTES WHO PLOT FROM PARIS OR LOS ANGELES OR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ADOLESCENTS WHO STREAK AROUND TEHRAN'S BACK STREETS IN THEIR BMW'S AND FOR WHOM CONSPIRACY IS A GAME. LAINGEN
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: AUGUST 26, 1979

REPLY TO ATTN OF: MICHAEL J. METRINKO - POL

SUBJECT: PRESENT STATUS OF THE PALIZBAN FAMILY

TO: THE FILES

I SPENT THE EVENING OF 12 AUGUST AND ABOUT TWO HOURS ON 23 AUGUST TALKING TO JAHANSHAH PALIZBAN, BROTHER OF GENERAL EIZATOLLAH PALIZBAN. THE PUBLICITY SURROUNDING THE GENERAL'S ALLEGED ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES HAS HAD SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES ON THE WELFARE OF FAMILY MEMBERS STILL LIVING IN IRAN, AND JAHANSHAH PALIZBAN DESCRIBED THE STATUS OF VARIOUS PALIZBAN RELATIVES AS FOLLOWS:

GEN. PALIZBAN'S PARENTS - ON 21 AUGUST COMMITTEE GUARDSMEN IN KERMANSHAH RAIDED THE HOUSE OF THE GENERAL'S PARENTS IN KERMANSHAH. THE FATHER, WHO IS 95 YEARS OLD AND IN POOR HEALTH, HAS BEEN ARRESTED. ACCORDING TO STORIES JAHANSHAH HEARD FROM OTHERS IN KERMANSHAH, HIS FATHER OPENED FIRE ON THE COMMITTEE GUARDS WHEN THEY TRIED TO FORCE ENTRY INTO THE OLD MAN'S HOUSE. JAHANSHAH SUSPECTS THE STORY MAY BE TRUE, SINCE IT WOULD BE LIKE HIS FATHER TO RESIST ARREST IN THIS MANNER. THE GENERAL'S MOTHER HAS DISAPPEARED, AS HAS ONE OLDER SISTER WHO LIVED WITH THE PARENTS, AND THE HOUSE IS NOW IN COMMITTEE HANDS. AS OF 23 AUGUST, JAHANSHAH CLAIMED HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE HIS MOTHER AND SISTER WERE, BUT BELIEVED THEY WERE SAFE.

GEN. PALIZBAN'S SISTER - ONE SISTER WAS A FORMER FARMANDAR (CITY GOVERNOR) OF MASHAD, AND MARRIED TO GENERAL EMANI, HEAD OF THE MASHAD POLICE. THE GENERAL WAS EXECUTED AFTER THE REVOLUTION, AND PALIZBAN'S SISTER IS NOW IN HIDING. ACCORDING TO JAHANSHAH, ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THIS SISTER TO DEPART IRAN SECRETLY, AND SHE WILL MAKE HER WAY TO EITHER ENGLAND (WHERE SHE HAS A HOUSE) OR TO WEST GERMANY, WHERE SHE HAS AN ELDERLY AUNT WITH WHOM SHE CAN STAY. ONE OF THIS SISTER'S SONS WAS A NAVY CADET, BUT HAS RESIGNED SINCE THE REVOLUTION. HE WAS HELPED IN THIS BY ADMIRAL MADANI (NAVY CHIEF AND PRESENTLY GOVERNOR GENERAL OF KHUZESTAN PROVINCE) WHO IS APPARENTLY A FAMILY FRIEND. THIS SON AND OTHER CHILDREN OF GEN. EMANI WILL BE LEAVING IRAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

JAHANSHAH PALIZBAN - JAHANSHAH'S WIFE AND CHILDREN LEFT IRAN SHORTLY AFTER THE REVOLUTON AND ARE NOW IN THE USA. HIS EXTENSIVE FARMLANDS IN THE HAMEDAN AREA WERE SEIZED LAST WEEK,

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AND HIS OVERSEER, A DISTANT RELATIVE WHO IS ABOUT 30 YEARS OLD, HAS BEEN JAILED IN HAMEDAN. SHORTLY AFTER THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION, THE HAMEDAN ESTATE HAD BEEN OCCUPIED BY SQUATTERS, BUT JAHANSHAH WAS ABLE TO REGAIN THE LAND THROUGH HIS OWN CONTACTS WITH THE LOCAL COMMITTEE, SINCE HE HIMSELF WAS NOT UNDER SUSPICION AT THE TIME. THE ESTATE CROPS WERE HARVESTED NORMALLY, AND THE HARVEST WAS SOLD TO THE KERMANSHAH AGRICULTURAL OFFICE. RECENTLY, HOWEVER, THE HEAD OF THE KERMANSHAH OFFICE HAD REFUSED TO MAKE ANY PAYMENT TO JAHANSHAH, CLAIMING HE "WOULD NOT PAY MONEY TO A PALIZBAN." JAHANSHAH WAS TRYING TO FOLLOW THIS UP WHEN HIS OWN STATUS SUDDENLY BECAME UNCLEAR. KERMANSHAH NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED HIS NAME DURING THE SECOND WEEK OF AUGUST AND ASKED ANYONE WHO HAD A COMPLAINT AGAINST HIM TO PRESENT IT TO THE KERMANSHAH REVOLUTINARY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE. PRIOR TO THAT TIME, THE ONLY TROUBLE JAHANSHAH HAD EXPERIENCED AT COMMITTEE HANDS WAS TWO SHORT INTERROGATION SESSIONS IN TEHRAN. HE DESCRIBED THE SESSIONS AS "POLITE AND EVEN FRIENDLY". THE INTERROGATORS WERE ONLY INTERESTED IN HIS BROTHER, THE GENERAL'S, WHEREABOUTS.

JAHANSHAH PALIZBAN HAD NOT BEEN FORBIDDEN TO LEAVE IRAN AND HAD PLANNED TO DEPART FOR THE USA ON 25 AUGUST. ON AUGUST 22, HOWEVER, HE WAS CALLED BY A FRIEND WHO LIVES NEAR HIS TEHRAN RESIDENCE AND TOLD NOT TO RETURN TO THE APARTMENT, SINCE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS HAD JUST ENTERED IT TO LOOK FOR HIM. WHEN I SAW JAHANSHAH ON 23 AUGUST, HE WAS OSTENSIBLY "IN HIDING." HIS PASSPORT WAS ALREADY AT THE AIRPORT WAITING TO BE PICKED UP PRIOR TO HIS FLIGHT, BUT JAHANSHAH SUSPECTED THAT IF HE TRIED TO DEPART IRAN VIA MEHRABAD AIRPORT, HE WOULD BE DETAINED AND ARRESTED. HE WAS TRYING TO DECIDE ON A COURSE OF ACTION, AND HIS ALTERNATIVES WERE: 1) ESCAPE FROM IRAN OVER THE KURDISH BORDER, 2) TRY TO USE HIS AIRPLANE TICKET AND RISK ARREST, OR 3) INTRODUCE HIMSELF TO THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE IN TEHRAN, PREFERABLY AFTER HAVING ONE OF THE AYATOLLAHS INTERCEDE FOR HIM.

GEN. PALIZBAN, HIS WIFE, AND CHILDREN - ACCORDING TO JAHANSHAH, THE GENERAL'S WIFE WAS SAFE, BUT HE HEDGED ON DETAILS OF HER WHEREABOUTS. "TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES", HE SAID, "SHE WAS OUT OF IRAN." THE GENERAL'S SON-IN-LAW HAD BEEN PICKED UP BY COMMITTEE GUARDS AFTER THE REVOLUTION, AND WAS HELD IN PRISON FOR ABOUT THREE WEEKS WHILE HE WAS GRILLED ABOUT THE GENERAL'S WHEREABOUTS. ONE SON (ANOUSHEREVAN) IS AT SCHOOL IN CALIFORNIA. ANOTHER SON WHO HAD BEEN A STUDENT AT THE AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL IN KERMANSHAH WAS ALSO PICKED UP AFTER THE REVOLUTION, BUT IS APPARENTLY SAFE NOW. JAHANSHAH AT FIRST CLAIMED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE HIS BROTHER WAS, BUT THEN IMPLIED THAT HE MIGHT STILL BE IN THE KURDISH AREA OF IRAN.

DURING WORLD WAR II, HE SAID, HIS BROTHER MANAGED TO EVADE ENEMY FORCES FOR A FULL SIX MONTHS THROUGH HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KURDISH AREAS, AND WAS NEVER FOUND BY AUTHORITIES AT THE TIME. SINCE THEN HE HAS HAD A CHANCE TO DEVELOP EXTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH PEOPLE IN THE AREA, AND HAS HAD VERY VALUABLE EXPERIENCE WITH IRANIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, SO FINDING HIM SHOULD BE NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE.

DRAFTER: M.J. METRINKO

CC: CHARGE
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